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INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty-five years, family law has become increasingly
privatized. In virtually all doctrinal areas, private norm creation and
private decision making have supplanted state-imposed rules and
structures for governing family-related behavior. This preference for
private over public ordering has encompassed both the substantive legal
doctrines governing family relations and the preferred procedures for
resolving family law disputes.'
1.
Recent historical scholarship suggests that this process of privatization may
represent an acceleration and intensification of trends that began as far back as the late
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The no-fault divorce revolution is perhaps the most obvious example
of this privatization process. Under the fault-based divorce system, the
state determined when and whether a couple could divorce. ,If a spouse

seeking divorce failed to establish one of the state-sanctioned grounds for
terminating a marriage, she could not legally end her union, even if both
she and her partner desired to do so. Under the current no-fault system,
by contrast, the spouses themselves-and often one spouse acting
unilaterally-can choose whether and when to terminate a marriage.
Divorcing couples today also have considerably more freedom than ever

before to determine privately the financial and parenting consequences of
their marital dissolution.
The no-fault divorce revolution is highly significant in and of itself.2
It is also emblematic of a much larger revolution in family law-the
transformation from public to private ordering of behavior. This Article
seeks to, explain and critique that larger family law revolution. Part I of
the Article will trace the privatization process in four areas of family law:
marriage and consensual alternatives to marriage; divorce and its financial

consequences; adoption and surrogate parenting; and the rise of mediation
as a preferred means for resolving divorce and custody disputes.
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

See generally MICHAEL GROSSBERO,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

3-30, 304-307 (1985).
2.
A plethora of recent studies establish that no-fault divorce results in severe
economic dislocation for many women and children. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the

FinanciallyDependent Spouse in Montgomery County, Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 284
(1988); Robert E. McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath,
20 J. FAM. L. 443 (1981-82); James B. McLindon, SeparateBut Unequal: The Economic
Disasterof Divorce For Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987); Barbara R.
Rowe & Alice M. Morrow, The Economic Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After 10
or More Years of Marriage, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 463 (1988); Barbara R. Rowe &
Jean M. Lown, The Economics of Divorce and Remarriagefor Rural Utah Families, 16
J. CONTEMP. L. 301 (1990); Charles E. Welch III & Sharon Price-Bonham, A Decade of
No-fault Divorce Revisited: California, Georgia, and Washington, 45 J. MARRIAOE &
FAM. 411 (1983); Heather R. Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20
FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986). While it is questionable whether women fared better economically
under the old fault-based divorce system, it is clear that the current no-fault system does
not adequately or equitably meet their needs. See generally Jana B. Singer, Divorce
Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989). Cf. Stephen D. Sugarman,
Dividing FinancialInterests at Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130-65
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna H. Kay eds., 1990) (questioning whether women are
importantly worse off under California's no-fault system than they were under the prior
fault regime, but acknowledging that divorced women fare considerably poorer than men
under both regimes).
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Part II of the Article will set privatization in its larger context by
relating the privatization of family law to doctrinal and jurisprudential
developments in a number of other areas. This examination is designed
to highlight the connections between the legal doctrines and theories
governing family relationships and the development of legal principles in
areas that have traditionally been viewed as unrelated to family law.
Among the connected legal phenomena that this Part examines are the
migration from constitutional to family law of liberal notions of privacy
and individual autonomy; the rejection of traditional gender roles and the
push for formal gender equality; the rise of law and economics analysis
and the application of economic thinking to the family; and the increased
dissociation of law and morality in the family context.
Exploring the relationship between these developments and the
privatization of family law also provides a useful vantage point for
evaluating the privatization process, a task I take up in Part III of the
Article. This Part examines briefly both the benefits of a more privatelyordered family law regime and its potential dangers. The examination
suggests that privatization may be particularly useful as a sort of transition
strategy-a way of moving from an outdated and unjust public law regime
to a system whose publicly-imposed constraints more accurately reflect
social reality and more fairly distribute the benefits and burdens of family
life.
I. THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
A. Marriage and Consensual Alternatives to Marriage
Traditionally, the legal principles governing marriage and consensual
alternatives to marriage reflected a strong preference in favor of public
ordering of behavior. First, and perhaps most important, the law
distinguished sharply between marriage and other intimate relationships
and used marriage or marital status as a criteria for allocating a wide
variety of public benefits and burdens. Second, the state, and not
individual marriage partners, determined many of the consequences of
marital status, particularly the legal and economic relationship between
spouses. Third, the law prescribed certain premarital procedures for
entering into a valid formal union. Fourth, the law controlled entry into
marriage by restricting who could marry whom.
In each of these four areas, the state has ceded some of its traditional
authority, in favor of increased private ordering of behavior. Most
strikingly, the sharp legal line between marriage and nonmarriage has
become increasingly blurred, as the state has extended to nonmarried
persons many of the benefits that it traditionally reserved for married
couples. At the same time, the law has accorded individual spouses a
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substantial degree of authority to define the terms of their relationship and
* has ceased to view marriage as a critical determinant of an individual's
legal status. The law governing the marriage process also reflects an
increased role for private ordering. Although the state still regulates
entry into marriage, parties contemplating matrimony today have
considerably more choice about who they will marry and what premarital
procedures they will follow than did their counterparts a generation ago.
1. THE BREAKDOWN OF DISTINCTIONS BASED ON MARITAL STATUS

Perhaps the most significant way the law traditionally regulated
intimate behavior was by distinguishing sharply, in virtually all important
contexts, between married persons and persons in nonmarital intimate
relationships. Through laws criminalizing adultery, fornication and
nonmarital cohabitation, the law carved out marriage as the only
legitimate arena for sexual intercourse. Tort causes of action for
enticement, alienation of affections and criminal conversation penalized
third parties who intentionally interfered with the marriage relationship;3
loss of consortium claims protected husbands (and later wives) against
those who negligently impaired marital relations. 4 No similar doctrines
protected nonmarital intimate relationships from deliberate or negligent
third party impairment.5
An elaborate network of statutes and common law doctrines also
distinguished sharply between children born within marriage and those
born outside of it. As one family historian explained, "[t]he law used
matrimony to separate legal from spurious issue. It defined the latter as
'filiusnullius,' the child and heir of no one." 6 Although reform efforts
during the nineteenth century resulted in the acknowledgment of some
legal ties between illegitimate children and their mothers, 7 twentieth
century legal doctrine continued to deny the connection between men and
their out-of-wedlock offspring, unless that connection was necessary to
protect the public purse.8 Similarly, state and federal programs designed
3.
See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 261-69 (1968). Intentional interference in the parent-child relationship was also

actionable, via suits by parents for abduction, enticement and seduction of a daughter.
Id. at 269-72.

4.
Id. at 272-78.
5.
Courts today are still reluctant to apply these doctrines to nonmarital intimate
relationships. See infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
6.

GROSSBERG, supra note 1, at 197.

7.

Id. at 207-15.

8.
Mary E. Becker, The Rights of Unwed Parents: Feminist Approaches, 63
SOC. SERv. REv. 496 (1989).
The legitimate child typically assumed her father's
surname, and she was entitled to his companionship and financial support; the illegitimate
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to compensate families for the death or disability of a wage-earner
typically excluded out-of-wedlock children as eligible beneficiaries. 9 A

major justification for these sharp distinctions between marital and
nonmarital children was to protect the exclusivity of the marital unit and
to punish adults (particularly women) who engaged in sex outside of

marriage. 0
A series of Supreme Court decisions between 1968 and 1983

eliminated as unconstitutional most of the categorical legal distinctions

between marital and nonmarital children."

These decisions explicitly

rejected the traditional notion that differential treatment of legitimate and

illegitimate offspring was justified as a way of encouraging matrimony
and of expressing society's "condemnation of irresponsible liaisons
beyond the bonds of marriage." 2 -A related series of Supreme Court
decisions established that unmarried fathers who develop a relationship
with their children must be given the same rights with respect to adoption
and custody decisions as are accorded to married fathers. 3 These
child was not. Similarly, the legitimate child would inherit from her father when he died
without a will and would inherit under a will leaving property to his "children"; the
illegitimate child would not. Id. at 497.
9.
See generally, HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEOITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
36-41 (1971); CLARK, supra note 3, at 178-80.
10.
Becker, supra note 8, at 497; see KRAUSE, supra note 9, at 73-78.
11.
Between 1968 and 1983, the Supreme Court decided more than 20 cases
involving statutory classifications based on illegitimacy. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462
U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S.
23 (1980); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Weinberger
v. Beatty, 418 U.S. 901 (1974), aff'g 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973); Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S.
619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S.
1069, aff'g 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 164, aff'g
342 F. Supp. 588 (D.C. Conn. 1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Labine
v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). For general discussion of these cases,
see Martha T. Zingo, Equal ProtectionFor Illegitimate Children: The Supreme Court's
Standard For Discrimination, 3 ANTIOCH L.J. 59 (1985); Raymond C. O'Brien,
Illegitimacy: Suggestions For Reform Following Mills v. Habuetzel, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J.
79 (1983); Earl M. Malz, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 831;
Robert L. Stenger, Expanding ConstitutionalRights of Illegitimate Children, 1968-1980,
19 J.FAM. L. 407 (1981).
12.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
13.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979). Unwed fathers who have not developed a parent-child relationship need not
be accorded such similar treatment. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1448 1992

1992:1443

Privatizationof Family Law

1449

judicial declarations were paralleled and reinforced by the Uniform
Parentage Act, promulgated in 1973 and approved by the American Bar
Association in 1974. The Act abandons the concept of legitimacy and

declares that "[t]he parent and child relationship extends equally to every
child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the par-

ents.""4
In reality, the economic and social circumstances of children born
outside of wedlock continue to be significantly more precarious than those
of their marital counterparts. 5 Moreover, some legal distinctions
between marital and nonmarital children continue to exist. But the legal
distinctions that remain are more likely to reflect the difficulties of

proving paternity than they are to demarcate a separate and unequal legal
status for children born outside of wedlock.16 As one commentator has
explained, the equalization of the legal status of legitimate and illegitimate

children has "gone far toward depriving formal marriage of one of its
traditionally most important effects, that of distinguishing the legitimate
family from all others." 17

Another way the law traditionally privileged marriage over
nonmarital intimate. relationships was by denying unmarried cohabitants
access to the judicial system for resolving financial disputes arising out of
their relationship. In particular, contracts between unmarried cohabitants
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1,978). In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a California statute that conclusively presumed
that a child born to a woman cohabiting with a fertile husband was a child of the'
marriage. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989) (amended 1990). The effect
of this statute in Michael H. was to deny a nonmarital father who had developed a
relationship with his biological child the opportunity to establish his paternity and thereby
to obtain parental prerogatives. The Court distinguished its earlier unwed father cases on
the ground that they did not involve a father who was seeking to obtain parental rights
over a child born into an extant marital union.
14.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 296(1987). Underthe Act, marriage
between the parents remains relevant as an important, but not exclusive, indicator of
paternity. Id. § 4, 9B U.L.A. 298.
15.
As of 1988, nearly one in every two female-headed families with children
lived in poverty compared to one in every twelve married-couple families. STAFF OF
SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN,

YOUTH AND

FAMILIEs,

100TH CONG.,

2D SESS.,

CHILDREN AND FAMILIES; DAY TRENDS IN THE 1980s, at 11 (Comm. Print 1988).
Nearly three-fifths of all children living in poverty live in a single-parent household.
Spencer Rich, The Many Unknowns of Child Poverty, WASH. POST, March 5, 1991, at
A19.
16.
See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (relying on "peculiar problems
of pr6of" in upholding New York intestate succession statute allowing illegitimate children
to inherit from their father only where there had been an adjudication of paternity before
the father's death).
17.

MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY 82 (1977).
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that related in any way to their sexual relationship were considered

unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 8 The rationale for this
traditional rule was that the law should not "lend its aid to either party to
a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration."19
Over the past fifteen years, this traditional rule has eroded
significantly.' The erosion began with the celebrated Marvin case, in
which an ex-cohabitant claimed that she had given up a promising acting
career in order to become a full-time homemaker and companion; in
return, she claimed, her unmarried partner had agreed to support her

financially for the rest of her life. 1 The California Supreme Court,

reversing the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, ruled that such an
agreement between unmarried cohabitants was enforceable unless it

explicitly stated that the consideration for one partner's financial support
was the other partner's meretricious sexual services.'

The mere

connection between an unmarried couple's sexual relationship and their
financial arrangements was no longer enough to invalidate their
cohabitation agreement. The Marvin court also suggested that, aside from

the plaintiff's contract claim, she might be entitled to a share of the
property accumulated during the couple's cohabitation relationship under
equitable theories such as constructive trust, quantum meruit and resulting
3

trust.2

In the decade that followed Marvin, courts in many states applied
both express and implied contract remedies to resolve disputes about
property and financial arrangements arising out of cohabitation relationships.' In doing so, courts largely abandoned public policy objections

to enforcing the private agreements of parties engaged in sexual relationships outside of marriage.'

18.

A few courts have reached beyond contract

HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES 18 (2d ed. 1988). [hereinafter CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS Il].

19.

Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ga. 1977) (emphasis added).
CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 18.
21.
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
22.
Id.at 114.
23.
Id. at 122-23. On remand in Marvin, the trial court found no contract had
been proved but awarded the plaintiff $104,000 for rehabilitation purposes to enable her
to retrain herself for the resumption of her career. Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 3077 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 1979); see CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra
note 18, at 18-19 n.6. The $104,000 award was reversed on appeal on the ground that
it was not within the issues framed by the pleadings in the case. Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106 (Cal. 1981).
24.
Carol S. Bruch, Cohabitation in the Common Law Countries a Decade After
20.

Marvin: Settled In or Moving Ahead?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 722 & n.19 (1989)

[hereinafter Bruch, Cohabitation].
25.
CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 18; Bruch, Cohabitation,
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in resolving cohabitation disputes, and have applied principles of

partnership law or have reasoned by analogy to state marital property
division statutes.'
Consistent with the modern emphasis on private
ordering, however, most courts have been unwilling to grant

nonagreement-based support rights to unmarried cohabitants or to extend
statutory divorce obligations, such as the payment of attorneys fees.'
Although courts have shown an increased willingness to enforce the

private commitments made by unmarried cohabitants to each other, they
have been somewhat more reluctant to expand the rights of unmarried
cohabitants vis-a-vis third parties.'
The California Supreme Court
recently refused to extend the logic of Marvin to support a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by an unmarried
cohabitant who had witnessed the tortious injury and death of his
partner. 9 Similarly, only a few courts have extended to nonmarital

partners the common-law right of a married person to recover for loss of
supra note 24, at 718.
26.
See, e.g., Carrol v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923 (Ariz. 1986) (implied partnership
agreement applied to jointly held property); Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872 (Miss.
1986) (analogy to common-law partnership applied without regard to title); Artiss v.
Artiss, 8 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2313 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5, 1982) ("ostensible family
relationship" of 24 years justified property division under express contract and, in equity,
by analogy to divorce statute's equitable distribution statutes upon an implied-in-fact
agreement); Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984) (applying a rule analogous
to that provided by statutes governing disposition of community property upon divorce).
27.
See, e.g., Maksuta v. Higson, 16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1530 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 12, 1990) (unmarried cohabitant not entitled to alimony or equitable
distribution of property); In re Freel, 448 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1989) (trial court lacked
authority to award visitation to former cohabitant of child's father); Tapley v. Tapley, 449
A.2d 1218, 1219 (N.H. 1982) (rejecting support claims by unmarried cohabitants not
based on express contract); Crowe v. DeGioin, 505 A.2d 591 (N.J. 1986) (denying
cohabitant's request for attorney's fees in her successful action to enforce an express
agreement for support). But cf. Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 17 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1559
(Or. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1991) (upholding application of equitable principles to divide
property accumulated during long term cohabitation relationship); Crowe v. DeGioin, 447
A.2d 173 (N.J. 1982) (upholding pendent lite support award to preserve the status quo
ante in a suit on allied express contract for support). See generally Bruch, Cohabitation,
supra note 24, at 729-30.
28.
For a general discussion of the ways in which the law disfavors unmarried
people (including, but not limited to, people in non-marital intimate relationships), see
Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of UnmarriedPeople in American Law,
30 ARIZ. L. REV. 207 (1988).
29.
Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988). Several courts have similarly
rejected attempts by unmarried cohabitants to invoke the testimonial privileges
traditionally afforded to spouses. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Witness Ms. X, 562 F.
Supp. 486 (D.C. Cal. 1983) (woman in "non-formalized marital relationship" cannot
invoke the marital privilege against testifying before a grand jury).
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a spouse's consortium, and each of these decisions has been brought into

question by later developments."
Unmarried cohabitants have also had mixed success in qualifying for
statutory benefits traditionally reserved for married couples. In some
situations, unmarried cohabitants have benefitted from federal and state
statutes, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which prohibit
discrimination based on marital status." In addition, at least one state
has explicitly amended its worker's compensation statute to provide relief
for the death of a nonmarital partner,32 and courts in several other states

have construed existing worker's compensation laws to provide statutory
benefits to dependent cohabitants. 3 Courts in other states, however,
have refused to extend such benefits to nonmarital partners, relying on a
30.
Bruch, Cohabitation,supra note 24, at 731. See Norman v. General Motors
Corp., 628 F. Supp. 702 (D. Nev. 1986); Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078
(D. N.J. 1980); Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503.(1983) (since overruled
by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988)). Bulloch and Norman were decided by
federal courts, applying what they thought the relevant state courts would hold to be the
law. In each instance, the prediction was inaccurate. See Elden, 758 P.2d at 589 n.7
(citing relevant contrary state court cases); Childers v. Stamton, 444 A.2d 1141 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). Many more courts have declined to extend consortium rights
to unmarried cohabitants. See, e.g., Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc. 732 P.2d 1021 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1987); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass. 1987); Chiesa
v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me.
1980); Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Sostock v. Reiss,
415 N.E.2d 1094 (11. App. Ct. 1980). See generally Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation,
Action for Loss of Consortium Based on Nonmarital Cohabitation, 40 A.L.R.4TH 553
(1988).
31.
See, e.g., Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (lender's refusal to aggregate the earnings of cohabitants who applied for a
home mortgage violates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's ban on discrimination based
on marital status); Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(police officer cannot be dismissed because of his refusal to answer questions about his
nonmarital relationship).
32.
OR. REV. STAT. § 656.226 (1989) (authorizing award to surviving de facto
spouse if cohabitation lasted at least one year and children of the relationship survive).
33.
See, e.g., Dep't of Indus. Relations v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,
156 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979) (death benefits awarded to cohabitant as "good faith member
of the family or household" of the deceased employee); Donovan v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1982) (homosexual relationship can
satisfy "good faith member of the family or household" requirement for workers'
compensation benefits); Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978)
(cohabitant was a "dependent family member" for purposes of worker's compensation
benefits); Parkinson v. J&S Tool Co., 313 A.2d 609 (N.J. 1974). Qf. Kempf v. State
Accident Ins. Fund, 580 P.2d 1032 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (statute permitting non-marital
partners to collect worker's compensation only if the non-marital relationship had resulted
in children did not deny equal protection by distinguishing between unmarried couples
with and without children).
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strict construction of statutory terms such as "spouse" and "family."
Courts have also reached inconsistent results on whether an unmarried
cohabitant who quits her job to relocate with her partner qualifies for
unemployment benefits that would be available to a spouse in similar
circumstances. 3
Despite these inconsistencies, the fact that courts today seriously
consider such claims for benefits by unmarried cohabitants constitutes a
significant departure from prior law. Like the judiciary's increased
willingness to resolve cohabitation disputes, and the demise of illegitimacy
as a legal category, these developments indicate that the once-sharp legal
line separating marriage from other consensual, intimate relationships has
blurred considerably. One commentator has even suggested that these
developments presage the "withering away" of marriage as a legal

concept.' While marriage is unlikely literally to wither away, it clearly
has lost its privileged legal status as the only legitimate arena for
intimacy, sex and procreation. Instead, marriage has become just one of
several permissible choices for individuals who wish to pursue an intimate
relationship within the framework of the law.

Other recent legal developments underscore the erosion of the
traditional distinctions between formal marriage and other consensual
adult unions. A small but growing number of municipalities now accord
legal recognition and a variety of employment-related benefits to

"domestic partnerships"-unmarried heterosexual or homosexual couples
who publicly register their relationship and pay a fee, procedures
substantially similar to the filing of marriage licenses.

7

A 1990 San

34.
See, e.g., Nieto v. Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(woman whose nonmarital partner was killed by police officer lacked standing to sue.
under state wrongful death statute); Powell v. Rogers, 496 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1975) (denying benefits under Longshoremen's and
Harborworkers' Compensation Act to woman who cohabited with decedent for 14 years
and bore three children with him); Crenshaw v. Indus. Comm'n, 712 P.2d 247 (Utah
1985) (worker's compensation death benefits). See generally, Bruch, Cohabitation, supra
note 24, at 732-33.
35.
Compare Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904 (Cal.
1983) (quitting job to move with non-marital partner with whom claimant had shared all
income and expenses for three years does not constitute "good cause" for purposes of
qualifying for unemployment benefits) with MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 207 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984) (female cohabitant who quit her job to move with male
partner and their child to New York qualified for unemployment benefits since claimant's
desire to preserve her family unit constituted "good cause" for leaving her job).
36.
Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of
Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663 (1976).
37.
See Registration of Domestic PartnersPassedin S.F., Nat'l. Rep. on Work
& Fam. (BNA) at 8 (Nov. 9, 1990). These municipalities include New York City;
Cambridge, Massachusetts; Seattle, Washington; Madison, Wisconsin; Takoma Park,

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1453 1992

1454

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Francisco ordinance, for example, amends the city's administrative code
"to create a way to recognize intimate committed relationships, including
those of lesbians and gay men who otherwise are denied the right to
identify the partners with whom they share their lives.""8
City
employees in domestic partnerships also qualify for a variety of family
benefits, including up to one year's unpaid leaveto care for a sick lover
or partner.3 9 Other municipalities have adopted similar ordinances
extending to unmarried heterosexual or homosexual cohabitants various
work-related benefits traditionally reserved for married couples.'

Maryland; and Berkeley, Sacramento, West Hollywood and Santa Cruz, California. See
Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic PartnershipRecognition in the Workplace: Equitable
Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others) 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067 (1991); Vada
Berger, Domestic PartnershipInitiatives, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 417 (1991). In Los
Angeles, unmarried city employees who file an affidavit confirming their live-in
partnership can take sick leave to care for a companion who is seriously ill and time off
in case of death. Joan Beck, Should The Law Recognize Today's New Families?, Cm.
TRIB., June 1, 1989, at 19.
38.
Registration of Domestic Partners, supra note 37, at 8. The measure is a
scaled down version of an earlier initiative adopted by the San Francisco City Council in
1989 but defeated by city voters that November. In addition to authorizing registration
of domestic partnerships, the earlier initiative forbade discrimination by the city against
such partnerships and explicitly granted domestic partners the same sick leave,
bereavement leave and maternity leave as married employees. See Beck, supra note 37,
at 19; San FranciscoBoard Approves Measure Giving Rights to City Workers' Partners,
Nat'l Rep. on Work & Fain. (BNA) at 1 (May 26, 1989). The 1990 ordinance does not
explicitly extend benefits to domestic partnerships.
39.
In 1990, the San Francisco Civil Service Commission expanded its definition
of the family to include persons "related together by strong social and emotional bonds
and/or by ties of marriage, birth, and adoption." This change allows city employees in
domestic partnerships to qualify for a variety of family benefits, including up to one year's
unpaid leave to care for a sick lover or partner. Nat'l Rep. on Work & Fain. (BNA) at
2 (Nov. 9, 1990). The changes adopted by the Civil Service Commission were the result
of recommendations made in June 1990 by a mayoral task force on family policy. Id.;
see Nat'l Rep. on Work & Fain. (BNA) at 5 (June 22, 1990).
40.
See Berger, supra note 37, at 423-27; Eblin, supra note 37, at 1072-77;
Bruch, Cohabitation,supra note 24, at 735 & n.68. These initiatives have been described
as "a self conscious 'attempt to try to equalize.., benefits between married couples and
couples who are not married, either through choice or because they are barred from
marriage.'" Berger, supra note 37, at 447 (quoting Berkeley, California Domestic
Partnership Information Sheet (1987)). The District of Columbia recently passed a Family
Leave Act that includes nonmarital domestic partners in its definition of family members.
District of Columbia Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990, D.C. CODE § 36-1301 et.
seq. (Supp. 1991). A growing number of private businesses, universities and non-profit
groups have also extended family-related employment and/or consumer benefits to couples
in nonmarital intimate relationships. See Berger, supra note 37, at 418 n. 16; Eblin, supra
note 37, at 1078.
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A recent New York Court of Appeals decision illustrates a similar
erosion of the line between marriage and other consensual intimate
relationships. In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company,41 New York's
highest court ruled that a tenant's long-term gay life partner fell within
the definition of "family member" under the New York City rent control
laws and was therefore entitled to remain in the couple's rent controlled
apartment after the tenant's death. The majority explicitly rejected the
dissent's suggestion that the regulatory reference to "family member"
should be limited to "objectively verifiable relationships based on blood,
marriage and adoption, as the State has historically done in the estate

succession laws, family court acts and similar legislation." 42 Instead, the
court emphasized the privately chosen aspects of the couple's life,
including the exclusivity and longevity of their relationship, their
"interwoven social lives," and shared financial obligations.I
Consistent with the analysis in Braschi and the growing recognition
of "domestic partnerships," a number of policy makers and scholars have
recently argued that the law should abandon its traditional reliance on

marriage and marital status as a basis for distributing economic and social
benefits, and should instead embrace a contexualist approach that focuses
on the functions performed and the values served by family-like relation-

ships." An explicit purpose of such a switch from formality to function
41.
543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
42.
Id. at 58.
43.
Id. at 55. The dissent, by contrast, would have limited the definition of
family to "objectively verifiable relationships based on blood, marriage and adoption, as
the State has historically done in the estate succession laws, family court acts and similar
legislation." Id. at 58. More recently, in Alison D. v Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y.
1991), the New York Court of Appeals refused to adopt a functional definition of
"parent" in ruling that the lesbian ex-partner of a natural mother had no standing to sue
for visitation with the mother's son, with whom the ex-partner had lived for several years.
44.
See, e.g., Mary Patricia Truethart, Adopting A More Realistic Definition of
Family, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91 (1990-91); Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet The Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 464, 468-73 (1990); David Meade,
Consortium Rights ofthe Unmarried: Time for a Reappraisal, 15 FAM. L.Q. 223 (1981);
Amy L. Brown, Note, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy
Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1990); Traci Dallas,
Note, Rebutting The Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 369 (1988); Stacey Lynne Boyle, Note, Marital Status Classifications: Protecting
Homosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111 (1988). Q.
Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the
Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991) [hereinafter Family
Resemblance] (criticizing case-by-case functionalist approach and proposing, as an
alternative, that legislatures provide open registration systems for adults who wish to
achieve legal recognition of non-marital intimate relationships).
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is "to give individuals greater control over the structure of their family
lives. "'
2.

CONTROL OVER THE CONSEQUENCES OF MARITAL STATUS

The shift from public to private control over the definition and
structure of family relationships extends as well to control over the
consequences of marital status. Traditionally, the law underscored the
public nature of marriage by defining for all participants the salient
aspects of the marriage bond, particularly the legal and economic
relationship between spouses. Although marriage has often been
described as a civil contract, until recently it was the state, and not the
parties, that set the terms of this contract.'
Parties could choose
whether to enter into marriage, but they could not define the terms of
their union. As the Supreme Court explained in Maynard v. Hill:
[Marriage] is something more than a mere contract. The
consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but
when the contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a
relation between the parties is created which they cannot
change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or
enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties.
Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps
in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities.47
The state-imposed terms of the traditional marriage contract were
both hierarchical and rigidly gender-based. The husband, as head of
household, was responsible for the financial support of his wife and
children. The wife, as the domestic partner, was responsible for
providing household services, including housework, sex and childcare."
45.
Family Resemblance, supra note 44, at 1641; see Boyle, supra note 44, at
139-40; Brown, supra note 44, at 1069.
46.
CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 24-25 ("Underlying all
aspects of the definition of marriage was the principle, frequently announced by the
courts , that the method of contracting marriage and the incidents of the relationship were
the province of the law and were not within the control of the parties."); Gregg Temple,
Freedom Of Contractand Intimate Relationships, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 123
(1985) ("Once the marriage is created, traditional marriage law gives the state control of
the terms of the relationship."); see Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d
500, 501 (1950) ("There are three parties to a marriage contract-the husband, the wife,
and the state.").
47.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
48.
LENORE WEiTzMAN, THE MARRIAOE CONTRACT (1981); Jana B. Singer,
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1112 (1989); Judith

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1456 1992

1992:1443

Privatizationof Family Law

1457

This compulsory gender-based division of labor persisted well into the
1960s, as did the inability of spouses to alter in any binding way the legal
and economic incidents of marriage. 9
The law employed a number of devices to prevent spouses from
modifying the state-imposed terms of the marriage contract. Under
traditional contract doctrine, private agreements that purported to change
the "essential incidents" of marriage-defined as the husband's support

duties and the wife's domestic obligations-were void as a matter of
public policy.' As a New York court explained, "[plublic policy in
such a vital matter as the marriage contract should not be made to yield
to subversive private agreements and personal considerations. "

Other, more specific, contract doctrines further restricted the
opportunities for private ordering. Courts sometimes refused to enforce
agreements between husbands and wives on the ground that these

agreements lacked the consideration necessary to support a binding
contract. 52 Courts also made liberal use of factual and legal presumpYounger, MaritalRegimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together With
Criticism and Suggestionsfor Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 48 (1981). Ironically,
the courts generally refused to allow spouses to enforce these state-imposed obligations
during an ongoing marriage. See McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
49.
See generally, WErrZMAN, supra note 48; Monrad Paulsen, Support Rights
and Duties Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REv. 709 (1956).
50.
See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 938 (E.D. Mich. 1940)
("The law is well settled that a private agreement between persons married or about to be
married which attempts to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract as
defined by the law is contrary to public policy and unenforceable."); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRAcTS § 580 (1939); 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1474 at 618
("An agreement attempting to relieve the husband of his duty to furnish support, or
otherwise to vary and regulate the marital relations of the parties has been held contrary
to sound policy and illegal."). See generally Marjorie M. Shultz, ContractualOrdering
of Marriage:A New Model For State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 207, 230-32 (1982).
51.
Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605,608-09, (N.Y. 1926) (refusing to recognize
an agreement between husband and wife that they would not engage in sexual relations
until they had been married in a religious, as well as a civil, ceremony).
52.
For example, an early Wisconsin decision held that a husband's promise to
maintain his wife did not constitute valid consideration for the wife's return promise to
devise property to him since, by pledging his continued financial support, the husband had
promised only what the law already required of him. Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431,
114 N.W. 820 (1908). Similarly, a Virginia court found that a married woman's promise
to give up her home and business in order to live with her husband was merely the
performance of her legal and moral duty as a wife, and hence did not constitute valid
consideration for her husband's written agreement to release all rights in her estate.
Ballard v. Cox, 62 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1950). Accord Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E.2d 414 (N.C.
1945) (wife could not recover under contract for services rendered to a helpless husband
since "[pierformance of wifely services is expected as part of normal married life");
Tellez v. Tellez, 186 P.2d 390 (N.M. 1947) (husband's antenuptial agreement to leave
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tions to deny enforcement of agreements between husbands and wives.
Although a wife's performance of services outside the scope of her usual
domestic duties could, in theory, constitute valid consideration for her
husband's return promise of compensation, courts often presumed that
such extraordinary services by a wife were intended to be gratuitous and,
hence, not in exchange for pay or other compensation. 3 Other courts
reasoned that, even where spouses had entered into written agreements
purporting to govern their activities during marriage, they could not have
intended for their agreements to result in enforceable legal obligations.'
Over the past twenty-five years, the law has loosened its control over
the legal and economic incidents of marriage in three related ways. First,
the state-imposed marriage contract is a far less comprehensive or precise
instrument than it was a generation or two ago. In particular, the
reciprocal rights and obligations of spouses are both less well-defined and
less extensive than they were in previous generations. Second, individual
couples today have considerably more freedom than in the past to vary by
private agreement what little remains of the state-imposed marriage
contract. Third, the law -increasingly treats marriage partners as
individuals, rather than as a single merged unit, for purposes of doctrinal
analysis.
a. The demise of the state-imposed marriage contract
The modern trend in favor of sex-based equality has eliminated many
of the explicitly gender-based terms of the traditional marriage contract.
A wife is no longer required to assume her husband's surname or to
accede to his choice of domicile. 5 Wives are not automatically entitled
all property to his prospective wife if she would care for him until his death is without
consideration and void as against public policy).
53.
See, e.g., Ladden v. Ladden, 158 A.2d 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1960); Bendler
v. Bendler, 69 A.2d 302 (N.J. 1949) (overruled on this point by Romeo v. Romeo, 418
A.2d 258 (N.J. 1980)). For a more recent example of such reasoning, see Leatherman
v. Leatherman, 256 S.E.2d 793 (N.C. 1979).
54.
See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571 (C.A. 1919).
55.
Recent scholarship shows that the widely-followed practice of married women
assuming their husbands' surname was based largely on custom and not required by
common law. HERMA H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 197-98 (1988); see Dunn
v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1975). Several states, however, interpreted their
laws to require that married women assume their husband's surnames for various
purposes. See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affid per
curiam, 405 U.S. 970 (1972) (Alabama may require a wife to use husband's surname in
applying for driver's license); Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1976)
(unwritten Kentucky regulation requiring married woman to apply for driver's license in
husband's surname even if she ordinarily uses her maiden name does not violate 14th
Amendment).
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to their husbands' financial support, nor husbands to their wives' domestic
services. in most community property states, laws that previously gave
husbands the right to manage and control community property during

marriage have been repealed or replaced by statutes providing for joint
management by both spouses.'
In some areas, the gender-based terms of the traditional marriage
contract have been replaced by gender-neutral obligations that apply
equally to husbands and wives. Husbands and wives in virtually all
states, for example, are jointly responsible for the financial support of
children born into a marriage.57 In other areas, however, the elimination of gender-specific marital obligations has tended to dilute or erase the
obligations altogether. For example, although the gender-neutral alimony
provisions found* in most states' divorce statutes might suggest a

reciprocal duty of spousal support, the fact that alimony is generally
restricted to ex-spouses who are incapable of self-support severely
circumscribes the scope and extent of any such reciprocal obligation.5"
Similarly, courts and legislatures in several states have chosen to eliminate
entirely the common law doctrine of "necessaries" rather than extend to
both spouses the husband's common law obligation to pay for "necessary"
goods and services supplied to his wife by third parties."
The shift from fault-based to no-fault divorce, discussed in detail in
the next section, also heralded the demise of the state-imposed marriage

56.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West 1970) (amended 1973).
57.
See, e.g., Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 1977).
58.
See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 308, 9A U.L.A. 347-48
(1987) (court may order maintenance only if it finds that the requesting spouse lacks
sufficient property to provide for her financial needs and is unable to support herself
through appropriate employment or is occupied with child care). Recently, a few
commentators have noted an appellate trend in favor of slightly more generous alimony
awards, particularly after long-term traditional marriages. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf,
Rehabilitative Alimony:

Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, in ALIMONY:

NEW STRATEGIES FOR PURSUIT AND DEFENSE 65 (A.B.A. Section on Family Law 1988).
59.
See, e.g., Emanuel v. McGriff, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1194 (Ala. Jan. 17,
1992); Condore v. Prince George's County Maryland, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981);
Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905-(Va. 1983). Courts
in several other states have held that the common law doctrine of necessaries now applies
to both spouses, according to their respective means and ability to perform the duty.
E.g., Manatee Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). In Jersey
Shore v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980), the New Jersey Supreme Court
replaced the common law necessaries doctrine with a gender-neutral rule holding spouses
reciprocally liable for each other's necessary expenses only where the assets of' the
incurring spouse are insufficient. See generally, Karol Williams, Note, The Doctrine Qf
Necessaries: ContemporaryApplication As A Support Remedy, 19 STETSON L. REV. 661
(1990).
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contract. Through prohibitions such as those against adultery and cruelty,
which carried substantial indirect economic penalties, fault-based divorce
law addressed central aspects of spousal behavior and interpersonal
relations.' One spouse's breach of these state-imposed obligations not
only entitled the other spouse to dissolve the marriage, but also played a
major role in determining the economic consequences of divorce. Under
the no-fault system, by contrast, breaches of the state-imposed marriage
contract are, at best, peripheral and are often irrelevant. 61 Since parties
could never enforce most state-imposed obligations during an ongoing
marriage,62 and since, under no-fault divorce rules, they are of minimal
importance at the time of divorce, one can reasonably question whether
marriage continues to entail any meaningful state-imposed obligations.
b. Alteration of marital obligationsby private contract
Even where state-imposed marital obligations remain as the
background legal regime, spouses today have considerable freedom to
alter those background obligations by private contract, either before or
during marriage. For example, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act,
which has been adopted by sixteen states since its promulgation in 1983,
authorizes prospective spouses to contract with each other with respect to
their property rights and support obligations, as well as "any other
matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of
public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty."'
The
commentary explains that this provision is meant to cover such matters as
the choice of abode, the freedom to pursue career opportunities and the
upbringing of children.' Similarly, while the Second Restatement of
Contracts continues to disapprove of marital contracts that would change
an essential incident of marriage "in a way detrimental to the public
interest in the marriage relationship,"' the Restators' comments make
clear that both the essential incidents of marriage and the public's interest
in the marriage relationship are to be interpreted more narrowly than in
60.
Lynn A. Baker, Promulgatingthe MarriageContract, 21 MICH. J.L. REFORM
217, 251-52 (1990).
61.
See Shultz, supra note 50, at 273-74. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act precludes a court from considering "marital misconduct" in distributing property or
awarding spousal support.
U;L.A. 239, 348 (1987).

UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §307, 308(b), 9A

62.
See McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
63.
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1983).
64.
Id. § 3 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 374.
65.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190(1) (1979). Marital contracts
are also unenforceable if they "tend[ ] unreasonably to encourage divorce or separation."
Id. §190(2).
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Several states have also amended their domestic relations

laws to facilitate enforcement of a broad range of spousal contracts

concerning the economic aspects of marriage.67
While much private contracting between persons in or contemplating
marriage concerns rights and obligations in the event of divorce, there are

indications that the law is becoming more receptive to enforcing private
agreements that relate to the structure of an ongoing marriage."
Moreover, wholly apart from enforcement by courts, many scholars,
marriage counselors and manuals urge couples to use contracts or
contract-like structures to govern the details of their relationship.'
Indeed, an entire body of literature has developed around "contracting"
as a tool of marriage and family counseling.' These practitioners not
only contract with their clients about the goals and methods of therapy;
they also initiate contracting processes between spouses as part of marital
counseling, reconciliation or divorce preparation. 7
Although the
"contracts" that result from these processes generally are not legally

enforceable, the counselors' use of contract terminology is intentional and
significant. In particular, "the contract label dramatizes the preference
for private ordering over the intrusion of outside norms as the basis for
choices about life-styles."'

66.
See RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, introductory note to topic
3 (1979); id. §190 cmt. a; id. §190, reporter's note, cmts. a-c.
67.
See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236B(3) (Consol. 1992) (permitting
enforcement in a matrimonial action of certain agreements concerning property, support
or "other terms and conditions of the marriage relationship").
68.
See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT §3 & cmt., 9B U.L.A. 371,
373-74 (1983) (authorizing prospective spouses to contract with respect to such aspects
of an ongoing marriage as choice of abode and freedom to pursue career opportunities);
UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 10(c)(2), 9A U.L.A. 103, 121 (1987) (authorizing
spouses to enter into marital property agreements respecting, inter alia, the management
and control of property during marriage); cf Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y.)
(enforcing antenuptial agreement that required husband to appear before a. religious
tribunal), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983); but cf Judith Younger, Perspectives on
Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1059, 1071-72 (1988) (predicting that
courts will continue to view such agreements as unenforceable).
69.
See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 50, at 253 ("Contractual ordering [of marriage]
offers a set of tools and governance strategies that legitimate pursuit of individual
satisfaction through planning and negotiation among equal parties.").
70.

See, e.g., CLIFFORD SAGER, MARRIAGE CONTRACTS AND COUPLE THERAPY

(1976); RICHARD B. STUART, HELPING COUPLES CHANGE 164-70 (1980); Clifford J.
Sager et al., ,The Marriage Contract, in 10 FAM. PROCESS 311-26 (1971).
71.
Shultz, supra note 50, at 257.
72.
Id. at 258.
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c. Treatment of marriedpartnersas individuals
A third way in which the state has ceded control over the legal and
economic incidents of marriage is by treating married persons as
individuals, rather than as a merged unit, for purposes of legal analysis.
Traditionally, the common law treated married persons not as individuals,
but as a single legal entity.'
Marriage stripped a woman of her
independent legal existence and merged it into that of her husband; she
became a "femme couvert," literally "a woman under cover" of her
husband.74 This notion of marital merger had far-reaching legal
consequences in a wide variety of doctrinal areas. Because husbands and
wives were considered one, they could neither contract with nor sue each
other.75 Nor could spouses testify for or against each other in civil or
criminal proceedings.76 As the legal representatives of their wives,
husbands were considered responsible for any torts their wives committed. 7 The notion of the unity of husbands and wives also had consequences for criminal law. Husbands and wives, being one, could not
constitute the two parties necessary to make up a criminal conspiracy.78
More generally, the legal fiction that the husband and wife were a single
entity was one of the rationales that supported the law's traditional refusal
to recognize marital rape or to provide remedies for victims of spousal
violence.'
Although the marital unity doctrine was formally abandoned in the
mid-nineteenth century with the passage by virtually all states of the
Married Women's Property Acts," the notion of married persons as a
73.
Younger, supra note 48, at 50 ("Common law rules recognized husband and
wife not as individuals but as 'one person in law.'").
74.
Id. The classic statement of this doctrine is found at 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. In 1966, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black
summarized the doctrine this way: "This rule has worked out in reality to mean that
though the husband and wife are one, the one is the husband." United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
75.
CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 287-88. Because
marriage deprived women of an independent legal existence, married women were
disabled from entering into contracts with anyone. Id. at 286. The State of Illinois
successfully relied on this contractual disability as justification for excluding women from
the legal profession until the late 19th century. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130 (1872).
76.
CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 288.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
See Gary Brown, Battered Women and the Temporary Restraining Order, 10
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 261, 262 (1988).
80.
Even before passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, some American
wives were able to escape the rigors of the marital unity doctrines through equitable

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1462 1992

1992:1443

Privatizationof Family Law

1463

single legal entity continued to exert a significant influence on the law
affecting spouses well into the twentieth century. As late as 1958, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the evidentiary rule that precluded spouses
from testifying against each other in criminal cases 8 -a rule one scholar

has described as "an archaic survival of [the] mystical religious dogma
[that husband and wife] 'are two souls in one flesh.'" '
Interspousal
tort immunity, also founded on the fictitious unity of husband and wife,
persisted, in a majority of states until the mid-1970s; it still exists in
modified form in a number of jurisdictions.'

Still more tenacious is the

common law rule that a husband is legally incapable of raping his wife;
this remnant of the marital unity doctrine persisted intact until the early
1980s and remains part of the criminal law in a substantial number of
states.'"
Despite these vestiges of the marital unity doctrine, the trend in most
areas of law today is to view married persons as two separate individuals,
rather than as a single unit, for purposes of legal analysis. Since 1971,
at least twenty-five states have abolished interspousal tort immunity, thus
allowing spouses to sue each other for negligent and other tortious behavior.' Judicial decisions abrogating the immunity have explicitly rejected
the argument that the doctrine is justified as a means of preserving marital

remedies, private acts, and ante- and post-nuptial agreements. Younger, supra note 48,
at 59. These were exceptions to the overall legal regime, however. Id.
81.
Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). In Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40 (1980), the Supreme Court overruled its decision in Hawkins and vested the
federal privilege against adverse spousal testimony in the witness (rather than the
defendant) spouse. At the time Trammel was decided, eight states provided that one
spouse was incompetent to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding. An
additional 16 states provided a privilege against adverse spousal testimony and vested the
privilege in both spouses or in the defendant-spousealone. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 48 n.9.
82.
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 145 & n.50 (2d ed.
1972) (quoting COKE, COMMENTARY ON LrrTLETON 6b (1628)).
83.
See CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 373 & nn. 22-23 for
a list of jurisdictions that have retained the immunity in whole or in part.
84.
As of 1983, the marital rape exemption was codified in 34 American
jurisdictions. Thomas R. Bearrows, Note, Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rape:
A Statutory Proposal,1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 203. Although a number of states have
recently narrowed or modified the exemption, a majority of jurisdictions continue to treat
rape in marriage differently than rape outside of it, either by allowing prosecution only
if the spouses are not living together, by according marital rape a lower level of
criminality than extramarital rape or by criminalizing only certain sorts of marital assaults.
See generally Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the
FourteenthAmendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 45-49 (1990).
85.
See CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 372 n.21 for a list
of cases and statutes abolishing interspousal tort immunity.
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harmony.' Even those jurisdictions that continue to recognize some
aspects of interspousal immunity, disclaim reliance on the notion of
marital unity.' The increased ability of spouses to contract with each
other is similarly grounded in the notion of married persons as separate

individuals, with potentially disparate interests.
Changes in the laws of evidence and the doctrines governing criminal
responsibility also reflect the legal individuation of the married couple.
The common law rule that a husband and wife could not make up the two
parties necessary to constitute a conspiracy has been abolished in virtually
all jurisdictions."8 In 1980, the Supreme Court abolished a criminal
defendant's privilege against adverse spousal testimony, noting that the
ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege-including the denial to
women of a separate legal identity-had long since disappeared." The
marital rape exemption has been abolished or narrowed in many
jurisdictions.'

Virtually all states have enacted or strengthened civil and

criminal statutes designed to protect victims of domestic violence.91
86.
See, e.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506 (Md. 1983); Shook v. Crabb, 281
N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951 (N.J. 1979).
87.
See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586, 589-90 (Haw. 1981); Varholla v.
Varholla, 383 N.E.2d 888 (Ohio 1978); Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Del.
1979). But cf Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1982) (purpose of interspousal tort
immunity is to protect family harmony).
88.
See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
490-91 (1972).
89.
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980). Under Trammel, the
privilege is vested in the witness spouse; a witness spouse may choose not to testify but
a defendant can no longer prevent his spouse from voluntarily testifying against him. Id.
at 53.
90.
See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573-76 (N.Y. 1984); Shunn
v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981). For
examples of legislative abolishment of the exemption, see COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 18-3-409
(Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 251 (1983 & Supp. 1989); id. § 252
(1983) (repealed 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319 to 320 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-5(b) (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 to 03 (1985 & Supp. 1989);
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.335 (1971) (repealed 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252
(Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1989).
91.
As of 1989, 48 states and the District of Columbia had enacted statutes
designed to protect victims of domestic violence through the issuance of civil orders of
protection. Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43, 43 (1989). These civil protection
orders generally enjoin batterers from further violence against their partners. Depending
on the jurisdiction, the order may also evict a batterer from a shared residence, grant
temporary custody of children, limit child visitation rights, require payment of child
support and order the batterer to attend mandatory counseling. id.
Despite the existence of these statutes, many law enforcement authorities have
remained reluctant to arrest and prosecute wife batterers. See, e.g., Amy Eppler,
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The overriding effect of these developments is that marriage no
longer constitutes a primary determinant of an individual's legal status.
For most legal purposes, married persons retain their status as individuals

and are free to contract with, or otherwise treat each other, as any two
nonspouses might. Conversely, when a married person engages in
behavior towards a spouse that would be unacceptable outside the
marriage context, the law is no longer likely to interpose marriage as a
barrier to the pursuit of civil or criminal redress. Taken together, these
developments both reduce the public significance of marriage and vest in

private individuals, rather than the state, the authority to define important
elements of the marital relationship.
3. ENTRY INTO MARRIAGE
In addition to enhancing private control over the consequences of
marital status, recent legal and constitutional developments have
significantly restricted the state's authority to block an individual's
decision to marry. Traditionally, the state limited entry into marriage in
a variety of ways. For example, to marry at all, a person had to have
obtained a minimum age and to have legally terminated any previous
marriages. Certain categories of persons, such as prison inmates and the
"feebleminded," were categorically prohibited from marrying.' Others,
such as those adjudicated the "guilty" party in a divorce, were
temporarily barred from marrying again."
A person's choice of
marriage partners was also constrained; only a male and a female could
Battered Women and the Equal ProtectionClause: Will the Constitution Help Them When
the Police Won't?, 95YALE L.J. 788, 790 (1986). To combat this reluctance, a number
of jurisdictions have passed mandatory arrest statutes that require police to make an arrest
whenever they have probable cause to believe that a domestic assault or.the threat of an
assault has occurred, regardless of the existence of a protection order. See, e.g., Dirk
Johnson, Abused Women Get Leverage in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1986, § 4,
at 8 (citing Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon and Utah
as states with such mandatory arrest statutes); Rogers Worthington, Family Violence Laws
Fill Jails, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 1989, at 16 (reporting on Wisconsin's adoption of
mandatory arrest law); Karlyn Barker, Domestic Abuse Arrests Expected to Soar Under
New D.C. Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1990; at BI (describing enactment in 1990 of
D.C. mandatory arrest statute).
92.
See generally Reverend Robert F. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the
Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 358, 372-73 (1968). As of 1968, 34 states and
Puerto Rico imposed impediments to marriage based on insanity, feeblemindedness or
related disabilities of one of the parties. Id. at 389-98 app. D.
93.
Drinan, supra note 92, at 375; Robert Kingsley, RemarriageAfter Divorce,
26 S. CAL. L. REv. 280 (1953).
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legally wed, and persons related closely by blood or marriage could not

marry each other.
The state still exercises considerable control over entry into marriage.

Both courts and legislatures have uniformly rejected attempts by same-sex
couples to marry," although a growing number of municipalities have
begun to recognize such unions.
Similarly, courts have rejected
constitutional challenges to age-based restrictions on the ability to

marry. 9 Despite this continuing state control, there has been substantial
movement toward private ordering of the decision to marry. In Zablocki
v. Redhail, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional an attempt
by the State of Wisconsin to prohibit marriage by parents who had failed
adequately to support their existing children." The Court characterized
marriage as a fundamental constitutional right, and held that state
regulation that substantially interfered with the decision to marry would
be subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny.' More recently, in Turner v.
Safely, the Court invalidated regulations promulgated by the Missouri
Department of Corrections that significantly restricted the ability of prison
inmates to marry. 98
The law has also eased its control over an individual's choice of
marriage partners. Several recent cases have held that statutory prohibitions against incestuous marriage do not apply to relationships created by
adoption.'
With respect to other kinship restrictions, states have
94.
See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Singer
v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971), appealdismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2201 (1984) ("Only a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State."). See
generally Hannah Schwarzschild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral
Threat and Legal Anomaly, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 94, 112-17 (1989).
95.
See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982). Although state regulation regarding the age at which persons
may marry (both with and without parental consent) remains extensive, the basis of
regulation has largely shifted from the reinforcement of family control over the marriage
decision to social concern about the risks supposedly involved in youthful marriages.
GLENDON, supra note 17, at 28.
96.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court relied on its earlier
decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down Virginia's
antimiscegenation laws on both equal protection and due process grounds.
97.
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-88.
98.
Turnerv. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See also Langonev. Coughlin, 712 F.
Supp. 1061 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding unconstitutional state ban on marriages by prison
inmates serving life sentences).
99.
See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Miesner v. Geile, 712 F. Supp. 1061 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) (statutory prohibition against marriage of uncle and niece does not apply to
uncles and nieces related by adoption). Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978)
(statute prohibiting marriage between brother and sister related by adoption is
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generally narrowed the circle of prohibited degrees of relationship, and

many have eliminated kinship restrictions based on affinity, rather than
on common ancestry.'
Moreover, where close relatives do marry
despite existing statutory bans, those "illegal" marriages today produce

many of the same legal effects as any other marriage." 1
Even the requirement of "one spouse at a time" is not as rigid as it

used to be. To be sure, simultaneous marriage to more than one person
remains unlawful in all fifty states." °
But, like prohibited kinship
marriages, such unions in fact produce legal consequences that increasingly resemble those of any lawful marriage. For example, the children of
bigamous marriages are no longer considered "illegitimate," even where

state law characterizes such marriages as "void."" ° Moreover, several
commentators have noted that the attitude of criminal law toward plural
marriages seems to be growing less harsh." °4 Criminal laws are seldom

enforced today against bigamists or polygamists and, in some states,
bigamy has ceased to be a crime."
The effect of a polygamous marriage on the right to rear children has
also changed. In 1955, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a finding of child

neglect, and the removal of several children from their parents' home,
unconstitutional as violative of equal protection); Bagnardi v. Hartnett, 366 N.Y.S.2d 89
(Sup. Ct. 1975) (marriage between adoptive father and adopted daughter legally
permissible).
100.
GLENDON, supra note 17, at 41 ("Prohibitions based on affinity and remote
consanguinity have been gradually dropping out of state law, do not appear in the Uniform
[Marriage and Divorce] Act, and are in any event of doubtful constitutionality.") A 1984
survey reports that only 15 states continue to forbid marriage between persons related only
by marriage.

IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL.,

FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 58

(1986). In 1968, 20 states and the District of Columbia prohibited such affinity-based
marriages. Drinan, supra note 92, at 370.
101.
GLENDON, supra note 17, at 43.
102.
See Glendon, supra note 36, at 672.
103.
GLENDON, supra note 17, at 39; see UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§ 207(c), 9A U.L.A. 168 (1987) ("Children born of a prohibited marriage are
legitimate.").
104.
See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 39; Ralph Slovenko, The De Facto
Criminalizationof Bigamy, 17 J. FAM. L. 297 (1978-79); R. Michael Otto, Note, Wait
'Til Your Mothers Get Home: Assessing The Rights of Polygamists As Custodial and
Adoptive Parents, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 881.

105.
Glendon, supra note 17, at 39; Otto, supra note 104, at 883 (noting that
"[during the past 30 years, criminal prosecutions against polygamists have ceased"). But
cf. Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd as modified, 760 F.2d
1065 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1988) (upholding dismissal of police officer
for engaging in plural marriage in violation of Utah law; rejecting constitutional challenge
to ban on polygamous marriage); Barlow v. Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990) (rejecting argument that free exercise clause protects practice of polygamy).
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based solely on the parents' unlawful polygamous marriage. 1 In 1987,
however, that same court ruled that a divorced mother's polygamous
remarriage could not be used as the primary ground for granting.her exhusband's request for custody of the couple's children."°
Most
recently, in 1991, the Utah Supreme Court held that polygamy, standing
alone, is insufficient automatically to disqualify polygamists as adoptive
parents."
These developments show that while the law still exercises considerable control over entry into marriage, the balance between public and
private ordering has shifted significantly. Individuals contemplating
marriage today have substantially more freedom than did their counterparts a generation ago to determine whether and under what circumstances
they will wed, and to effectuate their choice of. marriage partner.
Moreover, even where the law continues formally to proscribe certain
marriage choices, the consequences of exercising those choices in
violation of the legal rules are considerably less severe today than they
'were a generation ago.
4.

FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MARRIAGE

A final way the law has traditionally regulated marriage is by
requiring certain procedural formalities for entering into a valid ceremonial union."° For example, all states require prospective spouses to
obtain a marriage license, and most impose additional procedural
requirements, such as a waiting period and a physical examination."'
A number of states also regulate various aspects of the marriage
ceremony.

106.
In re State ex rel. Black, 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1955).
107.
Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987). The court distinguished its
earlier child neglect decision by noting that the legislature had deleted from its child
neglect statutes the reference to moral neglect relied on by the earlier judges.
108.
In re Adoption of W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083 (Utah 1991) (plurality opinion).
For a discussion of the case, see Otto, supra note 104, at 906-12.
109.
A limited number of American jurisdictions also recognize common law
marriage. In general, to enter into a valid common law marriage, parties must agree to,
be husband and wife and must hold themselves out to the world as married. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Anderson, 131 N.E.2d 301 (Ind. 1956); In re Dailman's Estate, 228 N.W.2d
187 (Iowa 1975). See generally CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 48.
Common law marriage, however, is a dying institution. As of 1979, only 14 states and
the District of Columbia continued to recognize the validity of common-law marriages
contracted within their borders. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT,
PROBLEMS 29 (2d ed. 1991).
110.
GLENDON, supra note 17, at 50.
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These procedural formalities have undergone only minor alterations
over the past two decades, but what small changes have occurred have
been in the direction of increased private control over the procedural
prerequisites for formal marriage."' 1 One of the major purposes of the

Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, approved in 1970 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was to "greatly

simplif[y] premarital regulation.""'

The minimal solemnization and

registration requirements contained in the Act were "designed to take
account of the increasing tendency of marrying couples to want a
personalized ceremony, without traditional church, religious or civil
trappings.""'
The drafters of the Uniform Act also suggested the

abolition of the traditional forms of premarital medical examination then
required by most states, characterizing such medical requirements as
"both avoidable and highly inefficient."' 4
A number of jurisdictions have followed the lead of the Uniform Act,
and have either reduced or eliminated various traditional premarital
formalities. While a few states have attempted to impose additional
premarital requirements, these attempts have generally been short
lived." 5 Moreover, as a result of the Supreme Court's characterization
of marriage as a fundamental constitutional right, procedural restrictions
that substantially interfere with the decision to marry are vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. 116
111.
See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 35-36
(1989); GLENDON, supra note 17, at 24-25, 49-51.
112.
UNIF. MARRIAGEAND DIVORCEACT, prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 148 (1979).
As of 1990, eight states had adopted the Act.
113.
Id. § 206 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 167. See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 55
(characterizing the UMDA as "really just a marriage registration law" and noting that "it
is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the present regulation of marriage in the
United States is already basically just a matter of licensing and registration").
114.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 203 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 164.
115.
In 1987, for example, the Illinois legislature mandated that all marriage
license applicants be tested for exposure to the AIDS virus. In 1988, the first full year
of the law's operation, the number of marriage licenses issued in the state dropped by
25% as many couples either went out of state to be married or simply declined to get
married. Of the 221,000 people married in Illinois during the first 18 months of the
statute's operation, only 44 tested positive for HIV exposure. In June 1989, the
legislature repealed the testing requirement. Isabel Wilkerson, PrenuptialTestsfor AIDS
Repealed, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1989, at A6. Louisiana similarly mandated premarital
AIDS testing for a brief period of time but repealed that requirement along with other
medical testing requirements in 1988. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:230-31 (West Supp.
1988) (repealed 1988).
116.
See generally Robert D. Goodman, In Sickness Or In Health: The Right To
Marry And The Case Of HIV Antibody Testing, 38 DEPAuL L. REV. 87 (1988).
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The impact of those premarital requirements that continue to exist is
further diluted by the minimal consequences of noncompliance. Courts
have repeatedly held that a couple's failure to comply with applicable
marriage formalities does not invalidate their marriage.'1 7 Nor will a
marriage be declared invalid because the person who presided over the
marriage ceremony lacked the legal authority to do so." 8 Moreover,
although some states provide criminal penalties for parties who obtain a
marriage license by fraud, or for officials who knowingly preside over an
unlicensed marriage, such crimes are rarely detected and even more rarely
prosecuted. 9
Thus, the formal prerequisites to marriage that exist today do not
constitute a significant restraint on private ordering of the marriage
process. Moreover, any attempt by the state to reassert control in this
area by imposing more onerous premarital requirements would present
serious constitutional difficulties.
B. Divorce and Its FinancialConsequences
1. THE SHIFT FROM FAULT-BASED TO NO-FAULT DIVORCE

The shift from public to private ordering of marriage has been
accompanied by the privatization of divorce and its financial consequences. Until the late 1960s, American law recognized no such thing as a
consensual or privately-ordered divorce."'2 Rather, statutes in each state
established specific grounds for terminating a marriage. Most of these
grounds required the spouse seeking a divorce to prove to a court that her
partner had committed a marital offense and that she was innocent of
marital fault.'
Thus, divorce was not the recognition of a private
decision to terminate a marriage; it was a privilege granted by the state
117.
See, e.g., Carabetta v. Carabetta, 438 A.2d 109 (Conn. 1980).
118.
See Annotation, Validity of Marriage as Affected by Lack of Legal Authority
of Person Solemnizing It, 13 A.L.R.4TH 1323 (1982); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 206(b), 9A U.L.A. 167 ("The solemnization of the marriage is not invalidated by
the fact that the person solemnizing the marriage was not legally qualified to solemnize
it, if neither party to the marriage believed him to be so qualified.").
119.
ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 25.
120.
Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 653 (1984); Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining:
The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1015, 1015 (1985).
121.
If both spouses were guilty of marital offenses, the defense of recrimination
precluded the granting of a divorce. See CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note
18, at 527.
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to an innocent spouse against a guilty one. 1" The Tennessee Supreme
Court stated the concept succinctly:
Divorce is

. .

. not a matter to be worked out for the mutual

accommodation of the parties in whatever manner they may
desire, or in whatever manner the Court may deem to be fair
and just under the circumstances. It is conceived as a remedy
for the innocent against the guilty. 1"
The model of divorce as a state-bestowed remedy for an innocent
spouse began eroding long before the formal adoption of no-fault divorce
statutes." The adoption of tiese statutes, however, signaled an important shift in the legal paradigm governing divorce. The state, in essence,
abandoned its role as the moral arbiter of marital behavior. In particular,
the state "washed its hands" of attempting to determine when the goal of
providing relief to an innocent spouse outweighed the strong public
interest in preserving marriage. With the adoption of no-fault divorce
statutes, the state ceded to the spouses themselves-and often to one
spouse acting unilaterally-the authority to make this judgement."
Thus, under no-fault divorce, the decision to end a marriage generally
rests on unreviewed private judgment; the state's role is diminished to one
122.
Friedman, supra note 120, at 653; see Sally B. Sharp, Divorce and the Third
Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements and the State, 59 N.C. L. REV. 819, 822
(1981) ("In a very real sense, divorce [under the fault-based system] was a kind of offense
against the state, and an offense implied an offender.").
123.
Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tenn. 1955) (citing Brewies v.
Brewies, 178 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943)). Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After NoFault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEW ENO. L. REv. 437, 454-56 (1988)
(describing American fault-based model of divorce as tort).
124.
See O'Connell, supra note 123, at 471-92 for a description of this process of
erosion.
125.
Although some early no-fault decisions suggested that judges should determine
independently whether a marriage was truly "irretrievably broken," these decisions soon
gave way to almost total deference to the judgment of the party or parties seeking a
divorce. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 107 (1991) (vast majority of states have adopted no-fault divorce
laws that make it possible for one party unilaterally to obtain a no-fault divorce, despite
the objections of the other spouse); Elaine C. Berg, IrreconcilableDifferences: California
Courts Respond to No Fault Dissolutions, LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453 (1974); Stephen L.
Sass, The Iowa No Fault Dissolution of Marriage Law in Action, 18 S.D. L. REV. 629,
650 (1973); Alan H. Frank et al., No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate: The Nebraska
Experience-An Interrupted Tne Series Analysis and Commentary, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1,
61-65 (1978). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030(b)(ii) (West 1986) (judge must
grant divorce if both parties say marriage is irretrievably broken or if one party continues
to so maintain after the couple has undergone counseling).
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of solemnization and recording, akin to its role in marital licensing."
The shift from fault-based to no-fault divorce took place in this
country with remarkable speed. In 1969, California became the first state
to eliminate fault-based grounds for divorce. 2 7 By 1976, forty-six

other states had effectively removed fault impediments to dissolution,
either by replacing their fault-based divorce statutes with pure no-fault

legislation or by adding no-fault provisions to their existing grounds for
divorce." By 1985-only sixteen years after California's pioneering
divorce legislation-not a single American jurisdiction retained a pure
fault-based system of divorce." 2 This nationwide transformation is all
the more striking in light of the absence of federal involvement and the
significant variation that states have traditionally shown in their approaches to domestic relations law. "°
The transformation of divorce from publicly-bestowed remedy to
private transaction has also led to various procedural innovations designed
to decrease state involvement in the divorce process. At least six states
126.
Shultz, supra note 50, at 272; see Wardle, supra note 125, at 96 ("Replacing
the old fault-notion of divorce was the assertion that divorce was a private matter that the
state had no legitimate interest to restrict when the marriage was irretrievably broken and
the parties to the marriage had agreed to terminate the marriage.").
127.
Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312. While California was
the first jurisdiction to adopt an exclusively no-fault approach to divorce, no-fault grounds
for divorce have existed since the 19th century. As of 1966, approximately a dozen states
had statutes that permitted divorce without regard to fault where the parties had lived
separately and apart for a prescribed period of time. Walter J. Wadlington, Divorce
Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 63 (1966). The prescribed time
periods ranged from two to seven years. Id. at 77-78.
128.
Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An
Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 104, 107 (1976); see Doris J. Freed, Groundsfor
Divorce in the American Jurisdictions, 8 FAM. L.Q. 401, 401 (1974) (As of June 1974,
there remained only five states in which marital misconduct was the sole basis for
divorce.).
129.
Fifteen states currently have "pure" no-fault laws that abolish all fault-based
grounds for divorce and substitute a judicial finding of marriage breakdown; twenty-one
states have added to their list of fault-based grounds a no-fault provision based either on
"irreconcilable differences" or some form of marriage breakdown; and fourteen states and
the District of Columbia provide a no-fault ground based on separation or incompatibility
in addition to their fault-based grounds. See Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference:
A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 5-6, 26-55
(1987).
130.
See Wadlington, supra note 127, at 38; Wardle, supra note 125, at 82-91.
For an historical study of the adoption of no-fault divorce legislation, see HERBERT
JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED

STATES (1988).

For a critique of Jacob's study, see Grace G. Blumberg, Reworking the
Past, Imagining the Future: On Jacob'sSilent Revolution, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 115
(1991).
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have adopted summary divorce procedures designed to achieve a
convenient divorce by mutual consent.13' A growing number of states
also allow divorcing parties to proceed by affidavits in lieu of court

appearances. 32 The effect of these procedural innovations is to reinforce the private nature of divorce and to further reduce its public component.
The shift from fault-based to no-fault divorce also signaled a
diminished role for attorneys in the divorce process. Indeed, the
widespread adoption of no-fault legislation spawned a proliferation of
published manuals and "kits" designed to enable spouses to dissolve their
marriage without the assistance of lawyers.'
Not surprisingly, the
legal profession reacted negatively to these developments, emphasizing the
continuing complexity of divorce issues and the financial pitfalls of do-ityourself divorce."

The profession's attempts to prevent the de-legal-

ization of divorce, however, have been, at best, only partially successful.
Although divorce remains, in theory, an adversary legal proceeding, the
removal of fault impediments to divorce has both reduced the importance
of legal knowledge and diminished the need for legal services in many

categories of consensual divorce. Moreover, as explained more fully
below, the rise of divorce and custody mediation has deprived the
131.
ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 192. These procedures are usually
available only for couples with no minor children and require that the parties submit
sworn statements indicating that they have agreed upon the disposition of any marital
property and waive any claim for support. Id. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4550 (West
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.485 (1990).
132.
See Jay Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody Disputes, 19 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 413, 413 n.4 (1985); Marilyn A. Meredith, Note, Divorce-Kit Dilemma:
Finding The Public Interest, 19 J.FAM. L. 729, 741 (1980-81).
133.
See Project, supra note 128, at 105 & app. A (listing divorce' kits and
services which have been available at some point in 14 states); Meredith, supra note 132,
at 733-34 (describing contents of divorce kits); Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Lay Divorce
Firms and the UnauthorizedPracticeofLaw, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 423, 430 (1973)
(describing two main approaches to lay divorce assistance). One recent study found that
47% of the divorces obtained in the Superior Court in Phoenix, Arizona during 1985 did
not involve lawyers. Debra C. Moss, Sel Helpers on the Increase, A.B.A. P., March 1,
1988, at 40.
134.
See, e.g., Warren H. Resh, Do-It- Yourself DivorceKits andServices, 47 WIs.
B. BULL., Feb. 1974, at 23 (describing as "one of the inevitable consequences" of pro se
divorces "the terrible burden they place on the courts and court personnel"); Gerald F.
Marine, Do-lt-YourselfDivorce-Wisconsin-Update,38 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEws 131,132
(1974); C. Ian MacLachlan, Pro Se Marriage Dissolution in Connecticut-Some
Considerations,51 CONN. B. J. 15 (1977). Bar associations in a number ofjurisdictions
initiated "unauthorized practice of law" actions against the providers of divorce kits and
other lay divorce'services. See Project, supra note 128, at 110 & app. A (listing suits
brought against lay divorce enterprises); Meredith, supra note 132, at 738-40.
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adversary system of its monopoly over the process of marital dissolution,
135
thus further diminishing the role of lawyers and legal knowledge.
2. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE

Particularly in its early stages, the no-fault divorce revolution also
heralded a significant retrenchment in state supervision of the economic

consequences of marital dissolution., Under the fault-based system, the
state not only asserted broad authority to define when divorce was
appropriate; it also played a significant role in structuring the spouses'
post-divorce economic relationship and the relationship of the ex-spouses
to their children." 6 In large part, this role was premised on the state's
interest in enforcing the terms of the traditional marriage contract, in
particular the husband's duty to support his wife and the wife's reciprocal
domestic and childrearing obligations.137 With the adoption of no-fault
divorce, and the accompanying demise of the state-imposed marriage
contract, the legitimacy of the state's role in structuring a couple's post
divorce economic and parenting relationship has become increasingly
problematic. 3 '
Indeed, one noted commentator has claimed that

"American law now recognizes explicitly that a primary function of law
at the time of divorce is to provide a framework within which divorcing
couples may exercise great freedom to determine
for themselves their post
139
dissolution rights and responsibilities."
Consistent with this recognition, most states now permit divorcing

couples to make binding and nonmodifiable separation agreements with
respect to both property division and spousal support.'

°

Moreover,

although courts are required in theory to review spousal agreements

135..
See generally Martha L. Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional
Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727
(1988).
136.
Mnookin, supra note 120, at 1015.
137. ' See Sharp, supra note 122, at 822-23.
138.
See Wardle, supra note 125, at 115 n.148 (adoption of no-fault divorce "has
created significant problems for the justification of the imposition of any post-dissolution
continuing spousal support or sharing obligations"); Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of
Alimony, 77 CAL. L. PEv. 1, 5-6 (1989) (modem divorce reform has completely
undermined traditional justifications for alimony).
139.
Mnookin, supra note 120, at 1015.
140.
Id. at 1015-16; Sally B. Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation
Agreements: A Word of Caution On ContractualFreedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399,
1401-04 (1984) [hereinafter Sharp, FairnessStandards]. For a discussion of the historical
treatment of separation agreements between spouses, see Sharp, supra note 122, at 827-
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regarding child support and custody, courts typically rubber-stamp

separation agreements, even in divorces involving children." 1
The shift from fault-based to no-fault divorce has also occasioned a
fundamental rethinking of the law's attitude toward premarital agreements
affecting divorce. Historically, the law viewed such private attempts to
predetermine the economic consequences of divorce as contrary to public
policy, and therefore void.1 2 Courts and commentators offered a
number of reasons for refusing to countenance such agreements. One was
that premarital agreements encouraged divorce and were therefore
inconsistent with the publicly-espoused idea that marriage was forever. 4 3 Another was that the husband's state-imposed duty of support
constituted an essential incident of marriage and was thus not a proper
subject for a private contract.1 "
With the advent of no-fault divorce and the demise of the stateimposed marriage contract, these rationales lost much of their force. As
a result, judicial hostility toward premarital agreements has been replaced
by the view that such private agreements are an acceptable and indeed

desirable method of resolving the financial issues incident to divorce.4

5

Thus, such premarital agreements are generally enforceable, even over the

objection of one party, as long as they meet applicable contract law
standards of voluntariness, disclosure and conscionability, and do not

leave either spouse in danger of becoming a public charge."
141.
Mnookin, supra note 120, at 1016; Sharp, Fairness Standards,supra note
140, at 1409-10.
142.
CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 11, supra note 18, at 6; Gregg Temple,
Freedom of Contract and Intimate Relationships, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 129
(1985).
143.
Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 127-28,42 N.W.2d 500,502 (1950); Crouch
v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).
144.
French v. McAnarney, 195 N.E. 714, 716 (Mass. 1935); See Nora J.
Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in
Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 493, 512 (1987).
145.
See, e.g., DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N. J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) ("Initially, it is clear that 'antenuptial agreements fixing post-divorce
rights and obligations [are] . . . valid and enforceable' and courts should 'welcome and
encourage such agreements at least to the extent that the parties have developed
comprehensive and particularized agreements responsive to their peculiar
circumstances.'") (quoting D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 491 A.2d 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985)).
146.
See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990); Gant v. Gant, 329
S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985); Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty
States: An Overview, FAM. L.Q., Winter 1988, at 417, 560 ("[Mlany states are
upholding [premarital] agreements as long as they are: (1) free from fraud and
overreaching, (2) reflect a full and fair disclosure by and between the parties of their
respective assets, and, in some states, (3) not unconscionable as to property division or
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The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, approved in 1983,
illustrates the modem view.147 Section 3 of the Act authorizes parties

contemplating marriage to contract with respect to their respective
property rights and obligations, the disposition of property. upon
separation or divorce, the modification or elimination of spousal support
and "any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not
in'violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty."'"
Under section 6 of the Act, such agreements are enforceable unless the
objecting party proves that she did not execute the agreement voluntarily
or that the agreement was unconscionable at the time of execution. 49
In order to invalidate a premarital agreement on grounds of unconscionability, an objecting party must also show that she (i) was not provided a

fair and reasonable disclosure of the other party's assets or obligations;
(ii) did not waive disclosure; and (iii) did not have an adequate knowledge
spousal support."). Some jurisdictions subject premarital contracts to a substantive
fairness review not generally applicable to commercial contracts. E.g., Buettner v.
Buettner, 505 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1973); Warren v. Warren, 523 N.E.2d 680 (IH. Ct. App.
1988). In other jurisdictions, the substantive unfairness of a premarital agreement raises
a presumption of overreaching, Carnell v. Carnell, 398 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), or shifts to the agreement's proponent the burden of showing that it was
entered into voluntarily and with full disclosure of assets. Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d
530, 534 (Fla. 1972). Finally, a few jurisdictions continue to hold unenforceable, on
public policy grounds, all premarital agreements purporting to limit post divorce spousal
support. E.g., In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Iowa 1979); Duncan
v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). See generally Robert Roy,
Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to Validity of PremaritalAgreements Contemplating Divorce or Separation, 53 A.L.R.4TH 22 (1987); Robert Roy, Annotation,
Enforceability of PremaritalAgreements Governing Support or Property Rights Upon
Divorce or Separation as Affected by Fairness or Adequacy of Those Terms-Modern
Status, 53 A.L.R.4TH 161 (1987); J. Thomas Oldham, Premarital Contracts Are Now
Enforceable, Unless. . ., 21 Hous. L. REv. 757 (1984).
147.
As of 1990, sixteen states had adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act: Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas and
Virginia.
148.
UNw. PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT Acr § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1983).
149.
Id. § 6, at 376. The comments to section 6 explicitly adopt the standard of
unconscionability used in commercial law. Id. at 376-77. The section contains a very
limited exception to these requirements if the enforcement of a premarital agreement
eliminating spousal support would cause one party to the agreement to be eligible for
public assistance. In that instance, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement,
may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that
eligibility. Id. § 6(b), at 376. For a discussion and critique of the Uniform Act's
enforcement provisions, see Ronald S. Ladden & Robert J. Franco, The Uniform
PremaritalAgreement Act.- An Ill-Reasoned Retreat From the UnconscionabilityAnalysis,
4 AM. J. FAM. L. 267 (1990).
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of the other party's assets or obligations."5 These standards do not
differ appreciably from the general contract law standards for assessing
the validity of agreements negotiated as part of an arms-length business
transaction.151
A comparative perspective may be helpful in assessing the magnitude
of the shift from public to private ordering that has accompanied this
country's no-fault divorce revolution. As Mary Ann Glendon has recently
noted, the transformation of divorce in the United States took place
contemporaneously with the liberalization of divorce laws in almost every
other Western industrialized country." 2 The divorce revolution in the
United States, however, went further than in most other countries in at
least two important respects. First, although divorce by mutual consent
is readily available in Western Europe, most Western European countries
permit one spouse to divorce an unwilling and legally guiltless partner
only after a lengthy period of separation. 53 Most American jurisdictions, by contrast, permit unilateral non-fault divorce after a separation of
one year or less." u Second, the divorce laws of England, France and
West Germany contain "hardship clauses" that (at least in theory) permit
judges to deny a unilateral non-fault divorce, even after expiration of the
required separation period, if the divorce would result in exceptional
hardship to the nonconsenting spouse or to the couple's children. 55 No
American jurisdiction has enacted anything resembling such a hardship
clause.
Moreover, in virtually all Western European countries, the government has assumed a far more active role in regulating the economic
consequences of divorce than the government has in the United States.
In part, this reflects broader political and ideological differences between
150.

The objecting party bears the burden of proof on each of these issues. UNIF.

PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 376.
151.
If anything, the requirements for proving unconscionability are more rigorous
than the general contract law requirements. See Ladden & Franco, supra note 149, at
274-75.
152.
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCEIN WESTERN LAW 66 (1987)
[hereinafter ABORTION AND DIVORCE].
153.
Id. at 70. Sweden is considerably more tolerant than England, France or
Germany of unilateral non-fault divorce. There, one spouse can petition for divorce
without having to give any reason. If the other spouse opposes the petition, or if there
are children under 16, a six month "period of consideration" must be observed. This six
month waiting period is not required where the parties have already been separated for
at least two years. Id. at 75-76.

154.
155.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 70, 72, 74. In practice, these hardship clauses are rarely used to deny

a divorce in England and Germany, but they are occasionally used to deny a divorce in
some parts of France. Id. at 74.
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the United States and Western Europe regarding the appropriate role of
government. In part, however, it reflects differences in the legal meaning
of the freedom to terminate an unsatisfactory marriage. In the United
States, far more than in Western Europe, the liberalization of grounds for
divorce has been accompanied by a lifting of economic responsibilities
toward former spouses and dependents. Particularly with respect to
spouses, the shift from public to private ordering of divorce has
encompassed the notion that divorce presumptively ends not only the
parties' legal union, -but also their financial responsibilities toward each
other."
In Western Europe, by contrast, the private decision to end
a marriage does not spell the end of such publicly imposed financial

responsibilities.
C. Adoption, SurrogateMothering and Parenthoodby
Contract

In the context of adoption, the shift from public to private ordering
has been more subtle, but equally profound. Most significantly, there has
been a change in the perceived purpose of American adoption law, from
promoting the welfare of children in need of parents' 57-traditionally
and unproblematically a "public" function-to fulfilling the needs and
desires of couples who want children.
This shift in purpose is most evident in the context of surrogate
mothering, where the procreative desires of couples who are unable (or
unwilling) to bear children drive the process and where there is no child
156.
See id. at 104-05 ("In fact, the United States appears unique among Western
countries in its relative carelessness about assuring either public or private responsibility
for the economic casualties of divorce. More than any other country among those
examined here, the United States has accepted the idea of no-fault, no-responsibility
divorce."); LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 368-71 (1985) (no-fault
divorce laws embody the idea that family support responsibilities terminate upon, or soon
after, divorce); cf. Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interest on Divorce, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 30, 103-65 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H.
Kay eds., 1990). (critiquing prevailing justifications for post-divorce income sharing and
suggesting 'that divorce law may not be the appropriate place to ameliorate income
disparities between women and men).
157.
See Leo A. Huard, The Law ofAdoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 743, 748-49 (1955) (distinguishing feature of American adoption law is the
paramount concern for the welfare of the child/adoptee); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption
Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 174-75 (1983) (unlike Roman
adoption law, which was based on the needs and rights of the adoptive parents, "American
law, from the beginning, protected the welfare of adopted children"); Sanford N. Katz,
Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM. ADvoc. 9, 10 (1982) (describing as primary goal
of adoption "to provide a permanent, secure and loving home for a child whose birth
parents are unable or unwilling to meet the child's needs").

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1478 1992

Privatizationof Family Law

1992:1443

1479

in existence at the time the "adoption arrangement" is entered into.' 58
The shift is also evident in the increased popularity of so-called independent or private placement adoptions, in which prospective adoptive
parents solicit available infants directly through newspaper ads and
physician referrals." Finally, the transformation of adoption from a
publicly-regulated child welfare institution to a privately ordered
consumer system is reflected in the increased acceptance (at least within
the legal academy) of calls for the legalization of a (modified) free market

in babies, championed by United States Court of Appeals Judge Richard
Posner. 110
1.

AGENCY-FACILITATED ADOPTION

American law recognizes two methods of placing children for
adoption with non-relatives: agency placement and independent or private
placement,' sometimes referred to as "gray market" adoption. 62 In
an agency adoption, the biological parents generally relinquish their
parental rights to a public or private adoption agency, after they have
been counseled about their options for raising the child."
The agency
158.
SeeMargaretJ.Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1931
(1987) ("Unlike a mother relinquishing a baby for adoption, the surrogate mother bears
a baby only in response to the demand of the would-be parents: their demand is the
reason for its being born."). This is true whether the surrogate mother is paid or unpaid.
Id.
159.
See Howe, supra note 157, at 181 ("Despite rhetoric about providing a loving
home for a child and meeting the needs of birth mothers who desperately desire an
opportunity to continue their lives free of unwanted parenthood, the true focus of
independent adoption is to service the needs of the adopter(s).").
160.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoption, 67
B.U. L. REv. 59 (1987).
161.
Joan H. Hollinger, Introductionto Adoption Law and Practice, in ADOPTION
LAW AND PRACTICE p. 1-1, p. 1-61 (Joan H. Hollinger ed. 1992). At least half of all
adoptions of children that take place in the United States each year are by stepparents or
other close relatives. Id. at p. 1-53; James B. Boskey, Placing Childrenfor Adoption, in
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra, at p. 3-1, p. 3-6. Because adoptions by relatives
generally involve the formalization of existing custodial arrangements, rather than the
"placing out" of children, this discussion of placement methods generally excludes
adoption by close relatives.
162.
See, e.g., Daniel G. Grove, Independent Adoption: The Casefor the Gray
Market, 13 VILL. L. REv. 116 (1967); George W. Myers, Jr., Comment, Independent
Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to Appear in the Controversy Over GrayMarket Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 629 (1980); David F. Tegeler, Comment,
Advertising for Adoption Placement: Gray Market Activities in a Gray Area of
ConstitutionalProtection, 25 DuQ. L. REv. 129 (1986).
163.
Hollinger, supra note 161, at p. 1-62. Frequently, if the biological parents
are not married, the birth mother will have had some contact with the agency prior to the
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is then responsible for placing the child with adoptive parents. Traditionally, in agency adoptions, the birth parents played little or no role in
selecting adoptive parents and had no contact with the adoptive parents
once they had been selected by the agency. This is changing, however,
largely in response to competition from private placement adoption.
Thus, many adoption agencies now permit birth parents to play a more
active role in selecting an adoptive family.'" State laws relaxing the
confidentiality of adoption records have also facilitated contact between
the biological and the adoptive parents in agency adoptions.
Adoption agencies are also generally responsible for investigating the
fitness of prospective adoptive parents. Traditionally, many adoption
agencies restricted eligibility for adoption based on factors such as age,
marital status, race, religion, financial stability and emotional health.'"
These restrictions disqualified many prospective parents from participating
in agency adoptions and discouraged others from even applying to
agencies.
Once an agency approves prospective parents for adoption, those
parents are typically placed on a waiting list until a suitable child becomes
available for adoption. The waiting period for a healthy infant today can
be as long as four to six years.'" When a possible child becomes
available, the agency often performs additional studies on the biological
parents and adoptive parents in an effort to ensure the success of the
adoption. Agencies also provide for the care of the child should problems
arise in the adoption process, and may perform follow-up studies after
placing the child in the adoptive home, to ensure that the child and family
are adjusting well."6 7
birth of her child. Although the mother may tentatively plan to relinquish her child during
pregnancy, she will have to reaffirm her intention after the child's birth, since a mother's
pre-birth consent to the adoption generally is not enforceable.
164.
See Nancy Gibbs, The Baby Chase, TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 86, 89 (birth
mother now plays a role in selecting adoptive parents in most agency adoptions); Lincoln
Caplan, An Open Adoption-I, THE NEW YORKER, May 21, 1990, at 40, 47 (describing
changes in agency adoption practice); Cythina Crossen, Hard Choices: In Today's
Adoptions, The Biological ParentsAre Calling the Shots, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1989,
at 1.
165.
Hollinger, supra note 161, at p. 1-64; see Natalie H. Wallisch, Note,
Independent Adoption. Regulating the Middleman, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 330-31
(1985). Some agencies also required applicants to present proof of their infertility.
Hollinger, supra note 161, at p. 1-64.
166.
David Ranii, Adoption: The Focus Shifts to Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., August
20, 1984, at 1. By contrast, potential adoptive parents in California who pursue
independent adoption often succeed in adopting a newborn infant within 18 months.
David K. Leavitt, The Model Adoption Act: Return to a Balanced View of Adoption, 19
FAM. L.Q. 141, 142 (1985).
167.
Wallisch, supra note 165, at 331.
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Adoption agencies are heavily regulated by the state. In all states,
such agencies must be licensed and, in most, they must operate as
nonprofit entities. 1" Some adoption agencies are dedicated exclusively
to the provision of adoption services; others are part of multi-service
agencies or government entities. The Child Welfare League of America,

a voluntary association of social service agencies, has published standards
for adoption services provided by agencies."
2. INDEPENDENT OR PRIVATE-PLACEMENT ADOPTION

Independent or private-placement adoptions occur without the
assistance of a licensed adoption agency." 7

Instead, birth mothers 7"

and prospective adoptive parents deal directly with each other or, more
commonly, through an intermediary such as a physician or a lawyer." n
Often, potential adoptive parents seek out pregnant women who are
considering adoption by placing advertisements in newspapers or
magazines. These advertisements typically promise a loving and
financially secure home for the baby, along with payment of the pregnant
168.

Id. at 332-33; Boskey, supra note 161, at p. 3-18.

169.

CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMEMCA,

STANDARDS

FOR ADOPTION

SERvIcES (Rev. Ed. 1978); see Boskey, supra note 161, at p. 3-7 & n.20.
170.
Walliseh, supra note 165, at 334; Tegeler, supra note 162, at 132. All but
seven states apparently allow parents to place their children with unrelated prospective
adopters, either through a direct private placement or with the assistance. of an
intermediary. In the seven states that do not allow private placement, only licensed state
or private agencies are authorized to place children for adoption by non-relatives. Even
in these states, however, birth parents may be able to arrange to have an agency place the
child with someone selected by the parents, or to get a judicial or administrative waiver
of the agency-placement requirement, if they can show that a waiver is in the best
interests of the child. Hollinger, supra note 161, at p. 1-66.
171.
In an independent adoption, an attorney or other intermediary will generally
deal only with the biological mother and will only infrequently meet or have substantive
dealings with the biological father. David K. Leavitt & Althea L. Jordan, The Attorney's
Role in Independent Adoption: Dual Representation, in ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE,

supra note 161, at p. 5-1, p. 5-7 & n.6.
172.
See Barbara L. Atwell,. Note, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of
Incompatibility, 20 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1990). Some states explicitly
permit third party intermediaries to assist a birth parent in locating prospective adopters
and in arranging for the actual physical transfer of the child. These states supposedly hold
intermediaries to strict accounting requirements for their fees and expenses. Boskey,
supra note 161, at p. 3-32. Other states permit private placements by parents, but
prohibit unlicensed intermediaries, including lawyers, from engaging in "child-placement"
activities. Even in these states, however, it is considered appropriate for lawyers
representing prospective adoptive parents to advise them on how to locate a child, and for
lawyers representing birth parents to advise them on how to evaluate prospective adopters.
Id. at pp. 3-32 to 3-33.
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woman's medical and legal expenses.'" Some lawyers specializing in
private adoptions engage in similar advertising directed at expectant
mothers.174 Couples seeking to adopt privately are also counseled to
send their resumes to obstetricians and to
post their resumes in public
175
places, particularly on college campuses.
Over the past ten years, there has been a marked increase in privateplacement adoptions, particularly for healthy white infants.176 A recent
treatise on adoption asserts that today "[tihe overwhelming majority of
healthy infants are adopted through private placements."'" Other
commentators report that, in California and other states that allow private
adoption, up to eighty percent of all newborn adoptions are handled
privately. 1" In the mid-1970s, by contrast, private adoptions accounted
for less than a third of all infant placements. 79
173.
See Lichtenstein, The Baby-Go-Round.. Want-Ad Adoptions, N.Y. MAO.,
Sept. 28, 1981, at 40. One such advertisement, in a South Carolina newspaper, read:
Adoption: Loving financially secure, college educated couple. Much love &
happiness to give to adopted white newborn. We invite you to live with us.
Share our vacations. Live like a queen. All expenses paid. Legal &
confidential. Please consider this an opportunity for a new start for you in a
booming area (Houston) ....
Newborn Fever: Flocking to an Adoption Mecca, TIME, Mar. 12, 1984, at 31.
174.
See Adoption Lawyer's Advertising Pamphlet Aimed At Pregnant Women
CriticizedBy Bar, 14 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1497 (Aug. 23, 1988). A number of states,
however, prohibit such advertising. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1986) (prohibits
advertising by anyone other than a licensed agency); CAL. Civ. CODE § 224p (West
1988).
175.

CYNTHIA D. MARTIN, BEATINO THE ADOPTION GAME (1980); Leavitt &

Jordan, supra note 171, at pp. 5-14 to 5-15.
176.
See, e.g., Mitchell A. Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, A.B.A.
J., June 1985, at 55; Wallisch, supra note 165, at 328; Ranii, supra note 166; Tegeler,
supra note 162, at 131. Data gathered in 1987 showed that between 1980 and 1987, 28%
of the adoptions of unrelated children were arranged without the benefit of an agency,
compared to 23% in the 1970s. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, ADOPTION IN THE 1980's, ADVANCE DATA No. 181 (1990). In
fact, as the title of the Charney article suggests, these statistics may represent not an initial
trend but a return to the notion of private adoption. It was not until the mid-1800s that
states first passed adoption laws asserting public control over the adoption process. Prior
to the passage of these state laws, adoption had been "a private legal act, like a
conveyance of real estate or a commercial contractual transaction." Katz, supra note 157,
at 9.
177.
Hollinger, supra note 161, at p. 1-64. A 1984 article reported that
approximately half of the healthy white infants adopted annually in the United States were
adopted through private placement. Ranii, supra note 166.
178.
Charney, supra note 176, at 55; Leavitt, supra note 166, at 142.
179.
Ranii, supra note 166. For a thoughtful and provocative discussion of some
of the forces that have facilitated the growth in independent adoptions, see Jane M.
Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REv. 105, 130-35 (1987).
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Private-placement adoption differs from illegal baby-selling primarily
in that payments to the birth mother are limited to her pregnancy-related
expenses, and payments to the intermediary (if any) are restricted to the
provision of professional services." ° The line between such permissible
and impermissible payments, however, is often difficult to draw."'
State laws differ substantially on what qualifies as a compensable

pregnancy-related expense on the part of the birth mother."n Similarly, the distinction between legitimate professional services and illegal
"child placement activities" on the part of an adoption intermediary is
neither clear nor uniform across the country. 1 3
180.
See Posner, supra note 160, at 60, 71; Atwell, supra note 172, at 13-14 n.62
("A black market adoption differs from a legal private placement or gray market adoption
only in that the intermediary receives a disallowable fee."); Paul T. Fullerton, Note,
Independent Adoption: The Inadequacies of State Law, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 754
(1986) ("A legitimate gray-market adoption becomes an illegal black-market adoption
when the intermediary or biological parent accepts an illegal fee.").
181.
See Boskey, supra note 161, at pp. 3-31 to 3-32 ("The question of whether
a particular private placement is lawful, or constitutes a 'black market' baby-selling
transaction may not be easy to answer."); Atwell, supra note 172, at 14 n.62 ("Since it
is so easy to cros's the line between a permitted private placement and an illegal black
market sale of a child, the threat of a black market adoption is greater with independent
adoptions.").
182.
South Carolina, for example, permits payment of "reasonable living expenses
incurred by the mother ... for a reasonable period of time." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-71690(0(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991). North Carolina, by contrast, does not permit any
payments to the birth mother, even for hospital expenses or prenatal care. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-37 (1984). Many states require an accounting of all adoption-related expenses
to be presented to the court. at the adoption hearing. Leavitt & Jordan, supra note 171,
at p. 5-35 n. 1. Wide variations exist both within and among jurisdictions regarding what
expenses are properly compensable. Compare, e.g., In re Adoption of Anonymous, 501
N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sur. Ct. 1986) (disallowing reimbursement for mother's pre- and postdelivery living and travel expenses) with In re Baby Boy, 552 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Fam. Ct.
1990) (birth mother may be reimbursed for wages lost in 10 week maternity leave; court
decries vagueness in statutory standards for allowable reimbursement). For a compilation
of state statutory provisions regarding permissible adoption expenses, see ADOPTION LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 161, app. I-A, answers to question IIC.
183.
See Boskey, supra note 161, at pp. 3-32 to 3-34. Many states prohibit
attorneys and other adoption intermediaries from providing "child placement" services or
from charging a fee for placing or locating a child for purposes of adoption. Katherine
G. Thompson & Joseph R. Carrieri, The Attorney's Role in Independent Adoptions:
Separate Representationof Each Party, in ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
161, at p. 6-1, pp. 6-35 to 6-38 & n. 15 (listing statutes). Interpretation of these statutes
has varied widely. In In re Baby Girl B., 544 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sur. 1989), the court held
that an attorney-intermediary did not violate the statutory prohibition on the placing out
of children when he physically transferred a baby from the hospital to adoptive parents
whom the birth mother had never met. The court ruled that the attorney's actions were
proper, since he had acted at the request and with the authorization of the birth mother-a
standard that would authorize virtually all placement activities by adoption intermediaries.
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Despite the fine line between private-placement adoption and illegal

baby selling, private adoption has become increasingly acceptable today,
in both legal and nonlegal circles.'

The 1988 Draft ABA Model State

Adoption Act not only allowed parents generally to place a child privately
for adoption, but also permitted intermediaries (such as doctors and
lawyers) to "assist a parent in locating or evaluating potential adopting
parents and transferring legal custody of the child to the potential adopting
parents."'
The Draft Act also permitted potential adoptive parents to

pay the birth mother's "legal, medical, hospital, transportation, maternity
home, counseling and necessary living expenses... preceding and during
pregnancy-related incapacity" as long as the payment is not contingent
upon the mother's consent to the adoption.'
According to one of its
drafters, the Model Adoption Act did not regard adoption as primarily a
public or social work activity; the Act was designed to "return control of

adoption as much as possible to the parties themselves and eliminate
unnecessary obstructions to adoption."'

Consistent with this view of adoption, a growing number of legal
commentators view private adoption as superior to agency-facilitated
placements, particularly for infants. 88 Proponents of private adoption
184.
See, e.g., Charney, supra note 176, at 55; Linda F. Smith, Adoption-The
Case for More Options, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 495, 526; Leavitt, supra note 166, at 142;
William M. Schur,. The ABA Model State Adoption Act: Observations From An Agency
Perspective, 19 FAM. L.Q. 131, 139 (1985). Private adoption has also been described as
a hot new legal specialty.
185.
MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT § 31 (Proposed Official Draft 1987), reprinted
in 19 FAM. L. Q. 103 (1985) [hereinafter, DRAFT MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT]. This

Model Act was approved by the Family Law Section Council in August 1987 and
presented to the ABA House of Delegates in August 1988. The House of Delegates failed
to approve the Act. However, the Model Act is influencing the efforts of a drafting
committee appointed in 1989"by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws to develop a new Uniform Adoption Act for enactment by state legislatures.
See Hollinger, supra note 161, at 3 (Supp. 1992).
186.
DRAFT MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT § 32(a). Subsection (b) of this section
makes it a misdemeanor for a birth mother to receive payment for pregnancy or
maternity-related expenses with the intent not to complete the adoption. id. §32(b). The
Model Act also requires the petitioner in an adoption proceeding to file an accounting of
all disbursements made in connection with the adoption. Id. §22. See In re Baby Boy,
552 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1005 (Fain. Ct. 1990).
187.
Leavitt, supra note 166, at 141.
188.
See, e.g., JOAN HOLLINGER, REFLECTIONS ON INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS,
LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 366 (1986); Leavitt, supra note 166;

Charney, supra note 176, at 53; Anthony T. Carsola & Susan Day Lewis, Independent
Adoptions: An Alternativefor Adoptive Parents, 9 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 4019 (Apr. 19,
1983). Independent adoptions have also received favorable attention from the popular
press. See, e.g., William R. Greer, The Adoption Market: A Variety of Options, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1986, at Cl; Lois Gilman, Adoption: How To Do It On Your Own,
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argue that, unlike agency piacement, private adoption allows both the
biological and the prospective adoptive parents to exercise control over
the adoption process. The birth mother can decide which adoptive family
will provide the best home for her child; 1" the prospective adoptive
parents can find out "specifically and in detail who their child was born
to, what the family tree is like, and what the obtainable family health

histories are."" 9

Because of this element of control, and because

parties to independent adoptions knowingly "choose each other,"
proponents claim that private adoption results in "fewer regrets on the
part of the birth parent(s) and a lower incidence of refusals to sign

consents to adoption."191
Proponents also emphasize that private
adoption appropriately minimizes state intervention into the private lives
of both birth parents and adoptive families. 1"
A minority of commentators are more skeptical of private adoption.
They caution that placement (or facilitation of placement) of children by

unlicensed intermediaries may not adequately protect the welfare of the
parties involved in the adoption, particularly the child."' They note
that while agencies generally conduct extensive preplacement screening

of potential adoptive parents, only an abbreviated form of post placement
screening occurs in many private adoptions." 9 Critics also argue that
MONEY MAO., Oct. 1985, at 161; Mary Kuntz, Paying Expenses Is Legal, Buying Babies
Is Not, FORBES, Dec. 31, 1984, at 128; Eileen Keerdoja, Adoption: New Frustration,
New Hope, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1984, at 80.
189.
See Carsola & Lewis, supra note 188, at 4019. Others suggest that it is the
intermediary, and not the biological mother, who makes the placement decision in most
independent adoptions. See JOAN MCNAMARA, THE ADOPTION ADVISER 77 (1975);
Wallisch, supra note 165, at 333.
190.
Leavitt, supra note 166, at 147.
191.
Carsola & Lewis, supra note 188, at 4023; see Leavitt & Jordan, supranote
171, at p. 5-11 ("The opportunity to meet and form a peisonal bond with the potential
adoptive parents enables the biological parents to entrust the child to others, close the door
and walk away form the child with a clear conscience.").
192.
Hollinger, supra note 161, at p. 1-65 (couples who adopt privately, rather
than through agencies, are "able to minimize the scope of public intrusions of their
privacy").
193.
See, e.g. LYNNE MCTAGGART, THE BABY BROKERS: THE MARKETING OF
WHITE BABIES IN AMERICA (1980); Alfred L. Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying:
Limiting Independent Adoption Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547 (1975); Carol S. Silverman,
Regulating Independent Adoptions, 22 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 323,329-31 (1989);
Schur, supra note 184, at 139-40; cf WILLIAM MEEZAN ET AL., ADOPTIONS WITHOUT
AGENCIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 28-34 (1978) (discussing risks of

independent adoptions).
194.
A home study is required by virtually all adoption agencies prior to the
placement of a child in an adoptive home. In private adoptions, by contrast, a home study
generally has not been performed prior to placement, although such a study must be
performed prior to finalization of the adoption. Boskey, supra note 161, at p. 3-20.
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the limited supply of "adoptable" babies, in contrast to the great demand
for them, inevitably generates pressure for unscrupulous intermediaries
and parents to sell babies at whatever price desperate adoptive couples are

willing to pay. 95

3. FROM PRIVATE-PLACEMENT TO MARKET ADOPTION

Although a majority of jurisdictions now permit private-placement
adoption, baby selling and baby brokering are currently illegal in all fifty

states.1

While few politicians openly advocate repealing these laws,

the notion of relying explicitly on the market to allocate children for
adoption has received increasing acceptance within the legal academy in

recent years.
The leading advocate of using market structures to govern the
adoption process is former professor and now federal appellate Judge

Richard Posner. In 1978, Posner co-authored an article that is usually
(though he claims incorrectly) described as advocating a free market in
babies." 9 The article provoked strident criticism in both the popular
and the scholarly press.'" Critics of the law-and-economics movement
seized upon the article as an example of the fundamental misguidedness
Critics have argued that such post placement home studies are insufficiently thorough and
that, even if the study reveals problems with the adoptive home, judges are reluctant to
remove a child from an adoptive home in which she has spent any substantial period of
time. See Wallisch, supra note 165, at 353-54. In response to these criticisms, an
increasing number of states that permit private adoptions have begun to require
preplacement approval of prospective private adopters. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
63.092 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-7-34, 40-7-40 (Michie
1986); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.190 (West 1992). However, these statutory
requirements are routinely waived in some jurisdictions. See James F. Thompson, Note,
South Carolina Adoption Law: Out of the Cradle Into the Twenty-First Century, 40 S.C.
L. REV. 767, 772-73 (1989).
195.
Schur, supra note 184, at 139-40; see Boskey, supra note 161, at p. 3-29.
For a recent example of the activities of such unscrupulous intermediaries, see Kathleen
Hunt, The Romanian Baby Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Mar. 24, 1991, at 24.
196.
See Atwell, supra note 172, at 27-29 & nn. 109, 110 (listing statutes).
197.
Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); see Posner, supra note 160, at 59.
198.
For examples of the popular reaction, see Paul M. Barrett, Influential Ideas:
A Movement Called Law and Economics Sways Legal Circles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4,
1986, at 1; Aric Press with Ann McDaniel, Free Market Jurist, NEwSWEEK, June 10,
1985, at 93-94; Lincoln Caplan, Meet Richard Posner, the Judge Who Would Sell
Homeless Babies, WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY ED., Oct. 29, 1984, at 23. For scholarly
reaction, see Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and the Ideology of
the Coarse Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 688 n.51 (1979) (calling proposal both
"irrational and immoral").
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of an economic approach to law."
Nine years later, Posner reiterated
his proposal in slightly modified form; this time it was the centerpiece of
a major law review symposium entitled "Adoption and Market
Theory." ° Not surprisingly, the proposal received a more favorable
reception than it had a decade earlier. One of the other symposium
authors, generally supportive of Posner's approach, characterized his
proposal to allow birth mothers to sell their infants as "both unremarkable
and unobjectionable.""

Judge Posner is up front about the "pressing social problem" to
which his market-oriented proposals are designed to respond: the
imbalance between the relatively small supply and the considerably larger

demand for healthy white adoptable babies.' Judge Posner's advocacy
of market principles thus makes explicit what has largely been implicit in
the growing acceptance of private-placement adoption: that the primary
purpose of adoption reform should be the satisfaction of "consumer"
demand for more (and better) adoptable babies. Attempts by politicians,
including President Bush, to persuade pregnant (and potentially pregnant)
women to "choose" adoption, rather than abortion, similarly reflect this
consumerist orientation. Posner's explanation of how a (regulated) baby
market would work also reveals that our current independent adoption
system already contains significant market elements." Thus, Posner
may not be far wrong in claiming that his baby-selling proposal entails
"
only modest changes in "the existing market in babies for adoption. 2

199.
See, e.g., Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder To
Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1986).
200.
Posner, supra note 160.
201.
Ronald A. Cass, Coping With Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on
Posnerandthe Law-And-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. REv. 73, 73-74 (1987). The two
other articles in the forum were critical of Posner's approach. Even those articles,
however, viewed Posner's proposal as worthy of serious academic analysis. Tamar
Frankel & Frances H. Miller, The Inapplicabilityof Market Theory to Adoptions, 67 B.U.
L. REv. 99 (1987); Jane M. Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REv.
105 (1987).
202.
Posner, supra note 160, at 61; see Cohen, supra note 201, at 105-06. At
least some of Posner's critics appear to agree with his characterization of the problem.
See, e.g., J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market For Babies, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 342
(1984) (describing as "tragic" the results of the existing adoption system, which leaves
"many couples deprived of the privileges and joys of child rearing").
203.
See Posner, supra note 160, at 60.
204.
Id. Accord ELLMAN ET AL., supranote 109, at 1306 (characterizing Posner's
proposal as seeking simply to improve the functioning of the existing adoption market).
The "modest changes" that Posner proposes, however, have enormous practical and
symbolic consequences. See Cohen, supra note 201, at 135-55 (exploring potential effects
of a baby market).
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Nor is Judge Posner the only public advocate of legalizing the market
in babies. One South Carolina family court judge reportedly stated:
Even if baby selling does exist, what's so horrible about that?
If the child is going to a home with good parents who can give
it all the love and security it will ever need, why should we care
if the parents paid $50,000 for the privilege? The child is
happy, the parents are happy, so what is the harm?'
Conservative spokesperson Phyllis Schlafly apparently agrees: "Where
there is a willing seller and an eager buyer, and the baby moves from an
unwanted environment into a home with loving adoptive parents, where's
the crime? . . . If there is such a thing as a victimless crime, this is

it."

6

4. SURROGATE MOTHERING

In many ways, surrogate mothering is the ultimate form of private
adoption; many also describe it as babyseling. 1
In a surrogate
parenting arrangement, potential adoptive parents contract to procure a
child even before that child has been conceived. The parties to a
surrogacy agreement find and deal with each other privately, either
directly or through a private, for-profit intermediary. State involvement
in the surrogacy process (assuming all goes well) is limited to approval
of the adoption that eventually results."
Although surrogate motherhood has an ancient pedigree, the use of
surrogacy contracts as a reproductive option is a recent phenomenon.
According to one expert, contract surrogacy emerged around 1976."
By the end of 1986, approximately 500 children had been born as a result
205.

Newborn Fever: Flocking to An Adoption Mecca, TIME, Mar. 12, 1984, at

31.
206.
MCTAGOART, supra note 193, at 317. Cf.Prichard, supra note 202, at 356
("We may well be in just such a period of transition to a society in which the objections
to the baby market will lose much of their force.").
207.
See, e.g., Atwell, supra note 172, at 15 ("Surrogate parenting agreements
are, in effect, a form of independent adoption."); Posner, supra note 160, at 71-72
(describing surrogate motherhood as an "important example of legal baby selling").
Experts estimate that as many as 4000 babies have been born to surrogate mothers in the
United States. Jay Mathews, California SurrogateStirs Dispute, WASH. POST, Sept. 21,
1990, at A8.
208.
A recent New Hampshire statute which legalizes surrogate parenting
arrangements contemplates a more active state regulatory role in the surrogacy process.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (Supp. 1991).
209.
MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 5 (1988).
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of surrogacy contracts;21 by mid-1990, this number had increased to
A 1989 Detroit News article estimated that,
approximately 4000."'
during the 1980s, would-be parents spent more than $33 million dollars
in connection with more than 1200 commercial surrogacy births. 22

As both the incidence and the publicity surrounding surrogacy have
grown, more and more people have come to consider surrogacy an
acceptable means of becoming a parent. In a 1987 Gallup survey, 35%
of adults polled indicated that they would consider surrogacy if they
wanted a child but could not have one because of fertility or other health
problems." 3 An even greater percentage of people generally approve

of contract surrogacy, even if they would not personally avail themselves
of such a reproductive option. Approximately 66% of magazine readers
responding to a 1986 poll on reproductive technologies favored surrogate
motherhood, while only 21% opposed it.2 4 An even larger majority-70%-favored gestational surrogacy arrangements undertaken in

connection with in vitro fertilization, an option only 18% opposed.213
Even the widely publicized Baby M decision, which held that paid
surrogacy contracts violated New Jersey's baby selling laws, does not

seem to have undermined public approval of contract surrogacy. A 1991
National Law Journal poll reported that more than half of adults surveyed
210.
Id.
211.
Mathews, supra note 207.
212.
Rebecca Powers & Sheila G. Belloli, The Baby Business: A Detroit News
Special Report, DETROrr NEWS, Sept. 17, 1989, at IS.
213.
Surrogate Mothers: A Newsweek Poll, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 48.
Fifteen percent of the women questioned in that same survey indicated that they would
consider becoming surrogates for the standard $10,000 fee. Id.
See LoRi B. ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANOERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS,
214.
EXPECTANT FATHERS & BRAVE NEW BABiES 209 (1989). Polls conducted by Newsweek,
Glamour and Parents magazines produced similar results. In the Parentspoll, 58% of
respondents approved of surrogacy, while 32% opposed it. Only 22% of respondents
favored laws that prohibited surrogate motherhood. Thirty-nine percent favored laws that
would permit surrogacy with appropriate regulation, while 35% opposed any sort of
legislation on the grounds that this is a personal matter in which the government should
not become involved. Id. at 209-10.
215.
Id. In a gestational surrogacy arrangement, the egg of the intended mother
is fertilized in vitro with the sperm of the intended father and the resulting pre-embryo
is then transferred into the uterus of the surrogate mother. See Karen H. Rothenberg,
Gestational Surrogacy and the Health Care Provider: Put Part of the 'IVF Genie' Back
Into The Bottle, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 345, 350 n. 1 (1990). This differs from
the more typical genetic surrogacy arrangement, in which the surrogate mother both
provides the egg and gestates the pregnancy. Id. Since 1986, there have been about 100
births by gestational surrogates in the United States. Id.; see Martin Kasindorf, And Baby
Makes Four: Johnson v. Calvert Illustrates Just About Everything That Can Go Wrong in
SurrogateBirths, L.A. TIMES MAo., Jan. 20, 1991, at 10.
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thought that couples should be allowed to pay a woman to conceive a
child for them using the sperm of the husband; 65% said that the
surrogate should be legally required to give up the child; and 57%
thought that she should have no visitation rights.216 Among younger
adults, 18 to 34 years old, 65% supported the surrogacy option.217
Similarly, more than half of those questioned in a 1989 Detroit News poll
said that surrogacy should not be regulated or restricted by the
government,
while only 27 %supported a government ban on pregnancy218
for-pay.
The typical surrogacy arrangement involves a married couple who
desire a biologically-related child but cannot produce one on their own
because the woman is unable to conceive or to carry a pregnancy.219
In a so-called "traditional" surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate mother
is artificially inseminated with the sperm of the commissioning father; she
is thus genetically as well as gestationally related to the child that she
contracts to bearY In a second and increasingly common type of
surrogacy, infertile couples hire surrogates to carry their own genetic
material. Under such "gestational surrogacy" arrangements, the egg and
sperm of the commissioning parents are fertilized in vitro and transferred
to the womb of a genetically unrelated surrogate mother, who agrees to
carry the pregnancy to term." . Gestational surrogacy is both more
216.
Rorie Sherman, Bioethics Debate; Americans Polled on Bioethics, NAT'L
L.J., May 13, 1991, at 1; see also AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON ETHICS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD,
COMMIEE OPINION No. 88 (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter ETHICAL ISSUES IN SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD) (concluding that paid surrogate parenting arrangements are morally
justifiable, in cases of medical need).
217.
Sherman, supra note 216. According to the survey, blacks are far less
supportive of surrogate parenting that are whites. Only 30% of black respondents,
compared to 54% of whites, endorsed the practice. The survey also found that people
with college degrees were approximately twice as likely as those with some high-school
education to endorse surrogacy: 61% vs. 36%. Id.
218.
Rebecca Powers & Sheila Gruber Beloli, The Baby Business: A Detroit
News Special Report, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 17-21, 1989, at 6T.
219.
FIELD, supra note 209, at 5; Surrogacy arrangements may also involve a
single man, a gay male couple, a single woman unable to become pregnant, or a married
couple that decides for reasons of inconvenience, rather than infertility, that the wife
should not become pregnant. Indeed, surrogacy attorney and pioneer Noel Keane
maintains that ."[s]urrogate parenting is an idea whose time is doming, not only for
infertile married couples but also for single men and women who want to have children
without romantic entanglements." NOEL P. KEANE, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 15 (1st
ed. 1981).
220.
See Rothenberg, supra note 215, at 350 n. 1; ETHICAL ISSUES INSURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD, supra note 216; Carol Lawson, Couples' Own Embryos Used in Birth
Surrogacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at Al.
221.
Rothenberg, supra note 215, at 350 n.1; see Lawson, supra note 220.
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expensive and more complicated medically than arrangements that use the

intended father's sperm and the surrogate mother's egg.' Nonetheless,
physicians and other experts report that gestational surrogacy, which is
often undertaken in connection with in vitro fertilization, has become an
increasingly popular reproductive option.22

Under a surrogate-parenting contract, the surrogate mother generally
agrees to conceive, bear and give birth to a child, to terminate her
parental rights, and to relinquish custody of the child to the biological
father or commissioning couple.'
In return, the commissioning father

or couple agrees to accept custody of the child and to pay the surrogate
mother a fee, as well as medical expenses, travel costs and attorneys'
fees. Typically, the surrogate mother also promises not to form or
attempt to form a relationship with the child, to restrict her activities
during the pregnancy, and to submit to genetic testing and to an abortion
at the biological father's request.' Failure to comply with any of these
222.
Lawson, supra note 220; see Rothenberg, supra note 215, at 348-49. In a
gestational surrogacy arrangement, a physician must administer hormones to the genetic
mother to stimulate multiple egg production and to coordinate her menstrual cycle with
that of the gestational surrogate. The surrogate then continues on hormonal injections for
several weeks to maximize the chances of successful implantation and pregnancy.
Moreover, to maximize the chances of achieving a pregnancy, multiple embryos are often
transferred to the gestational surrogate; this, in turn, increases the likelihood of multiple
births, as well as maternal morbidity and mortality. Rothenberg, supra note 215, at 34849; Lawson, supra note 220. A recent article estimated that the total cost of gestational
surrogacy to the contracting couple is about $40,000, approximately $10,000 more than
the cost of traditional surrogacy. Id.; see Powers & Belloli, supra note 212, at 6S (cost
of gestational surrogacy typically totals more than $40,000).
223.
See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 220. ("The experts say more and more
infertile couples are creating embryos from their own eggs and sperm and hiring other
women to carry the fetuses to term."); Gina Kolata, When Grandmother Is the Mother,
Until Birth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at Al (experts say gestational surrogacy "is
becoming increasingly common"); John A. Robertson, A Grandma'sSurrogacy Could Be
LiberatingStep, NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 1991, at 119 (leading bioethicist and law professor
characterizes gestational surrogacy as "an important advance" that will enable some
infertile couples to "fulfill their strong desire to form a family with biologically related
offspring").
224.
Brian J. Carney, Note, Where Do The Children Go?-SurrogateMother
Contracts and the Best Interests of the Child, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1187, 1192-93
(1988); Thomas A. Eaton, Comparative Responses to SurrogateMotherhood, 65 NEB. L.
REV. 686 (1986). To circumvent the baby-selling laws, the wife of the biological father
is generally not a party to the contract, unless she is also a genetic parent. Carney, supra,
at 1192 & n.37.
225.
Carney, supra note 224, at 1193 & n.41. Under the terms of the contract in
the Baby M. case, for example, Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to "undergo amniocentesis
or similar tests to detect genetic and congenital defects. In the event said test reveals that
the fetus is genetically or congenitally abnormal Mary Beth Whitehead, Surrogate, agrees
to abort the fetus upon demand of William Stern, Natural Father ... " In re Baby M.,
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provisions may jeopardize the gestational mother's right to compensation
under the contract.
Infertile couples generally find surrogate mothers through for-profit

agencies or brokers.' These intermediaries solicit potential surrogates
through advertisements in newspapers and flyers; they also use radio and
television appearances as recruiting devices. 7 Most agencies screen
potential surrogates for physical health, genetic disease and mental
stability, although both the method and the extent of the screening
vary. "
Although some surrogate parenting agencies also screen

potential adoptive couples to determine their suitability as parents, the
adoptive couple's ability to pay is generally the most important determinant of eligibility.2
537 A.2d 1227, 1267-68 app. A (N.J. 1988) [hereinafter Baby M. Ill, aff'g in part, rev'g
in part, remanding525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) [hereinafter Baby M.
11. If such a compelled abortion took place before the fifth month of pregnancy, the
contract provided that Whitehead would receive no compensation. If it took place after
that, she would receive $1000. Id.
226.
A 1989 Detroit News study reported that 27 surrogacy agencies and brokers
have operated in the United States since 1976. Powers & Belloli, supra note 212, at 10S.
The article noted, however, that more than half of these agencies have gone out of
business and that, as of 1989, only 14 surrogacy brokers were still active. Id. See
Carney, supra note 224, at 1190 (referring to approximately a dozen surrogate parenting
agencies). More recent newspaper reports estimate the number of surrogate parenting
brokers at more than 30 nationwide; this figure includes more than a dozen surrogacy
arrangers in California alone. See Kasindorf, supra note 215.
227.
See KEANE, supra note 219, at 173-85; ANDREws" supra note 214, at 4-7,
17-18, 63-64; Richard H. Nakamura, Jr., Behind The 'Baby M.' Decision: Surrogacy
Lawyering Reviewed, 13 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 3019, 3019-20 (June 2, 1987). Potential
adoptive couples also advertise directly for surrogates. See Nakamura, supra, at 3019-20
(reprinting advertisement from New York Review of Books seeking "tall, trim, intelligent
and stable" surrogate mother and promising to rear child in an "outstanding environment"
and to pay $50,000).
228.
Charney, supra note 224, at 1191. Most agencies also make some attempt
to screen out potential surrogates who would have difficulty relinquishing custody after
the child is born. Id. But such screening may be minimal and full results may not be
disclosed either to surrogate or to potential adoptive parents. Judith Areen, Baby M.
Reconsidered, 76 GEO. L.J. 1741, 1755 (1988); see Nakamura, supra note 227, at 3020
(psychologist who screens for leading surrogacy agency has "a moral objection to
screening out people" and rarely rejects a potential surrogate).
229.
Charney, supra note 224, at 1191; see Powers & Belloli, supra note 212, at
8S ("Most programs do not scrutinize clients who come to them for babies, as adoption
agencies do."). Some surrogacy agencies require that prospective adoptive couples
undergo medical and/or psychological testing.
AMY Z. OVERVOLD, SURROGATE
PARENTING, 166-68 (1988). Agency directors agree, however, that there is a lack of

clinical data defining the components of proper screening. In the absence of such data,
many agencies report that they base many of their acceptance decisions on "intuition" and
"trust." Id. at 168-69.
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Courts have reached different results on the legality of surrogate
parenting contracts. In the most widely publicized case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, reversing a trial court decision, held that a paid
surrogacy contract that included the surrogate mother's irrevocable
consent to surrender the child at birth violated both New Jersey's adoption
statutes and the state's public policy, and was therefore illegal and
unenforceable.'
Notwithstanding its determination that the surrogacy
contract was illegal, the New Jersey Supreme Court awarded custody of
the child to the contracting father and his wife under a "best interests of
the child" standard."'

In a more recent California case, a trial court upheld and specifically
enforced a gestational surrogacy contract, over the objection of a
surrogate mother who had changed her mind about relinquishing custody
after the birth of the baby.3 The appeals court affirmed, holding that
the surrogate mother-who was not genetically related to the child she had
borne-was not the child's "natural mother" and therefore had no parental
rights 33
A number of other state courts have also dealt with issues relating to
surrogacy contracts. Several decisions initially suggested that paid
surrogacy contracts did not violate state baby-selling statutes, since

surrogacy did not present the evils or pose the dangers that the babyselling statutes were designed to address.'
More recently, courts have
upheld statutory'restrictions on commercial surrogacy against claims that
those restrictions violate the commissioning parties' constitutional rights;
these courts have emphasized, however, that the challenged statutes did
not preclude couples from entering into surrogacy arrangements where.
compensation is limited to the surrogate mother's actual medical

230.
Baby M. H, 537 A.2d 1227.
231.
Id. at 1255-61. The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court for resolution of the surrogate mother's visitation rights. Id. at 1261-64.
232.
Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), aff'g Johnson
v. Calvert, No. 63-31-90 (Orange Cty. Super. Ct. Cal., Oct. 22, 1990).
233.
ild. at 376-81. The court reasoned that because the gestational surrogate was
seeking parental rights independent of the surrogacy contract, it did not have to decide
whether the contract was enforceable. Id. at 381.
234.
See, e.g., Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. 1985) (state
paternity statute could be applied to give the sperm donor in a surrogate parenting
arrangement the right to establish his paternity in court); Surrogate Parenting Assocs.
Inc., v. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (paid surrogacy contracts did not violate
state baby-selling statutes, since those statutes were designed to keep baby brokers from
pressuring parents with financial inducements to part with a child already conceived). The
Kentucky legislature subsequently passed a statute specifically outlawing surrogate
parenthood. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
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expenses.2 5 A number of courts have also approved adoptions arising
out of surrogacy arrangements, albeit while expressing doubts as to the
legality of the underlying surrogacy contracts.'
State legislatures have also taken various approaches to the enforcement of surrogacy contracts. As of November 1990, thirteen states had
passed legislation dealing with surrogate parenting. 7 A majority of
these statutes declare paid surrogacy contracts void or unenforceable as
contrary to public policy;"5 a few jurisdictions also make it a crime to
broker or participate in commercial surrogacy.3 9 In several of these

jurisdictions, however, unpaid surrogacy arrangements may be enforced
under certain circumstances. The Florida statute, for example, explicitly
authorizes noncommercial surrogacy contracts (which it refers to as
"preplanned adoption agreements") so long as they contain certain terms
235.
E.g., Doe v. Attorney Gen., No. 88-819032 CZ (Wayne Cty. Cir, Ct. Nov.
9, 1988) (upholding constitutionality of a 1988 Michigan statute prohibiting "all surrogate
arrangements where the surrogate mother is compensated (other than actual medical
expenses as a result of the pregnancy) and agrees to voluntarily relinquish her parental
rights to the child"); Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1183 (1983) (interpretation of state baby-selling statute to prohibit the payment
of consideration to surrogate mothers did not violate privacy rights of surrogate mother
or potential contracting couple). See also Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992)
(reinstating negligence suit against surrogacy broker and physicians for failure reasonably
to protect parties from foreseeable harm caused by surrogacy undertaking).
236.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl L. J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur. 1986)
(approving uncontested private placement adoption arising out of surrogate parenting
arrangement, along with contract payment of $10,000 to the surrogate mother); In re
Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Fam. Ct. 1990) (approving surrogate's surrender
of parental rights on condition that she forego $10,000 contract payment and that parties
submit affidavits stating that they will neither offer nor accept compensation in exchange
for the child); Miroff v. Surrogate Mother, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
Oct. 2, 1986) (condemning paid surrogacy contract, but approving adoption arising out
of contract in view of surrogate mother's post birth reaffirmation of her consent). C.
:Anonymous v. Anonymous, N.Y. L., Oct. 10, 1991, at 1 (dismissing paternity petition
brought by surrogate mother in light of state policy forbidding the exchange of cash or
other compensation in transactions involving the status of children).
237.
State Legislative Report: Surrogate ParentingContractLegislation Enacted:
1987, 1988 and 1989 Legislative Sessions, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES vol. 15, no. 2 (1990); id., 1990 Update (July 1990); see ELLMAN ET AL.,
supra note 109, at 1327.
238.
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 674 (1989) (but only contracts involving
compensation declared void); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991) (but
baby-selling provisions also amended to specify that they do not apply to' surrogacy
contracts, leaving such contracts unenforceable, but noncriminal); IND. CODE § 31-8-2-1
(Supp. 1991) (agreement not enforceable); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.2713 (1991).
239.
E.g., MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 722.851 to 722.863 (Supp. 1992); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1991) (no penalty specified); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1990
& Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.250 (1989).
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and so long as they give the gestational mother the opportunity to rescind
her relinquishment of parental rights within seven days after the child's
birth.' The statute also allows reimbursement to the surrogate mother
for medical, legal and "reasonable living" expenses. 1 Enactments in
New Hampshire and Nevada appear to allow both paid and unpaid
surrogacy contracts; to be enforceable in New Hampshire, such contracts
must be preapproved by a court and must give the surrogate seventy-two

hours to rescind her agreement to surrender the child. 2
In addition, both the Family Law Section of the American Bar
Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws have promulgated model acts addressing surrogacy. The
Model Act of the Family Law Section provides for the enforcement of
paid surrogacy contracts that comply with certain disclosure, screening
and compensation requirements; the Act also authorizes the surrogate's
pre-birth relinquishment of her parental rights and authorizes the adoptive
parents to sue for specific performance-that is, court-enforced delivery
of the child-if the surrogate changes her mind.' 3 The Uniform Status
of Children of Assisted Conception Act, adopted in 1988 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, contains two
alternatives for surrogacy.'
Alternative A provides for the enforcement of surrogacy contracts that have been preapproved by a court.'
Alternative B provides that surrogacy agreements are unenforceable and
240.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (1989).
241.
Id.
242.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 to B:32 (1990); see NEV. REV. STAT., §
127.287 (Supp. 1991) (excludes from baby-selling prohibitions a "lawful contract to act
as a surrogate" while also not "prohibit[ing] a natural parent from refusing to place a
child for adoption after its birth").
243.
MODEL SURROGACY ACT §§ 3-6, reprinted in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
POLITICS AND PRIVACY 270-80 (Larry Gosten ed., 1990). The ABA House of Delegates,
at its February, 1989 meeting, voted against endorsing the Family Law Section's Model
Surrogacy Act. The ABA instead endorsed the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act, submitted.by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. See Model Surrogacy Act Loses.in House of Delegates, 11 FAM. ADVOC. 64
(Spring 1989).
244.
UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACr, 9B U.L.A. 122
(Supp. 1992). The American Bar Association has endorsed this Uniform Act. See supra
note 243.
245.
UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, ALTERNATIVE
A §§ 5-6, 9B U.L.A. 128-30 (Supp. 1992). Under this alternative, any party may
terminate an approved surrogacy contract before the surrogate becomes pregnant. Id. §
7(a). In addition, a surrogate who is also a genetic contributor may terminate the contract
at any time during approximately the first six months of pregnancy. Id. § 7(b). This time
period was a compromise, chosen in part to correspond to the abortion right recognized
under Roe v. Wade. See id. § 7 cmt.
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that the gestational mother and her husband, if a party to the agreement,
are the legal parents of any child resulting from such an arrangement. M
A tremendous amount has been written by both legal and other
scholars on all sides of the surrogacy debate. u7 Most legal commenta-

tors who have expressed concern about. the enforcement of surrogacy
contracts have focused primarily on two issues: compensation to the
surrogate mother (and to any broker or intermediary) and the surrogate's

prebirth consent to adoption. Only a few scholars have focused more
broadly on the propriety or the wisdom of allowing the sort of private
transfer of parental rights and obligations that surrogate parenting
entails.'
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M. stated
explicitly that it found no legal obstacles to surrogate parenting when the
surrogate mother receives no payment and is given the opportunity to
change her mind and reassert her parental 'rights after birth.' ' The
failure of most courts and commentators to examine critically the private

transfer of parental rights that characterizes both paid and unpaid
246.

UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION AcT,ALTERNATIVE

B § 5, 9B U.L.A. 136 (Supp. 1992). If the surrogate's husband is not a party to the
agreement, Alternative B'provides that paternity of the child is governed by the Uniform
Parentage Act. Id. One state (North Dakota) has adopted this alternative.
247.
Full length books on surrogacy include, LoRI B. ANDREWS, BETWEEN
STRANGERS:

(1989);

SURROGATE MOTHERS, EXPECTANT FATHERS, AND BRAVE NEW BABIES

MARTH

A.

FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD

(1988); A.

OvERVOLD,

SURROGATE PARENTING (1988); SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY

(Larry Gosten ed., 1988); NOEL P. KEANE, THE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981). Law
review articles include Janet Dolgin, Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood: An
Illumination of the Surrogacy Debate, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 515 (1990); Colloquy: In re
Baby M, 76 GEO. L.J. 1717 (1988) (includes articles by seven authors); Barbara L.
Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv. 1 (1988); Margaret J.Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987); Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65
N.C. L. REV. 127 (1986); Avi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws,
20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS., 1 (1986). Writings by other scholars and professionals
include Michelle Harrison, Psychological Ramifcatiois of "Surrogate" Motherhood, in
PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF REPRODUCTIVETECHNOLOGY 97 (Scotland ed., 1990); Michelle
Harrison, Social Construction of Mary Beth Whitehead, 1 GENDER & SOc'Y 300 (1987);
Ralph Slovenko, Obstetric Science and the Developing Role of the Psychiatrist in
Surrogate Motherhood, J. PSYCHIATRY & L., Fall-Winter 1985, at 487; Philip J. Parker,
Surrogate Motherhood, Psychiatric Screening and Informed Consent, Baby Selling, and
Public Policy, BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 21 (1984).

248.
Two important exceptions are Janice G. Raymond, Reproductive Gifts and
Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 7, and
Dolgin, supra note 247. See also Areen, supra note 228, at 1745 (characterizing
recognition of surrogacy contracts as an extension of the general trend in family law
toward privatization of family issues).
249.
Baby M. ii, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988).
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surrogacy is not surprising; to do so would call into question not just
surrogate parenting contracts, but most forms of private adoption as well.
D. Privatizationof the Dispute Resolution Process
The shift from public to private ordering not only distinguishes
substantive doctrinal developments in a variety of family law areas; it also
characterizes important changes in the procedures for resolving family
disputes. In particular, mediation-both voluntary and compelled-has
replaced adjudication and lawyer-conducted negotiation as the preferred
means of resolving legal disputes relating to divorce and child custody.
Although mediation as a dispute resolution process has a long history
in a variety of cultures,' the use of mediation to resolve legal issues
relating to marital dissolution is a relatively recent phenomenon. 1 '
Under the fault-based divorce system, mediation played little or no role
in processing divorce-related disputes. A number of states had court-

connected conciliation services, but the focus of these services was to
provide marriage counseling aimed at reconciliation, not to resolve
disputes related to divorce.

2

Court-connected divorce and custody mediation became firmly
established in the 1970s. 3 With the advent of no-fault divorce, the
focus of existing court conciliation services shifted from reconciliation to

divorce counseling and custody mediation. '
In addition, a number of
states initiated court-connected conciliation services as part of their

250.
Ann Milne & Jay Folberg, The Theory and Practiceof Divorce Mediation:
An Overview, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-4 (Jay Folberg & Ann
Milne eds., 1988).
251.
See, e.g., KENNETH KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DIVORCE 178 (1985) ("The
field of divorce mediation is no more than ten years old, and only within the last five
years has it gained any real degree of public and professional visibility."); Daniel G.
Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation:
History, Review, Future Directions,
CONCUiATION CTS. REV., Dec. 1982, at 1, 3 ("Mhe direct application of mediation
specifically to divorce disputes has a very short history.").
252.
Milne & Folberg, supra note 250, at 5.
253.
Linda R. Singer, Divorce Mediation in the United States: An Overview, in
THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 11,

13 (Vermont Law School Dispute Resolution Project 1987). Although the rise of divorce
mediation can be seen as part of a broader movement in favor of alternative methods of
dispute resolution, the extraordinarily rapid growth of divorce mediation programs
indicates a particular willingness on the part of policymakers to institute alternative
processes (primarily mediation) in divorce and family matters. See Susan Myers et al.,
Divorce Mediation In the States: Institutionalization, Use, and Assessment, ST. CT. J.,
Fall 1988, at 17, 17-18 [hereinafter Divorce Mediation in the States].
254.
Milne & Folberg, supra note 250, at 5-6; see Fineman, supra note 135, at

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1497 1992

1498

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce."5 Although these services
initially focused on reconciliation, as no-fault divorce became more
accepted, this focus was replaced first by a divorce therapy model and
ultimately by the contemporary mediation ideal.'
In the process,
many social service personnel who had previously been associated with
court-connected conciliation programs were transformed into divorce and
custody mediators, often with minimal, if any, retraining. 7
The rise of court-connected mediation programs was accompanied by
a flurry of state legislative activity. By 1983, at least seventeen states had
passed legislation specifically addressing mediation as a form of dispute
processing for marital dissolution cases. 8 Individual jurisdictions also
jumped on the mediation band wagon. Between 1973 and 1985, at least
seventy-eight divorce mediation programs were initiated in various court
systems across the country." s
By 1988, court-connected divorce
mediation had been implemented in one form or another in thirty-six
states and the District of Columbia, with more than 120 programs
operating nationwide.'
Virtually all of these programs mediate child
custody and visitation issues; a significant percentage also mediate other
issues relating to divorce, such as child support and property matters."
In 1981, California became the first state to mandate mediation of
divorce-related custody and visitation disputes.6 2 In the wake of
California's action, a number of commentators predicted that the majority
of states would follow California's mandatory mediation lead, just as
almost all states had followed California's example in adopting no-fault
divorce legislation.'
While this prediction has proven somewhat
255.
See Fineman, supra note 135, at 743.
256.
Fineman, supra note 135, at 743.
257.
See W. Patrick Phear, Family Mediation: A Choice of Options, 39 ARB. J.
Mar. 1984, at 22, 27.
258.
Martha Shaffer, DivorceMediation: A FeministPerspective, 46 U. TORONTO
FAC. L. REV. 162, 163-64 (1988); see LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (A.B.A. Monograph Series No. 2, 1984).

259.
Divorce Mediation in the States, supra note 253, at 18 fig. 1.
260.
Susan Myers et al., Court-Sponsored Mediation of Divorce, Custody,
Visitation, and Support: Resolving Policy Issues, ST. CT. J., Winter 1989, at 24.
261.
Divorce Mediation In the States, supra note 253, at 22-23.
262.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1992) (effective Jan. 1, 1981). For
an analysis of the California mediation statute, see Susan C. Kuhn, Comment, Mandatory
Mediation: California Civil Code Section 4607, 33 EMORY L.J. 733 (1984).
The
California mediation statute was part of a legislative plan to facilitate joint custody
agreements between divorcing spouses. Id. at 743; see Hugh Mclsaac, Mandatory
Conciliation Custody/Visitation Matters: California'sBold Stroke, CONCILIATION CTS.
REv., Dec. 1981, at 73.
263.
Michelle Deis, California'sAnswer: Mandatory Mediation of Child Custody
and Visitation Disputes, 1 OHIO S.J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 149, 152 (1985); see Jay Folberg,
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exaggerated, a handful of additional states have passed legislation
mandating mediation of divorce-related child custody disputes on a statewide basis.'
Several other states have enacted statutes or court rules
that give judges the authority to order mediation in individual divorce and
custody cases, without regard to the consent of the parties.'
In addition, local jurisdictions in at least eighteen states have instituted

mandatory mediation programs.' A recent nationwide survey of more
than 100 court-connected divorce mediation programs reports that thirtyseven percent of the programs are mandatory for at least some issues.'
Private, noncourt-connected mediation of divorce-related disputes
also grew rapidly in the 1970s. In 1974, attorney and marriage counselor

O.J. Coogler established the Family Mediation Center in Atlanta,
Georgia.'
Coogler's book, Structured Mediation in Divorce
Settlement, helped popularize the idea of divorce mediation and provided
one of the first theoretical models for the conduct of divorce and custody
' mediation.'
His structured mediation model also formed the basis for
The Changing Family - Implicationsfor the Law, CONCILIATION CTs. REV., Dec. 1981,
at 1.
264.
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 752 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991)
(mandating mediation of all divorce cases in which child custody or visitation is a
contested issue); DEL. FAM. CT. C.R. 16(A)(1) (court rule mandating mediation of
custody disputes); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 107.755-107.795 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.1 (1991) (mediation required if custody or visitation issues involved); cf Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.081 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) (divorcing parties must participate in
"counseling for marriage assessment, divorce and separation").
265.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:351
(West 1991) (court can order mediation when it appears to be in child's best interest);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-602 (1988 & Supp. 1991) (court can order parties in child custody
cases to mediate their dispute before they resort to litigation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.183
(West Supp. 1992) (court may refer divorcing parties to mediation); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 598.41, 679.1-14 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West
1990 & Supp. 1992); MD. CT. R. S73(A) (1992) (court shall order mediation in contested
custody and visitation proceedings if appropriate and reasonable).
266.
See Divorce Mediation in the States, supra note 253, at 19 fig.2. The states
are Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Hawaii,
Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, Florida, Minnesota, Texas, Washington, New York,
Virginia and Wisconsin.
267.
Id. at 21. This 37% figure does not include programs in which individual
judges may require certain cases to go to mediation. Id.
268.
Milne & Folberg, supra note 250, at 6.
269.
Id. See O.J. COOOLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCESErLEMENT
(1978). Coogler was moved to write his book by his own bitter and financially costly
divorce. Milne & Folberg, supra note 250, at 6. For a description of the principles of
structured divorce mediation, see Sarah C. Grebe, Structured Mediation and Its Variants:
What Makes It Unique, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 250,
at 225.
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the first wave of heavily publicized and attended mediation training
sessions across the country.' 7 After Coogler's death in 1982, the
Academy of Family Mediators was established to carry on his mediation
model and training methods. 271
As the practice of divorce and custody mediation has grown in
popularity, it has also become increasingly professionalized. A number
of professional organizations, including the Association of Family and
Conciliation Courts and American Bar Association, have sponsored

mediation training programs and have formed committees to assist with
professional development of the practice.2 ' I At least two national
professional membership organizations for family mediators have also
been established.'TI In 1984, both the American Bar Association and
the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts issued model standards
of practice for divorce and family mediators.'7 Various state and local
court systems have also adopted practice standards and/or minimum

qualifications for mediators.'
270.
See Daniel G. Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History, Review,
Future Directions, CONCILIATION CTs. REV., Dec. 1982, at 1, 14. Coogler is referred
to by many mediators as the father of divorce mediation. JOAN BLADES, FAMILY
MEDIATION 126 (1985); see Penny L. Willrich, Resolving the Legal Problemsof the Poor:
A Focus on Mediation in Domestic Relations Cases, 22 CLEARINOHOUSE REV. 1373, 1374
(1989) (referring to Coogler as "the acknowledged patriarch of private family
mediation"). A 1983 survey reported that nearly half of all mediators then working in
both the private and public sectors had been trained by the Family Mediation Association.
Jessica Pearson et al., A Portraitof Divorce Mediation Services in the Public and Private
Sector, CONCILIATION CTs. REV., June 1983, at 1, 7.
271.
Willrich, supra note 270, at 1374.
272.
Ann Milne, Divorce Mediation: The State of the Art, MEDIATION Q., Sept.
1983, at 15, 16. A 1987 article reported that more than 5,200 people nationwide had
been trained to mediate divorce and custody disputes. Debra C. Moss, Enter The Divorce
Mediator, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 27.
273.
The Family Mediation Association and the Academy of Family Mediators.
274.
See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, reprinted in 17 FAM.
L.Q. 455

(1984);

MODEL STANDARDS

OF PRACTICE FOR

DIVORCE AND

FAMILY

MEDIATION, reprinted in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 250,

at 419. For a discussion of these two sets of standards, see Thomas A. Bishop, Standards
of Practicefor Divorce Mediators, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 250, at 403.
275.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1745 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992)
(requiring conciliation counselors in state's mandatory mediation program to have a
master's degree in a behavioral science); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 107.610, 107.775 (1983)
(mediator qualifications are the same as those providing conciliation services; conciliator
must have master's degree in behavioral sciences, or bachelor's degree and one year
training in behavioral sciences and two years case work or clinical experience, or
behavioral science bachelor's degree and four years case work or clinical experience).
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Despite this growing professionalization, the qualifications of
mediators vary widely. For example, a 1988 survey reports that many
court-connected mediation programs rely to a significant degree on unpaid
volunteers to mediate divorce and custody cases.276 Similarly, a recent

law review article asserts that even within California's mandatory
mediation system, instituted nearly a decade ago, "the services offered are
frequently inadequate at best, even from the perspective of proponents of
mandatory mediation."'
Divorce and custody mediation has also received widespread attention
and endorsement in both the popular and the scholarly press.2 8 Over
the past fifteen years, scores of books on divorce mediation have been

written and published across the country.'

A number of these books

276.
Divorce Mediation In the States, supra note 253, at 23 (Just over one third
of responding mediation programs reported the use of unpaid, trained workers to mediate
cases.).
277.
Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545, 1553 (1991).
278.
Richard Crouch, acritic of attorney involvement in private divorce mediation,
observed in 1982, "It is as difficult today to be against 'mediation as it once was to be
against motherhood. This dispute-resolution process is riding the crest of an immense
wave of fad appeal, within both the professions and the media." Richard Crouch,
Mediation and Divorce; The Dark Side Is Still Unexplored, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1982,
at 27. For examples of favorable treatment of mediation by the popular press, see
Sanford N. Katz, Mediation Is Coming of Age, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6, 1984, at 25;
Elizabeth Forst, Divorce Without Dueling, MCCALLS, Nov. 1982, at 88; Aric Press,
Divorce' American Style, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42-45; Ciji Ware, Wat A
Mediator Can Do, Ms., Apr. 1983, at 79-80; Ruth Simon, The Growth of Divorce
Mediation, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 1, 6-7. For scholarly endorsement, see Joseph
P. Tomain & Jo Anne Lutz, A Modelfor Court-Annexed Mediation, 5 OHIO ST. J.ON
DIsP. RESOL. 1 (1989); Nancy G. Maxwell, Keeping the Family Out of Court: CourtOrderedMediation of Custody Disputes Under the Kansas Statutes, 25 WASHBURN L.J.
203 (1986); Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative
Custody After Divorce, 64 TEXAS L. REv. 687, 756-79 (1985); Jay Folberg, Mediation
of Child Custody Disputes, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 413 (1985); Gary A.
Weissman & Christine M. Leick, Mediation and Other CreativeAlternatives To Litigating
Family Law Issues, 61 N.D. L. REV. 263 (1985); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes,
Mediation and Divorce: The Benefits Outweigh The Costs, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1982,
at 26; Patricia L. Winks,,Divorce Mediation:A Non-Adversary Procedureforthe No-Fault
Divorce, 19 J. FAM. L. 615 (1980-81).
279.
Full length books devoted exclusively to divorce and/or custody mediation
include LEONARD MARLOW & S. RICHARD SAUBER, THE HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE
MEDIATION (1990); EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INDIVORCEAND FAMILY MEDIATION (J. Kelly
ed., 1989); JOHN M. HAYNES, MEDIATINO DIVORCE (1989); F. HANSON, MEDIATION FOR
TROUBLED MARRIAGES (1989); DIANE NEUMANN, DIVORCE MEDIATION: How TO CUT
THE COST AND STRESS OF DIVORCE (1989); DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND

PRACTICE (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988); STEPHEN K. ERICKSON, FAMILY
MEDIATION CASEBOOK: THEORY AND PROCESS (1988); DIVORCE MEDIATION AND THE
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are essentially enthusiastic "how to" manuals addressed to the prospective
or novice divorce mediator. Legal and social science scholarship devoted
to.divorce and custody mediation has also proliferated, as have mediationrelated courses at both the graduate and the professional school level.'

Mediation proponents account for the growing popularity of divorce
and custody mediation by asserting that it offers a number of advantages
over both adjudication and adversarial divorce negotiation. They argue,
first, that mediation reduces hostility and minimizes divorce-related
trauma to both spouses and children. 1 It does this, they claim, by

facilitating direct communication between the parties and by converting
disputes that the adversary system tends to present as zero-sum conflicts
into problems that can be solved with gains to both parties, as well as to
children.'
By reducing divorce-related hostility, mediation is said to

both increase the likelihood that divorcing parties will reach agreement
and increase the parties' commitment to any agreement reached.'
Enhanced party commitment, in turn, results in increased compliance with
divorce-related obligations and decreased post-divorce conflict between
LEGAL PROCESS (Robert Dingwall & John Eeekelaar eds., 1988); P. FRANCES, FAMILY
CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION (1988); THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN DIVORCE
PROCEEDINGS; A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Vermont Law School Dispute Resolution
Project ed., 1987); CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS (1986); J. SHAPIRO,
PARTING SENSE: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION (1986); JOAN BLADES,
FAMILY MEDIATION (1985); DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION (Sarah Childs Grebe ed.,
1985); SARAH C. GREBE, STARTING YOUR OWN MEDIATION PRACTICE (1985); FLORENCE
BIENENFELD, CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION (1985); J. AVNER, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A
GUIDE FOR WOMEN (1984); K. SCHNEIDER, DIVORCE MEDIATION; THE CONSTRUCTIVE
WAY TO END A MARRIAGE WITHOUT BIG LEGAL BILLS (1984); JOHN M, HAYNES ET
AL., MEDIATION (1984); D. SAPOSNECK, MEDIATION CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES (1983);
J. COULSON, FIGHTING FAIR (1983); JOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION (1981);
HOWARD H. IRVING, DIVORCE MEDIATION (1980); O.J. COOGLER, STRUCTURED
MEDIATION (1978).

280.
See Brown, supra note 270, at 22. In 1983, Mediation Quarterly became the
first professional journal devoted exclusively to the theory and practice of family
mediation. More recently, the journal has expanded its focus to encompass the use of
mediation in other settings, including environmental, commercial, international and
educational disputes. See Editor's Notes, 7 MEDIATION Q. 1 (Fall 1989).
281.
See, e.g., BLADES, supra note 279, at 34-35; BIENENFELD, supra note 279,
at 27; Linda Silberman & Andrew Schepard, Court-Ordered Mediation in Family
Disputes: The New York Proposal, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 741, 742
(1986); Weissman & Leick, supra note 278, at 279-80.
282.
BIENENFELD, supra note 279, at 27; see Desmond Ellis, Marital Conflict
Mediation and Post-Separation Wife Abuse, 8 LAW & INEQ. J.317, 320 (1990); Martha
Shaffer, Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective, 46 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 162,
172 (1988).
283.
Schepard, supra note 278, at 768-69; Folberg, supra note 278, at 422-23.
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Proponents also claim that, because of its emphasis on party

control, mediation promotes feelings of competence and enhances the
conflict management skills of the participants.' By contrast, under the
adversary system, "because lawyers replace rather than assist couples with
negotiations, the agreements generated inspire little commitment and fail
to enhance the conflict management skills of the parties. " '

Mediation proponents also claim significant systemic benefits. They
assert that the widespread substitution of divorce mediation for more
adversarial forms of dispute processing will result in significant cost
savings to both divorcing couples and the public.'
In particular,
proponents argue that, where parties can afford to pay for mediation
privately, mediation presents "the unique opportunity to return to the
private sector part of an area that has been an escalating expense to the
public.""
Proponents also claim that successful mediation is swifter
than either contested court proceedings or adversarial negotiations; they
acknowledge, however, that these time savings evaporate where mediation
fails to produce agreement and the parties must resort to adjudication.'
Finally, proponents argue that mediation is superior to adversarial

284.
Schepard, supra note 278, at 769; Folberg, supra note 278, at 425-27;
Maxwell, supra note 278, at 205-06. The available data does not fully support this claim.
See Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of the Research
Results, 19 COLuM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 451, 469-71 (1985) [hereinafter Pearson &
Thoennes, Divorce Mediation] (reporting mixed evidence regarding the compliance
patterns associated with mediated and adjudicated agreements).
285.
Milne & Folberg, supra note 250, at 9; Deis, supra note 263, at 164.
("Mediation also demonstrates the kind of behavior required to make the agreement work
and forms the negotiation skills necessary to resolve future conflicts without the help of
a mediator or counselor.").
286.
Jessica Pearson, Child Custody, Why Not Let The ParentsDecide, JUDGES J.,
Winter 1981, at 4, 6.
287.
Schepard, supra note 278, at 769; Folberg, supra note 278, at 427-30;
Silberman & Shephard, supra note 281, at 742-43. In fact, information about the actual
cost savings achieved by mediation is contradictory and incomplete. See, e.g., Pearson
& Thoennes, Divorce Mediation, supra note 284, at 477-79; Tomain & Lutz, supra note
278, at 16; Lee E. Teitelbaum & Laura DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Divorce: Natural Experimentation in Family Law, 40 RuTGERs L. REv. 1093, 1112-16
(1988).
288.
Folberg, supra note 278, at 428.
289.
Id. at 431; see Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating
Custody Disputes: A LongitudinalEvaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497, 507 (1984) [hereinafter
Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating] ("Successful mediation clients move
through the court system faster than their purely adversarial counterparts, but unsuccessful
mediation respondents travel slowest.").
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decision making because it produces higher rates of "user satisfaction"

than either adjudication or attorney-conducted negotiation.'
Many of the claims made by mediation proponents are controversial
and have been questioned or criticized elsewhere. 1 Others have been
the subject of disagreement, even within the mediation community.' n
It is not my purpose here to examine the substance of these claims.
Rather, I note them to show that both the growing popularity of mediation
and the arguments offered in support of it parallel the substantive
privatization of family law in a number of important respects. First, as
mediation proponents have emphasized, mediation is consistent with the
underlying premise of no-fault divorce-that the responsibility for
determining when divorce is warranted rests with individual spouses, not
"The introduction of divorce mediation as a means
with the public.'
of allowing divorcing individuals to develop their own financial, property,

and parental agreements continues the philosophy of returning decisionMediation extends this preference for private
making to the family."'
over public authority to cover not only the decision to divorce but also the

financial and parenting consequences of that decision. "[M]ediation's first
290.
See, e.g., Joan Kelly, Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents'
Perceptions of Their Processes and Outcomes, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1989, at 71;
Folberg, supra note 278, at 434; Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation, supra note
284, at 463-65; Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating, supra note 289, at 505,
508, 514-15. But cf. Teitelbaum & DuPaix, supra note 287, at 1117-20. (criticizing user
satisfaction data).
291.
See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 277, at 1545; Ellis, supra note 282, at 317;
Wilirich, supra note 270, at 1375-78; Shaffer, supra note 282; Teitelbaum & DuPaix,
supra note 287, at 1112-28; Donald Summers, The CaeAgainst Lay Divorce Mediation,
N.Y. ST. B.J., May 1985, at 7 (emphasizing shortcomings of mediation); Laurie Woods,
Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progresson Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 431 (1985); Robert J. Levy, Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on
Mediation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 525 (1984). See generally Kenneth Kressel, Research On
Divorce Mediation: A Summary and Critique of the Literature, in THE ROLE OF
MEDIATION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 253, at 219, 220-21 ("[Slome of the
much ballyhooed virtues of divorce mediation have thus far failed of confirmation.").
292.
See generally Howard H. Irving, Family Mediation Research: Critical
Review and Future Directions, in THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 253, at 234; Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation, supra note 284, at 451.
Milne, supra note 272, at 15.
293.
Id. at 15-16; Ann L. Milne, Private Sector Divorce Mediation in the United
294.
States-Scope & Relationship to Formal Proceedings, in THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 253, at 91, 91 (Divorce mediation continues the
philosophy of reducing third party involvement in matrimonial disputes and vesting
decision-making authority with the parties.); Folberg, supra note 278, at 414 ("Mediation.
is a process of conflict resolution and management that returns to the parents the
responsibility for making decisions about their children.").
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principle is a reliance on private ordering and parental autonomy. Selfdeterminism is the basic premise. " '

Mediation proponents also emphasize that mediation allows divorcing
couples to exercise this decision-making authority unfettered by generalized societal norms and other traditional legal constraints.'
As a
leading mediation scholar explains:

The ultimate authority in mediation belongs to the parties
themselves and they may fashion a unique solution that will
work for them without being governed by precedent or by
concern for the precedent they may set for others. The parents

may, with the help of the mediator, consider a comprehensive
mix of their children's needs, their interests and whatever else
they deem relevant, regardless of rules of evidence or strict
adherence to substantive law.'
Thus, in the eyes of at least some mediation theorists, any attempt on the

part of the state, or even on the part of an individual mediator, to insist
that a couple's post divorce financial and parenting arrangements conform
to public notions of fairness infringes on the divorcing couple's right "to
make the decisions that affect their lives on their own, free of third-party
interference."'
This emphasis on enhancing the authority of private
295.
Silberman & Schepard, supra note 281, at 756; see Peter D. Axelrod et al.,
Custody and Visitation Mediation, in HANDLINo CHILD CUSTODY CASES: FAMILY LAW
SIES 42 (Ann M. Haralambie ed., 1983) (Mediation "makes the family, rather than the
legal system, become the place offirst resort, providing parental control over the issues
which will influence the family members' lives.").
296.
See BLADES, supra note 279, at 40 ("Mediation encourages couples to rely
on their own sense of fair play and justice rather than on generalized societal norms.").
297.
Folberg, supra note 278, at 419; see MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note 279,
at 8 (listing, as a basic assumption of mediation, that "there are no legal answers" to the
essentially personal questions involved in a divorce and criticizing attempts "to obfuscate
this self-evident fact with misleading labels which refer to legal answers as legal rights");
W. Richards Evarts & Frances H. Goodwin, The Mediation and Adjudication ofDivorce
and Custody. From Contrasting Premises to Complementary Processes, 20 IDAHO L.
REv. 277, 282 (1984) (Mediation "posits the superiority of consensus as a foundation of
settlement over the concept of rectitude, or standards of commonly agreed legal
principles.").
This disregard for precedent and lack of reliance on legal rules
distinguishes mediation from adversarial divorce negotiation, which is conducted in the
shadow of the law. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
298.
MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note 279, at 41; see id. at 64-65 (Divorce
mediation "rejects the idea that these legal rules and principles embody any necessary
wisdom or logic. In fact, it views them as rather arbitrary principles, having little to do
with the realities of a couple's life and certainly not superior to the judgments that they
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decision makers by freeing them from publicly-imposed rules and
constraints tracks precisely the rhetoric that has accompanied the shift

from public to private ordering of the substantive legal doctrines
governing marriage, divorce and the transfer of parental rights.
. Mediation theorists also espouse the view that divorce is not

primarily a legal event to be resolved with reference to public norms, but
rather an emotional and psychological process to be managed within the
family system.'
As such, divorce does not entail primarily the
termination of a legal status and the allocation of benefits acquired during
that status, but rather the restructuring of an ongoing personal and family
relationship.'
Having redefined the nature of divorce from a legal
event to a psychological process, mediation proponents argue convincing-

ly that the adversarial system is ill equipped to perform the essentially
nonlegal tasks associated with ongoing family management. 0
Mediation proponents, like other enthusiasts of private ordering, also
rely heavily on the notions of individual choice and consent.'1 z They

argue both that divorcing parties are entitled "to choose from a bevy of
professional services" in managing their divorce,' and that the process
of mediation is superior to adversary decision making because it affirms

could make on their own.").
299.
See, e.g., id. at 8 (listing as a basic assumption of a mediation perspective
"[that divorce is first and foremost an important personalevent in the life of a couple and
their family, and only secondarily a legal event") (emphasis in original); Evarts &
Goodwin, supra note 297, at 282 ("Since the [marital] relationship is primarily affective,
subjective, and emotional, the only enduring transformation of that relationship is one
which takes account of the true nature. of the relationship."); Fineman, supra note 135,
at 744-47.
300.
See Evarts & Goodwin, supra note 297, at 280 (contrasting adjudicative
perspective of divorce as "the termination of a legal relationship between the spouses"
with the mediation view of divorce as the modification of an ongoing emotional,
psychological, parental and financial relationship); Grebe, supra note 269, at 225, 226
(discussing "need to redefine the divorce experience from one of dissolving the family to
one of restructuring it").
301.
See Fineman, supra note 135, at 746-52, 762-63.
302.
Mediation proponents often have difficulty reconciling their commitment to
choice and party autonomy with their endorsement of mandatory mediation programs.
With the proper education, proponents believe that most divorcing couples will "choose"
mediation. See, e.g., Milne, supra note 272, at 29. In the meantime, however, many
mediation enthusiasts endorse mandatory mediation. See e.g., Pearson & Thoennes,
Divorce Mediation, supra note 284, at 455-56; Silberman & Schepard, supra note 281,
at 746. But see Richard Danzig, Toward the Creationof a Complementary, Decentralized
System of CriminalJustice, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1973) (compulsory mediation contradicts
the emphasis on voluntarism in mediation ideology).
303.
Milne, supra note 272, at 29.
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and enhances party choice.'
In this respect, mediation proponents
share with other advocates of private ordering the conviction that
arrangements that are based on private consent are inherently superior to
those that rest on outside authority, including the authority of the law.'

Mediation is also private in the more traditional sense of being
hidden from public view, a characteristic that proponents view as a
significant advantage. "Mediation is conducted in private, so that private
matters may be freely discussed without concern that the discussion is part
of a public record."'

Proponents view the private nature of mediation

as appropriately enhancing party control and as furthering the policy of
minimum state intervention in the family.'

Supporters of independent

adoption and surrogate parenting make similar privacy-based arguments
in favor of reducing government involvement in the process of child
transfer. Similarly, supporters of no-fault divorce legislation successfully
attacked the fault-based divorce system for forcing a divorcing couple to
air their dirty laundry in public."

The arguments made by mediation proponents have received a
favorable reception from judges, many of whom are uncomfortable
deciding custody disputes under the indeterminate "best interest of the
child" standard and at least some of whom believe that matrimonial cases
clog up the judicial system, taking valuable time away from more
important and more legitimately public matters.'
Thus, instead of
304.
See, e.g., Milne & Folberg, supra note 250, at 7 ("Mediation is first and
foremost a process that emphasizes the participants' responsibility for making decisions
that affect their lives."); Meyer Elkin, Divorce Mediation: An Alternative Process For
Helping Families To Close The Book Gently, CONCILIATION CTS. REv., June 1982, at iii,
v ("Divorce mediation, resting as it does on self-determination, endows the participants
with a dignity that flows from the ability to rationally determine the course of one's future
life through one's internal authority, strength and intelligence. . . . "); W. Patrick Phear,
Family Mediation: A Choice of Options, ARBIT. J., Mar. 1984, at 22, 29-30.
305.
Evarts & Goodwin, supra note 297, at 287 (Mediation asserts "the superiority
of consensus rather than the superiority ofjudgment and authority over the parties."). See
generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 297, at 956-57.
306.
Folberg, supra note 278, at 419.
307.
Milne & Folberg, supra note 250, at 9-10; see Folberg, supra note 278, at
419 ("Family mediation furthers the policy of minimal state intervention and recognizes
the family as a self-governing unit, even in decisions regarding its dissolution."); Janet
M. Spencer & Joseph P. Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposalfor Private
Resolution ofDisputes Between Divorcedor SeparatedParents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911,919
("As used here, the concept of privacy goes beyond merely closing the courtroom doors
to the public. It means not having one's domestic problems made a matter of public
record and not having one's future depend upon governmental fiat.").
308.
See Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L.
REv. 32, 85 (1966).
309.
See Fineman, supra note 135, at 759.
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opposing the shift from adjudication to mediation as an incursion upon
judicial authority, the judiciary has generally welcomed the opportunity
to reduce its involvement in divorce and custody disputes. This judicial
willingness to cede its traditional authority over the financial and
parenting consequences of divorce has further reinforced the
idea-implicit in the substantive privatization of marriage, divorce and
adoption-that the formation and dissolution of family relationships are
essentially private matters, as to which the public has little legitimate
interest and no important regulatory role.
II. PRIVATIZATION IN ITS LARGER CONTEXT

The privatization of family law has not occurred in a legal vacuum.
Rather, it is a natural outgrowth of important doctrinal and jurisprudential
developments that have occurred in a number of other areas. Among
these important legal developments are (1) the migration from
constitutional to family law of notions of individual privacy and
autonomy; (2) the rejection of traditional gender roles and the push for
formal gender equality; (3) the rise of law-and-economics analysis and the
application of economic thinking to the family; and (4) the increased
dissociation of law and morality in matters related to family relations.
This section is designed to explore the connections between the
privatization of family law and these related doctrinal and theoretical
developments. In undertaking such an exploration, I join other contemporary family law scholars in. attempting to bridge the distance that has
traditionally separated scholarship about the family from scholarship in
other legal fields. Situating the privatization process in its larger legal

and jurisprudential context also provides a useful vantage point from
which to evaluate the privatization process, a task I turn to in Part III of
this Article.
A. The Migrationfrom Constitutionalto Family Law of Notions of
Individual Privacy and DecisionalAutonomy
Concepts of individual privacy and decisional autonomy have long
occupied a central place in American political and legal thought.31
Until recently, however, these notions played a relatively minor role in
310.

See, e.g.,

ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM

AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985)

[hereinafter HABITS OF THE HEART)

(discussing the primacy of individual autonomy in the prevailing ideology of American
society); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.

REV. 193 (1890).
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the legal regime governing family relations."' To the extent that the
concepts of privacy and autonomy were deemed relevant to family
matters, they were generally ascribed to the family as a unit, rather than
to particular individuals within the family or to individual decisions about
family structure."' Thus, for example, the Supreme - Court in the
1920s, held unconstitutional state laws that required parents to send their
children to public schools313 and that prohibited parents from obtaining
foreign language instruction for their children," on the ground that
these laws impermissibly infringed upon the autonomy of parents to rear
their children. Similarly, courts justified their refusal to intervene in
intra-family disputes by invoking the image of the family as a private
domain "into which the King's
writ does not run and to which his officers
315
do not seek to be admitted.
While this notion of family privacy insulated from public oversight
certain sorts of decisions and activities that took place within families, it
did not support private choices regarding the formation or dissolution of
family relationships. Indeed, the traditional notion of family privacy may
have reinforced public control over the definition and composition of
families, since only certain sorts of intimate groupings were considered
worthy of the degree of autonomy that the tradition provided. Moreover,
an important component of this traditional view of family privacy was the
law's reluctance to enforce agreements between spouses or to adjudicate
interspousal disputes.3 16 In this sense, the traditional notion of family
privacy represented not a commitment to private ordering of family
behavior, but rather the substitution of the family for the state as the
relevant source of public norms.

311.
See Bruce C. Hafen, The Family As An Entity, 22 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 865,
899 (1989) [hereinafter Hafen, The Family].
312.
As Professor Lee Teitelbaum, among others, has pointed out, the effect of
the law's adherence to notions of family privacy and autonomy was to confer or ratify the
power of one family member over another. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135, 1174-79.
313.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
314.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
315.
Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571, 579 (1919) (refusing to enforce written
agreement between spouses); see McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953)
(refusing to enforce husband's duty to support his wife during ongoing marriage).
316.
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
639 (1980). For the view that this tradition of family autonomy contributed to the
subordination of wives by their husbands, see Kathryn L. Powers, Sex Segregation and
the Ambivalent Directions of Sex DiscriminationLaw, 1979 WiS. L. REV. 55; Lenore J.
Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169
(1974).
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In a series of opinions in the 1970s, the Supreme Court transformed
the traditional notion of family privacy into a doctrine that focused
directly on individual choice and that elevated to constitutionally protected
status a wide range of individual decisions regarding marriage, parenthood
and procreation. 17 These individualized notions of privacy and autonomy found fertile soil in state-family relations, where they combined with
the much older legal tradition of state noninterference in the family.
Unlike this older legal tradition, however, the Supreme Court's modern
privacy jurisprudence singles out the individual, rather than the family,
as the appropriate unit of insulation from publicly created norms. 9
The Supreme Court articulated this shift clearly in Eisenstadt v. Baird, in
which it upheld the right of unmarried, as well as married, individuals to
receive contraceptives:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted government
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.3 2
The Supreme Court's changing treatment of marriage illustrates the
effect of this doctrinal shift from family privacy to decisional autonomy.
One hundred years ago, in Maynard v. Hill,32' the Supreme Court cited
both the public and the private importance of marriage as reasons for
retaining a high degree of state control over the institution of marriage:
317.
See, e.g., Griswaldv. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Carey v.
Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
318.
See generally Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourseand the Transformationof
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1835-39 (1985) [hereinafter Schneider,
Moral Discourse].
319.
See Hafen, The Family, supra note 311, at 897-900 (discussing shift from
familistic to contractual assumptions in family law); Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and
Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 7-23
[hereinafter Hafen, Individualism andAutonomy] (discussing the influence on family law
of individualistic concepts of autonomy, borrowed primarily from the context of
constitutional law).
320.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
321.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). In Maynard, the Court rejected a
constitutional challenge based on the prohibition against impairment of contracts to state
legislation granting a divorce.
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Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as
having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people
than any other institution, has always been subject to the control
of the legislature.'
A century later, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court invoked a
strikingly similar characterization of marriage to affirm the existence of
an individual right to marry and to hold that state requirements that
significantly interfered with the exercise of this individual right were
constitutionally suspect.'
Although both Maynard and Zablocki
emphasize the fundamental importance of marriage, this importance has
profoundly different implications in the two decisions. For the Maynard
Court, the importance of marriage to both individuals and society is
precisely what justifies substantial public ordering of the marriage
relationship. In Zablocki, by contrast, the importance of marriage no
longer counts as an appropriate reason for state involvement; instead, it
becomes the linchpin for insulating private marriage choices from
"interference" by the state. Moreover, although both Maynard and
Zablocl emphasize the importance of marriage, the principal locus of that
importance has clearly shifted. In Maynard, the Court emphasizes the
importance of marriage to society, noting its critical role in preserving
-morals and ensuring progress. In Zablocki, by contrast, the Court
highlights the importance of marriage to the individual and uses that
importance to limit collective constraints on individual marriage decisions.
This shift in constitutional doctrine both reflects and has contributed
to a broader legal and philosophical change in the perceived nature and
purpose of marriage. At the time Maynard was decided, and for at least
a half century thereafter, the law characterized marriage as an important
public institution that carried out vital societal functions. By 1977, when
the Supreme Court decided Zablocki, both the law and the larger society
perceived marriage as essentially a private relationship, the main purpose
of which was to promote individual happiness and personal

322.
Id. at 205; see id.at 211-12 (characterizing marriage as "a relation the most
important, as affecting the happiness of individuals, the first step from barbarism to
incipient civilization, the purest tie of social life and the true basis of human progress")
(quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 485 (1863)).
323.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 (1977); see Robert D. Goodman,
In Sickness or in Health: The Right To Marry and the Case of HIV Antibody Testing, 38
DEPAuL L. REV. 87, 89 (1989). The Supreme Court first characterized the freedom to
marry as a "vital personal right" in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), in which
it held unconstitutional a Virginia law forbidding interracial marriages.
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fulfillment.'
Consistent with this change in perception, Maynard is
concerned primarily with safeguarding marriage as an institution, while
Zablocki focuses on protecting the individual's unfettered decision to
marry.
The perceptual shift from marriage as a public institution to marriage
as a private relationship leads naturally and perhaps inexorably to the
increased private ordering of marriage and its dissolution. If the main
purpose of marriage is to promote individual happiness, then it seems
logical that individuals, and not the state, should decide how their
marriage should be structured and under what conditions it should
continue. Moreover, if the law protects marriage primarily to safeguard
the opportunities it offers for individual happiness, then it is difficult to
see why the law should not also protect other consensual intimate
relationships that are likely to offer these same opportunities."
Similarly, to the extent that the preferred legal status of marriage derives
not from the social utility of marriage, but from its importance to the
individuals involved, then it no longer seems legitimate for the state to
privilege the decision to marry over the decision to enter into a functionally similar intimate relationship." 2
Indeed, once the essence of
marriage is recharacterized in this way, then extending to unmarried
intimate partners the benefits traditionally reserved for married couples
seems a natural extension of the marriage right, rather than a threat to it.
Viewing marriage primarily in terms of its potential for promoting
individual happiness also implies that the law should grant individuals a
high degree of freedom to end a marriage when they believe it is no
longer achieving these ends. The doctrinal shift from family privacy to
decisional autonomy is thus consistent with the rapid shift from faultbased to consensual divorce and ultimately to divorce at the option of
either spouse. Although the Supreme Court has never held that there is
a constitutional right to divorce, several commentators have suggested that
the right to terminate an unsuccessful marriage, and thereby become
eligible to remarry, is a necessary corollary of the constitutionally
protected right to marry, recognized in cases such as Loving and

324.
See Note, Interspousal Contracts: The Potentialfor Validation in Massachusetts, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185, 204-05 (1974); Hafen, The Family, supra note 311, at
898. See generally HABITS OF THE HEART, supra note 310 (drawing on empirical
research to describe how Americans over the past 50 years have shifted their view of.
marriage from a relatively permanent social institution to a temporary source of personal
fulfillment).
325.
See Karst, supra note 316, at 662.
326.
See Truethart, supra note 44, at 97-98; Eblin, supra note 37, at 1086-87.
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Zablocki.32' According to this reasoning, "[flault-oriented divorce
structures are not only outmoded but also represent arrogant state
intrusion into private areas of interpersonal decision making." 3" The
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico accepted just such an argument when it
ruled in 1978 that the constitutional right of privacy recognized in the
Puerto Rican Constitution required the territorial government to allow
divorce by mutual consent without a waiting period.' 2
Notions of privacy and decisional autonomy are also central to the
arguments made by proponents of divorce and custody mediation.
Indeed, proponents view mediation as superior to adjudication precisely
because mediation is designed to return decisional autonomy to the
divorcing parties.'
Similarly, mediation proponents often contrast the
private, confidential nature of mediation with the destructive public
exposure inherent in traditional adversary procedures. 31
Just as the doctrinal shift from family to individual privacy coheres
with the transformation of marriage from public institution to private
compact, so too has the Supreme Court's emphasis on autonomous
decision making about procreation contributed to a similar
reconceptualization of the nature of parenthood. Traditionally, the laws
governing the creation and transfer of parental rights emphasized the
importance of parents to children and, more generally, the importance of
parenting to society. Thus, the primary purpose of twentieth century
American adoption law was to promote the welfare of children potentially
eligible for adoption. 32 Many of the requirements imposed on potential
adoptive parents, such as the preplacement home study and the elaborate
agency screening process, reflect this child protective purpose.
Over the past ten years, however, the. law has increasingly viewed
parenthood in terms of its potential for adult fulfillment. Recent trends
in adoption law, including the increased acceptance of private adoption
327.
See, e,g., Cathy J. Jones, The Rights To Marry and Divorce: A New Look
At Some Unanswered Questions, 63 WAsH. U. L.Q. 577, 626-33 (1985) (Supreme Court
decisions support the argument that divorce is a fundamental righi); Karst, supra note 316,
at 671. ("To condition divorce on a showing of fault is to place an insuperable burden
on some spouses, and thus, as in Zablocki itself, to interfere very significantly with such
a spouse's decision to associate with another person in marriage."); Donna J. Zenor,
Note, Untying the Knot: The Course and Patternsof Divorce Reform, 57 CORNELL L.
REv. 649, 652 (1972) ("A corollary of Loving's constitutional right to marry... should
necessarily be the right to terminate an unsuccessful marriage without unreasonable state
delay, impediment, or moralism.").
328.
Zenor, supra note 327, at 654.
329.
Ferrer v. Commonwealth, 4 FAM. L. REP. 2744 (P.R. May 15, 1978).
330.
See sources cited supra notes 294-95.
331.
See sources cited supra notes 306-07.
332.
See sources cited supra note 157.
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and the rise of surrogate parenting, have focused not on child welfare, but
on effectuating adult decisions to acquire children. This shift in
orientation is reinforced by the widespread media attention and the vast
amounts of financial resources devoted to the "infertility epidemic."333
As one scholar and reproductive technologies expert recently observed:
"Infertile couples became the poster children of the 1980s."3'
Recent trends in child custody law similarly emphasize the importance of parenthood to adults. Many joint-custody statutes and related
parenting proposals emphasize the "right" of both divorcing parents to

close and continuing contact with their children, while paying little (or
no) attention to the nurturing obligations of parents who do not reside
with their children.335 Efforts to use the legal system to enforce what
are increasingly and revealingly termed the "access rights" of non-

custodial parents to their children have also increased, with few, if any,
parallel efforts to treat visitation by such parents as an enforceable legal
obligation. 3 Also consistent with the shift from child welfare to child

acquisition, Supreme Court decisions over the past fifteen years have
emphasized the importance to adults of the decision to become (or to
avoid becoming) a parent, rather than the importance of parenting and
decisions about parenting to children and to society.
Moreover, just as the recharacterization of marriage as a vehicle for
the pursuit of individual ends led naturally to the privatization of marriage

and divorce, so too has the recasting of parenthood in terms of its
333.
Despite a widespread perception that infertility is increasing rapidly in the
United States, government figures show that the infertility rate has remained stable in
recent years and, among married couples, has actually declined. See Research Refutes
Perceived 'Infertility Epidemic', WASH. PosT, Dec. 7, 1990, at All. Although the
absolute number of women and married couples with fertility problems has grown, this
reflects an increase an the relevant population base, rather than an increase in the
infertility rate. Id. A recent study by the National Center for Health Statistics suggests
that the increased use of fertility services and the increased number of older, relatively
affluent couples with fertility problems may help to account for the misperception that
infertility is increasing or that it is more common than it actually is. Id.
334.
ANDREWS, supra note 214, at 17.
335.
See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers And Draftees: The Struggle For
ParentalEquality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991). Some joint custody proponents have
claimed that joint custody offers substantial benefits for children, but there is little
empirical evidence to support this claim. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A
Dissent On Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497 (1988). Indeed, recent research suggests
that, in some situations, joint custody may be harmful to children. See, e.g., Rosemary
McKinnon & Judith S. Wallerstein, Joint Custody and the PreschoolChild, BEHAV. SI.
& L., Winter 1986, at 169.
See generally Czapanskiy, supranote 335; Carol S. Bruch, Making Visitation
336.
Work: Dual Parenting Orders, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1978, at 22; Cecelia T. Allen,
Note, Interference With Visitation As An Independent Tort, 24 J.FAM. L. 481 (1985-86).
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importance to adults resulted in pressure for increased private ordering of
the processes for creating and transferring parental rights. Advocates of
private-placement adoption, for example, have successfully criticized
agency practices for constraining the choices of unwed mothers, thus
discouraging them from offering their children for adoption. Critics have
also faulted agencies for setting unduly restrictive criteria for adoptive
parents, thus unfairly limiting the opportunities to acquire a child.
Advocates of free market adoption similarly defend their proposals as a
means of increasing parenting opportunities; they argue, in particular, that
for a relatively modest payment, many pregnant women might be induced
to forgo abortion and instead place their babies up for adoption, thereby
alleviating the undersupply of "desirable" infants for adoption." 7
Advocates of surrogate motherhood are even more explicit about the
child acquisition goals that surrogacy is designed to achieve. Well-known
attorney and surrogacy broker Noel Keane explains that he decided to
enter the surrogacy field
because of a very strong and straightforward bias. I believe that
children fulfill one's self in a way that nothing else can ever
equal. . . .And since I believe so strongly in children myself,
I feel that any qualified couple or individual who wants a child
should be able to have one, as long as they are not breaking a
law or harming anyone else.33
Surrogacy is thus touted as a solution to the "personal and social
calamity" of infertility and as a response to "the vast unmet demand for
adoptive children.""' Because traditional adoption procedures can no
longer satisfy the needs and desires of adults who wish to become parents,
surrogate mothers are necessary to "provide another source of children
for the infertile."'
As a mechanism for acquiring children, surrogacy offers a number
of advantages over more traditional forms of child transfer. As one
leading surrogacy proponent explains: "There is a simple reason why
people prefer finding a surrogate mother to adoption: the child will bear
337.
Posner, supra note 160, at 61-63.
338.
KEANE, supra note 219, at 23.
339.
Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections On The Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1793,
1796 (1988).
340.
KEANE, supra note 219, at 14; see id. at 12 (describing surrogate motherhood
as "a powerful new option that may replace adoption as the major hope for the infertile");
see BARBARA KATz ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 74-81 (1989) (discussing surrogacy as a

response to the desire of adults to own children).
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the genetic imprint of the man. " " Surrogacy is also promoted as
quicker and more efficient than adoption. "Through surrogate motherhood, a couple desiring a child need not wait an indefinite number of
years for an adoptable baby, as generally happens at the present
time."342

Given surrogacy's explicit focus on satisfying adult desires to become
parents, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court's pronouncements on
procreative decision making have figured prominently in the ongoing
debate over surrogate parenting. A number of commentators have
interpreted the.Court's privacy decisions as establishing a constitutional
right to noncoital procreation, which would include the use of commercial
surrogates.' The trial court in the Baby M. case, citing this analysis,
held that the fundamental right to procreate, which flowed from the
individual's right to privacy, encompassed the use of surrogates to create
a family.'
The court suggested that a state prohibition on payments
to surrogates, or a refusal to enforce surrogacy contracts, might
"constitute an unconstitutional interference with procreative liberty since
it would prevent childless couples from obtaining the means with which
to have families."'
341.
KEANE, supra note 219, at 15. Keane quotes the explanation of one of his
first surrogacy clients:
"Maybe it's egotistical .... but I want my own child. Adoption leaves me
cold. I guess for some women, as long as they have a child, it's fine. But
for me, it's like if I see my child do something, I need to know that he's
really mine."
Id. at 29-30. Gestational surrogacy arrangements produce children who are genetically
related to both members of the contracting couple, an aspect that proponents view as an
important advantage of this type of surrogacy arrangement. See John A. Robertson, A
Grandma'sSurrogacy Could Be Liberating Step" NEWSDAY, (Nassau ed.), Oct. 24, 1991,
at 119.
342.
Noel P. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 147, 147-48 (1980).
343.
See, e.g., CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY
(1989); John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and ProcreativeLiberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 956-57 (1986); Lizbeth A.
Bitner, Womb For Rent: A Callfor PennsylvaniaLegislation Legalizing and Regulating
Surrogate Parenting Agreements, 90 DIcK. L. REV. 227, 236-37 (1985) (woman has
constitutional privacy right to become a surrogate); Phyllis Coleman, Surrogate
Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestionsfor Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV.
71 (1982). See also KEANE, supra note 219, at 19 ("Critics say the adoptive parents are
'buying half a baby' but I argue that the constitutional right to privacy overrides any state
interest in preventing the legal payment of a fee from people who want to adopt through
[artificial insemination] and the use of a surrogate mother.").
344.
Baby M. 1, 525 A.2d 1128, 1163-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
345.
Id. at 1164 (citing Robertson, supra note 343).

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1516 1992

1992:1443

Privatizationof FamUily Law

1517

Those opposed to the enforcement of surrogacy contracts also invoke
the right to privacy; specifically, they argue that enforcement of a
surrogacy contract, over the objection of the surrogate mother, violates
that mother's privacy-based right to the care and companionship of her
child.'
The appearance of privacy-based claims on both sides of the
surrogacy debate indicates that straight right-to-privacy arguments are
often of limited help in resolving family law disputes. Unlike the typical
privacy case, which pits a single rights-holder against the state, family
law disputes, including surrogacy, commonly involve at least two rightsholders whose interests conflict. 7 Where, as in the surrogacy context,
both parties have plausible parenting claims, privacy doctrine alone
cannot determine which of their protected interests should prevail. A
constitutionally-based preference for private ordering of behavior,
however, is significantly more dispositive: it suggests that we should
honor the father's contract-based claim over the mother's status-based
objections unless the particular agreement between them fails to satisfy
applicable contract law standards of voluntariness and conscionability.'
Similarly, a conception of parenthood that focuses on effectuating adult
intentions to acquire children suggests that the contacting father should
prevail; after all, he intended to become a parent while the surrogate
mother intended, at least initially, to relinquish her parental claims.
B. Gender Equality
The privatization of family law is also linked closely to the rejection
of traditional gender roles and the law's embrace of formal gender
equality. Indeed, notions of both gender and racial equality have been
important subthemes in many of the Supreme Court's right-to-privacy
346.
See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy and the Baby M. Case, 76
GEo. L.J. 1759, 1761-62 (1988); Baby M. 11, 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988)
(describing constitutional argument of Mary Beth Whitehead).
347.
Carl E. Schneider, Surrogate Motherhood From The Perspective Of Family
Law, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL. 125, 129 (1990); see Hafen, Individualism and
Autonomy, supra note 319, at 28 (in family cases, in contrast to traditional civil liberties
contexts, "the Constitution weighs one individual's interest against another-or several
other-individual's interests."). For another example of a recent family law dispute in
which both parties raised constitutionally based privacy claims, see Davis v. Davis, 1990
Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), af'd, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (Tenn.
1992) (dispute between divorced couple, over control of frozen embryos created during
marriage).
348.
See Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood. An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 Ws. - L. REv. 297 [hereinafter
Intent-Based Parenthood]. But cf. Allen, supra note 346, at 1783-86 (discussing
limitations on contract enforcement).
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decisions. 9 This concurrence is hardly a coincidence; honoring the
decisional autonomy of those individuals and groups who have traditionally been disfavored by the law promises both to enhance personal freedom
and promote equality goals. Substituting private for public control over
the formation and structure of family relationships seems to offer a similar
double benefit: it expands the opportunities for the exercise of personal
choice while affirming the inherent equality of the sexes.
The rejection of traditional gender roles and the push for formal
gender equality have played particularly important roles in facilitating the
privatization of marriage and divorce.
Because the state-imposed
marriage contract both stereotyped and subordinated women, limitations

on interspousal freedom to contract became identified with the perpetuation of inequality between the sexes.35 It thus made sense for advocates of gender equality to espouse increased contractual freedom in and
around marriage as one way of avoiding the sexism of the state-imposed
marriage rules. At the same time, enthusiasts of marital and nonmarital
contracting were able to use gender equality arguments to support their

calls for increased private ordering of intimate relationships.351
Notions of formal gender equality also supported the privatization of
divorce.
Because the state-imposed marriage contract perpetuated
women's economic and sexual subordination, the shift from public to
private ordering that characterized the no-fault divorce revolution seemed
consistent with gender equality goals. No-fault divorce, at least in theory,
offered women the opportunity to exit from a relationship that confined
and subordinated them. 52 Moreover, no-fault divorce provided an
alternative to a fault-based divorce system that was itself rife with gender
stereotypes and inequalities. 53 Similarly, allowing couples to determine
349.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
350.
Sally Burnett Sharp, FairnessStandards, supra note 140, at 1400; see Joan
M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, PartnershipMarriage: The Solution to an
Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 577, 580, 582-83
(1974).
351.
See, e.g., WEITZmAN, supra note 48, at 227-31; Shultz, supra note 50, at
269-72. Gender equality notions also supported efforts to gain legal recognition of
consensual alternatives to marriage, since such nonmarital relationships provided another
way of avoiding the sex-based strictures of the traditional marriage contract.
352.
In actuality, neither organized women's groups nor concerns about gender
equality played a central role in the early stages of no-fault divorce reform. See, e.g.,
Kay, supra note 129, at 55-56; Deborah Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming The
Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives On Divorce, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 2, at 191, 195.
353.
Under the fault-based system, the standards for judging marital misconduct
reflected both the gender-based expectations of the traditional marriage contract and the
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privately the financial consequences of divorce seemed consistent with
gender equality goals, since the public rules that governed divorce-related
financial allocations were predicated on the gendered terms of the
traditional marriage contract.3" Indeed, courts have routinely cited the
emerging equality of women as an important reason for abandoning
traditional restrictions on the enforceability of private agreements
contemplating divorce. 55
The contractual ordering of marriage and divorce is also linked to
gender equality notions in another, more general, way. Proponents of
private ordering have insisted that the process of contracting is "by its
very nature, an egalitarian enterprise," in that it requires the voluntary
consent of two independent and autonomous parties." Moreover, they
have argued that the formality of contract-in particular its clear-cut
delineation of rights and responsibilities-tends to reduce discretion and
equalize power in relationships (such as marriage) that might otherwise
be hierarchical. 57 These arguments led many policy-makers and
commentators to accept uncritically the link between gender equality goals
and the contractual ordering of marriage and divorce.35
The rise of formal notions of gender equality also helped quell
objections to private ordering that were based on concerns about
disparities in bargaining power, particularly between husbands and wives.
Women's legal equality, coupled with the increased economic opportunities that were (or would soon be) available to them, rendered problematic
the argument that a system of private ordering would inevitably exploit
double standard applied to men's and women sexual activities. See generally SINGER,
supra note 2, at 1110-11; LAWRENCE STONE, THE ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 15301987 (1990) (discussing sexual double standard in English divorce law).
354.
See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down as violative of
equal protection Alabama statute that authorized the award of alimony to wives, but not
to husbands).
355. . See Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Ky. 1990); Simeone
v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 112 (W.Va.
1985). See also Robert Roy, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to Validity of

Premarital Agreements Contemplating Divorce or Separation, 53 A.L.R.4TH 22, 31
(1987) ("The courts have perceived women's relative equality to men as justification for
allowing them to see to their own affairs including premarital agreements.").
356.
WEITZMAN, supra note 48, at 230. See Oldham, supra note 146, at 760-61
(linking increased judicial acceptance of premarital agreements to the emergence of
feminism and the increased labor force participation of married women).
357.
Id. at 229-37; Shultz, supra note 50, at 260. Cf Patricia J. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 259-22 HARV.

C.R.-

C.L. L. REv. 401, 406-08 (1987) (illustrating use of contract mechanisms to establish
trust and respect).
358.
See Sharp, Fairness Standards, supra note 140, at 1400-01 & nn.ll & 17

(citing examples).
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women. Judges and policy makers insisted (sometimes gleefully) that
women could not expect to have it both ways: women could not argue,
on the one hand, that they were entitled to equal treatment on the job and,
simultaneously, insist on special protection when it came to marriage and
its dissolution. 3'
At least some proponents of private ordering
reinforced the notion of such an either/or dilemma by suggesting that
concerns about the exploitation of divorcing women themselves reflected
inappropriate or outdated sex-based stereotypes.' °
Proponents of private adoption and surrogate motherhood have also
employed arguments based on gender equality. Marjorie Schultz has
argued powerfully for enforcement of surrogate parenting contracts.as part
of an intent-based approach to parenthood that relies heavily on gender
equality concerns."1 She argues, in particular, that the law's refusal
to enforce private surrogacy contracts reinforces damaging stereotypes
regarding the unpredictability of women's intentions and decisions, the
desirability of segregating women from the market, and the givenness of
women's biological destiny.362 Enforcement of commercial surrogacy
contracts, by contrast, would promote greater gender equity by encouraging men's choices to nurture children and by helping to offset the
biological disadvantages men experience in. accessing child-nurturing
opportunities.'
Lawyer and reproductive technologies expert Lori Andrews is even
more emphatic about the positive link between contract surrogacy and
gender equality. She argues that both the practice of surrogacy and the
demand that surrogacy contracts be enforced is "a natural outgrowth of
the women's movement."'
The same feminist gains that have allowed
women to pursue educational and career opportunities previously reserved
359.
Cf. MARTHA MINOW, MAKINO ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 40-42 (1990) (discussing equal rights versus special

benefits dilemma).
360.
See, e.g., MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note 279, at 42 (argument that law
should judge the fairness of private divorce-related agreements "is grounded in the rather
unflattering and infantilizing notion that women, like children, need the special protection
of the law"). Cf.Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts
of Surrogate Motherhood, J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, Spring 1989, at 21, 27
("Tlhe idea that women who 'sell' . .. their reproductive capacity, like women who sell
sexual favors, are 'exploited' patronizes women.").
361.
Intent-Based Parenthood,supra note 348, at 398.
362.
Id. at 378-79. See also Robertson, supra note 341 (suggesting that surrogacy
"may be another step in the liberation of women from their traditional procreative roles");
Louis M. Seidman, Baby M and the Problemof Unstable Preferences, 76 GEO. L.J. 1829,
1831 n.5 (1988) (suggesting that restricting the enforceability of surrogacy contracts may
be inconsistent with a view of women as the moral and political equals of men).
363.
Intent-Based Parenthood, supra note 348, at 303, 378.
364.
ANDREWS, supra note 214, at 159.
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for men have also meant that more women are postponing childbearing,
and suffering the natural decline in fertility that comes with age. As a
result, Andrews argues, "some of these women [find] that the chance for
a child ha[s] slipped by them entirely and need[ ] to turn to a surrogate
mother."'
At the same time, Andrews claims, feminism has made it
more likely that other women will feel comfortable being surrogates by
teaching that not all women relate to pregnancies in the same way and by
insisting that women have the absolute right to control their bodies.'
To oppose surrogacy under these circumstances, Andrews argues, is
tantamount to telling'both women who want to become surrogates and the
men who want to hire them that "biology is destiny"-a message that is
fundamentally inconsistent with the equal treatment of the sexes. 7
Surrogacy proponents have also invoked gender equality notions to
argue that since most states sanction "surrogate fatherhood" by allowing
men to sell their sperm, a ban on surrogate motherhood constitutes
unlawful discrimination based on sex.'
As one commentator put it:
"Men and women who use their reproductive organs to provide services
for infertile couples are similarly situated but not treated alike."'
Proponents also suggest that since the law permits women to procreate
noncoitally through artificial insemination, equal protection principles
require that men be permitted to do the same via the use of surrogate
mothers. 3" The New Jersey trial court in Baby M. relied in part on
these gender equality arguments in upholding the validity of the surrogacy
contract. 7 '
In language that parallels the feminist defense of surrogate parenting,
proponents of divorce and custody mediation have justified their

365.
Id.
366.
Id.
367.
Id.; see also Posner, supra note 360, at 28 (feminist criticisms of surrogacy
"reinforce the anti-feminist stereotype summed up in the slogan, 'biology is destiny'").
368.
Keane, supra note 342, at 166. .f Peter H. Schuck, The Social Utility of
Surrogacy, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 132, 132 (1990) (noting that the sale of sperm
raises many- of the same questions as surrogate motherhood).
369.
Karen M. Sly, Comment, Baby Sitting Consideration: SurrogateMother's
Right to "Rent Her Womb"for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 539, 558 (1982-83). The

assertion that sperm donors and potential surrogate mothers are 'similarly situated" for
purposes of constitutional analysis has been sharply challenged. See FIELD, supra note
209, at 47-49; Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the OwnershipofLife, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 146-47 (1990).
370.

Intent-Based Parenthood, supra note 348, at 388; Jack F. Williams,

Differential Treatment of Men and Women by Artificial Reproduction Statutes, 21,TULSA
L.J. 463, 483-84 (1986); Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Baby M Case, 76
GEO. L.J. 1793, 1798 (1988).
371.
Baby M. 1, 525 A.2d 1128, 1165-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
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preference for joint custody after divorce by stressing the nurturing
capacities and desires of fathers and by emphasizing changing gender
roles within the family."

Mediation advocates have also used argu-

ments based on gender equality to counter fears that husbands would
dominate wives during the mediation process."
Additionally, a
commitment to formal gender equality underlies the preference of at least
some mediation theorists for "achieving the highest degree of financial
independence of the former husband and wife at the earliest possible
time.""
C. Economic Discourse and Law-and-Economics Analysis
The traditional view of the family emphasized its separateness and
distinctiveness from other social institutions, particularly politics and the
market. Because of this ideological separation, family law was not
thought to be governed by the principles and ideologies that, beginning
in the nineteenth century, increasingly came to govern other fields of law,
such as contracts and torts.375 Chief among the ideologies thought

inapplicable to family law was liberal economics, in particular the general
theory that the public good would emerge from the self-interested
activities of individuals. 6 Instead, the values associated with a "successful" family-altruism, sympathy, mutualism-were precisely those

that were viewed as incompatible with success in the economic
sphere."
372.
See, e.g., BLADES, supra note 279, at 27-28 (joint custody, which the author
characterizes as "a boon for everyone" reflects the fact that "[flathers are becoming
'liberated,' learning that they are important to their children and recognizing their own
need for intimacy with their children"); Michelle D. C. Samis & Donald T. Saposnek,
Parent-Child Relationships in Family Mediation: A Synthesis of Views, MEDIATION Q.,
Winter 1986/Spring 1987, at 25 ("It is a reality in today's families that there are often
two or more psychological parents in a child's life. Many mothers work outside the
home, and parenting as well as economic responsibilities are shared more equitably today
than they were in the 1950s and 1960s.").
373.
See, e.g., MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note 279, at 42 (1990) (fairness
concerns about mediated divorce agreements are "grounded in the rather unflattering and
infantilizing notion that women, like children, need the special protection of the law").
374.
COOGLER, supra note 269, at 16. See also Grebe, supra note 269, at 232
("The goals of most divorcing couples are financial and emotional independence. By
structuring the order of the settlement areas, the mediation process encourages and
supports the couple in achieving this independence.").
375.
Lee E. Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
801, 804 (1989); see also Hafen, The Family, supra note 311, at 899.
376.
Teitelbaum, supra note 375, at 804-05.
377.
Id. at 805,807; see also Hafen, Individualism andAutonomy, supra note 319,
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In light of this perceived dichotomy between the family and the
market, it is not surprising that notions of individual choice traditionally
played a much less prominent role in family law than they did in more
market-oriented legal fields. The notion that the public good would
emerge from a legal structure that accorded individuals a high degree of
freedom to plan and structure their own transactions-central to nineteenth
century economic thought-was deemed inapplicable to intra-family
relations. Moreover, the customary and common law traditions on which
family law rested did not derive from the premises of autonomy and selfinterest "inherent in the natural rights doctrines that fueled the political
and economic individualism of the nineteenth century." 3' Indeed, only
if family law carefully circumscribed the opportunities for individual
choice and reduced the incentives for self-interested behavior would the
family be able to serve its purpose of providing a "haven in a heartless
world. "'
Starting in the 1960s, scholars in a number of disciplines began
seriously to challenge the ideological and methodological separation
between the family and the market. In particular, several influential
social science theories challenged the notion that people do (or should)
behave differently in family relationships than they do in more overtly
economic settings. In the early 1960s, exchange theories in sociology
asserted that all social interaction could profitably be analyzed as a series
of exchange relationships." s Economic analysis extended this insight
by positing (or at least assuming) that human beings act rationally to
maximize their satisfactions in all spheres of human life."' This
assertion paved the way for the application of economic analysis to all
sorts of purportedly noneconomic activities, including family behavior,
and to the legal doctrines governing that behavior. 3"
378.
Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 571-73
(1983).

379.
See CHRISTOPHER
BESmGED (1977).

LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY

380.
See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE (1964);
GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961).

381.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 41-42 (1981)

("Particularly important to the approach of this book is . . . Bentham's insistence that
human beings act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions in all spheres of life, not
just the narrowly economic . . . ."); Id. at 237 (suggesting that people behave as

rationally in marriage, friendship and procreation as they do in traditional economic
markets).
382.
See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (1976); Essays in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN AND
HUMAN CAPITAL ( Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974); Posner, supra note 360. As one of

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1523 1992

1524

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

The application of economic analysis to behavior in and around the
family has influenced the privatization of family law in several related
ways. First, the economist's assumption that persons act rationally to
maximize their interests in 'all spheres of life undermined the sharp
distinction the law traditionally drew between the principles that should
govern family relationships and those that should govern transactions
outside the family.3" This meant, among other things, that those who
.objected to public constraints on family transactions could more legitimately draw on market analogies and on the law governing market
transactions in critiquing those constraints and proposing reforms. The
assumption that family members do and should act as rational maximizers
in their dealings with each other also meant that restrictions on intrafamily bargaining were vulnerable to charges of both paternalism and
inefficiency.
Second, the legal economists' insistence that the pursuit of private
self-interest generally served the public good eased both the need and the
justification for the direct pursuit of societal goals via the legal doctrines
governing the family. If deferring to the results of privately negotiated
family bargains is likely to promote the overall good, then what is to be
gained, as a general matter, by limiting the scope or substance of such
private bargaining?
Third, the economist's endorsement of consumer sovereignty-the
notion that the individual is the best judge of her own interests and
desires-strongly implied that the legal doctrines governing the family,
like the doctrines governing economic behavior, should maximize
individuals' opportunities to pursue their interests by bargaining freely
with other individuals.'" Moreover, the dual commitment to consumer
the founders of the "law and economics" movement put it recently: "Economics is not
just about the exchange of objects. Labor economics, and more recently family or
household economics, are important fields of economic inquiry even though they deal with
the exchange of, and not merely between, human beings." Posner, supra note 160, at 61.
For a recent attempt to construct and justify a theoiy of alimony primarily in economic
terms, see Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989).
383.
See, e.g., PosNER, supra note 381, at 2 ("If rationality is not confined to
explicit market transactions but is a general and dominant characteristic of social behavior,
then the conceptual apparatus constructed by generations of economists to explain market
behavior can be used to explain nonmarket behavior as well."); Mnookin, supra note 120,
at 1019 (private ordering of divorce "is premised on the notion that divorce bargaining
involves rational, self-interested individuals").
384.
See Posner, supra note 160, at 60 ("According to one of the least
controversial concepts in normative economics-Pareto superiority-a transaction that
makes at least one person better off and no one worse off increases social welfare, and
is therefore efficient. A voluntary exchange is such a transaction, since the parties would
not make it if they did not think it would make both of them better off.").
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sovereignty and the pursuit of self-interest in all spheres of life leads the
legal economist to celebrate private markets as the ideal form of social
interaction in both the family and the nonfamily realms. Government
restrictions on family bargaining, for example by the imposition of
mandatory marriage obligations or the prohibition of paid surrogacy
contracts, are presumptively illegitimate and can be justified, if at all,
only as a means of correcting market failure.3"
This limited view of the legitimacy of public restraints on private
ordering is reinforced by the legal economists' flattening (some would say
obliteration) of the distinction between moral or ethical values and all
other human desires. Economic analysis tends to lump these things
together as simple preferences or tastes (as in a taste for altruism, for
fidelity or for domestic violence) and denies the possibility of ranking or
distinguishing among them, except by reference to the results of the
market." Economic analysis thus renders extremely problematic what
has traditionally been a central feature of family law-state-imposed
restrictions on private ordering justified in the name of morality or public
values. To be sure, economic analysis leaves intact other justifications for
public constraints, for example, to correct for defects in the market or to
promote efficiency where bargaining is costly or impossible, but these are
not the sorts of justifications that have traditionally been offered in
support of public ordering in family law.
Economic analysis, however, does more than deny any meaningful
distinction between values and preferences; it also denies that we can talk
meaningfully about our values, whether through law or other social
institutions.'" Economic analysis thus privatizes the inquiry about
human values by suggesting that value choices are wholly private
questions and not the proper subject of shared conversation, whether
through law or other public avenues.
Economic thinking also contributes to the privatization of family law
in another, more subtle, way. The economists' model of all human
interaction as a series of exchanges presupposes the existence of things (or
resources), separate from the human actors, that are the subjects of these
exchanges.38 Where the exchange occurs in the traditional market
realm, the things being exchanged are likely to be material goods and
money. When the exchange model is applied to the family arena,
however, the things allegedly being exchanged-love, sexual services, the
capacity to bear children-are much more intimately connected with one's
385.
See generally Margaret J. Radin, supra note 158, at 1863-70.
386.
James B. White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN.
L. REv. 161, 173-74 (1986).
387.
Id. at 174-75.
388.
See id. at 167.
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identity and sense of self. Nonetheless, the economist is constrained to
think of those things as objects that can be possessed and traded-no
different, in principle, than cars or widgets."' Economic analysis thus
tends to erase the distinction our legal system has traditionally drawn
between alienable objects and inalienable attributes of human personality.'
Moreover, in conceiving of all human attributes as "things" that
can be sold or traded, the legal economist invites markets to fill the social

universe.391 State attempts to limit market transactions in any sphere,
including the family, become problematic; limits can be justified, if at all,
only as a means of controlling externalities that prevent the market from

working properly.
Economic analysis also denies the ability of law to shape our values,
by virtue of its assumption of stable consumer preferences. According to
the legal economist, individual preferences are fixed at least over the short
and medium term.'
While legal rules can create incentives for

individuals to act in certain ways, those rules cannot affect our values or
other preferences.' 9 This undermines yet another common justification
for public ordering of family law-the idea that law can perform an
important educational or inspirational role by encouraging individuals to
shape (or reshape) their values in ways society collectively thinks
desirable.

389.
Richard Posner, for example, finds it useful "[flor heuristic purposes (only!)
..to analogize the sale of babies to the sale of an ordinary good, such as an automobile
or a television set." Posner, supra note 160, at 64. Nobel prize winner Gary Becker,
a leading economist of the family, similarly defines love as a "particular non-marketable
household commodit[y]." Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part II, 82 J.POL.
ECON. 511, 512 (1974).
390.
Radin, supra note 158, at 1880-81.
See id. at 1905 ("Universal
commodification undermines personal identity by conceiving of personal attributes,
relationships, and philosophical and moral commitments as monetizable and alienable from
the self.").
391.
Id. at 1851; cf. Posner, supra note 360, at 31 (attributing judicial refusal to
enforce surrogacy contracts to "the hostility to markets" characteristic of judges and other
American intellectuals).
392.
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10
(1983). See MINOW, supra note 359, at 162 (According to law and economics analysis,
people's wants and preference are "subjective and taken as givens-free from secondguessing by society.").
393.
See POLINSKY, supra note 392, at 10 ("For example, an individual's
evaluation of the desirability of cleaner air is assumed not to depend on whether the legal
system establishes a right to clean air. This is known as the assumption of exogenous
preferences."); Posner, supra note 360, at 26-27 ("People are what they are; and what
they are is the result of millions of years of evolution rather than of such minor cultural
details as the precise scope of the market principle in a particular society.").
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D. Increased Dissociationof Law and Morality
In an insightful and provocative article several years ago, Carl
Schneider suggested that many of the changes that have taken place in
American family law over the past few decades can be understood as
reflecting "a diminution of the law's discourse in moral terms about the
relations between family members, and the transfer of many moral
decisions from the law to the people the law once regulated."'
Schneider argued that these doctrinal changes have both reduced family
law's reliance on moral considerations and transferred the authority to
make moral decisions from the state to the individuals involved.'
The increased dissociation of law and morality that Schneider
documents is directly linked to the privatization of family law. As long
as moral inquiry is central to legal discourse about the family, and as long
as family law both reflects and attempts to implement our collective moral
judgments, then the state has a legitimate and necessary role to play in
regulating the formation and dissolution of family relationships. If family
law is no longer charged with enforcing, or even announcing, moral
norms, however, then it becomes far more difficult to justify public
ordering of family behavior. To be sure, public ordering may still be
appropriate if particular categories of private decisions are likely to result
in tangible harm to the decision makers themselves or to others affected
by the decisions. But since our legal system generally presumes that
adults are capable of protecting themselves and that parents are willing
and able to protect their children, the opportunities for public intervention
on behalf of vulnerable or unrepresented third parties are likely to be
limited.396
Moreover, the increased dissociation of law and morality means that
state involvement in family life is more likely to be reactive than
aspirational; that is, it is more likely to be based on the need to protect
endangered family members than on the desire to shape or transform
394.
Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 318, at 1807-08. The instant Article
originally grew out of a suggestion made by Schneider that these family law developments
could also usefully be analyzed as a shift away from public standards to private ordering.
See Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 318, at 1805.
395.
Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 318, at 1819-20. In a more recent
article, Professor Schneider applies his hypothesis about the increased dissociation of
family law and moral discourse to the law governing post-divorce alimony. Carl E.
Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 197, 233-57.
396.
Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (rejecting the argument that the
Constitution requires a hearing before parents can commit their children to state mental
hospitals on the ground, inter alia, that the law has historically recognized "that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children").
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It is also likely to occur only after a particular family has

shown itself incapable of caring or providing for its most vulnerable

members.
This link between the diminution of moral discourse and the
increased appeal of private ordering is evident in each of the doctrinal
areas discussed in Part I of this Article. The fault-based divorce system,
for example, both reflected and sought to enforce society's sense of the
proper moral relations between husband and wife.'
The no-fault
system, by contrast, generally eschews moral judgments and leaves to
individual couples the moral choices about whether and under what,

circumstances to dissolve their relationship. In addition, the shift from
fault-based to no-fault divorce, in conjunction with the demise of

permanent alimony, represents a determination that the state should no
longer attempt to enforce the moral standard of life-long mutual responsibility between spouses.'
Modern standards for determining custody and visitation also de-

emphasize the relevance of moral judgments, particularly judgments
regarding sexual morality. In the past, a parent's sexual behavior was
considered highly relevant to her fitness as a parent; in many states, a
parent who engaged in disfavored behavior, such as adultery or fornication, was presumptively unfit as a custodian."
Today most states
consider a parent's sexual behavior relevant to determining custody only
if the behavior directly affects the parent's relationship with the child.: 1

397.
See Hafen, The Family, supra note 311, at 883.
398.
Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 318, at 1809.
399.
Id.; see Hafen, The Family, supra note 311, at 879 ('Many contemporary
decisions about divorce and alimony implicitly reject lifelong commitments of mutual
responsibility between marriage partners, in part because of doubts that the social interest
in marriage is as important as the individual interest.").
400.
See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 120 N.W.2d 585 (Neb. 1963) (wife's adultery
rendered her unfit custodian as a matter of law); Carol S. Bruch, Forms of Exclusion in
Child Custody Law, 7 ETHOLOGY & SocIOB1OLOoY 339, 341-42 (1986).
401.
See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 147, 561
(1987) ("The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect
his relationship to the child."); CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 804
(endorsing the "sensible and workable approach... taken by the authorities which hold
that the parents' sexual relations are only relevant when they have a direct effect upon the
care of the child or upon the parent-child relationship"). See generally Katheryn D. Katz,
Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L. REV. 405, 440-69 (1988). In
cases involving gay and lesbian parents, "the evolving majority rule" similarly requires
that there be a nexus between the parent's sexual behavior and harm to the child. Sharon
Hammer, Family Law II: The Role of Sexual Preference in Custody Disputes, 1986 ANN.
SuRV. AM. L. 685, 689-90. Some courts, however, simply presume that a parent's
homosexuality will harm the child, while other courts require a showing of actual harm.
Id. at 690.
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There has been a similar shift away from basing custody decisions on
other sorts of marital fault.'
Considerations of morality and marital fault also play a much smaller
role in determining the financial consequences of divorce than they did
under the fault-based system. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,

for example, provides that decisions about both property division and
spousal maintenance are to be made "without regard to marital misconduct."'

A substantial number of states have followed the lead of the

Uniform Act in precluding consideration of marital fault in the determination of divorce-related financial responsibilities. ' Even in those states
where fault is still relevant in dividing property or awarding support, it

is only one of many relevant factors. Moreover, just as the shift from
fault-based to no-fault divorce meant that the state would no longer
attempt to enforce the moral standard of life-long spousal fidelity, the
modern emphasis on the economic "rehabilitation" of financially
dependent spouses explicitly rejects the notion of marriage as a permanent
financial partnership.
The blurring of the legal line between marriage and other intimate
relationships and the breakdown of marital status as a criteria for
distributing public benefits also reflect the increased dissociation of moral
judgments and family law rules. In approving the enforcement of
cohabitation contracts that do not rest explicitly on meretricious sexual
services, the Marvin court (and those that followed its lead) declared that

moral qualms about a couple's sexual relationship are insufficient to
preclude judicial enforcement of the couple's financial expectations.' °

Similarly, in condemning as unconstitutional the differential treatment of
marital and nonimarital children, the Supreme Court expressly rejected
moral condemnation as an appropriate justification for legal
classification.'
402.
CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 802 & n.47.
403.
UNIF. MARRIAGEAND DIVORCEAcr §§ 307, 308(b), 9A U.L.A. at 238-39,
347-48 (1987). The prefatory note states that "[tihe Act's elimination of fault notions
extends to its treatment of maintenance and property division." Id. at 149.
404.
According to a recent family law survey, only a minority of states consider
fault relevant in awarding alimony, while a bare majority of states continue to permit
courts to consider fault in distributing property. Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Foster,
Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, FAM. L.Q., Winter 1991, at 309, 343-44
tbl. v, 355-56 tbl. vii (1991). Moreover, recent cases suggest a trend away from faultbased property awards, even in those states that formally allow such awards. ELLMAN
et al., supra note 109, at 253.
405.
See Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 318, at 1814-15.
406.
See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)
(rejecting argument that differential treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children is
justified as a way of expressing "society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond
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The dissociation of law and morality has also facilitated the growing
popularity of divorce and custody mediation.
As its proponents
acknowledge, mediation is not well suited to resolving disputes according
to moral, or other normative, standards.' Indeed, mediation theorists
characterize as a significant shortcoming the legal system's commitment
to normative decision making, since such a normative commitment "limits
the use of creative problem-solving."'
Thus, when the allocation of
post-divorce rights and responsibilities depended heavily on normative
judgments about fault and relative parental fitness, mediation was neither
useful nor popular. Only after the acceptance of no-fault divorce and the
rise of the joint-custody paradigm made divorce a conflict to be managed
within the family system, rather than a dispute to be resolved with
reference to public norms, did mediation become a plausible alternative
to adjudicative decision making.'
The practice of mediation is also characterized by an aversion to
moral discourse. Mediation is relentlessly forward looking; it actively
avoids dredging up the past.41° Mediators make no attempt to assign
blame or determine guilt, since they believe that these are inappropriate
criteria for decision making related to divorce."' Participants in
mediation are similarly discouraged from focusing on each other's past
behavior, since such a focus is unlikely to enhance understanding or
achieve consensus. 2 Thus, both the acceptance of divorce mediation
the bonds of marriage").
407.
See, e.g., Stephen K. Erickson, The Legal Dimension of Divorce Mediation,
in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 105, 106
("Mediation says that what the legislators or courts have said should occur in divorce
cases is less important than what the couple thinks is fair.").
408.
Ann Milne, The Nature of Divorce Disputes, in DIVORCE MEDIATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 27, 43.

409.
410.

See Fineman, supra note 135, at 732-33, 744-45.
Shaffer, supra note 258, at 163, 176; see MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note

279, at 17 (purpose of mediated divorce agreements is to "help [couples] put the past
behind them and to get on with the important business of their lives"); Erickson, supra
note 407, at 107 (mediation frames questions about divorce issues "in mutual, future-

oriented terms, in contrast to the adversarial system's win-lose, past-oriented approach");
Hugh Mclsaac, Court-Connected Mediation, CONCILIATION CTS. REV., Winter 1983, at
49, 53 (mediation is "focused on the future, not the past").
411.
Linda K. Girdner, How People ProcessDisputes, in DIVORCE MEDIATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 45, 55; MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note 279,
at 17.
412.
See, e.g., Mary Tall Shattuck, Mandatory Mediation, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 191, 200 ("The mediator's role

is to move the parents toward solutions, and solutions are to be found in the present and
future, not in the family's past."); Anthony J. Salius & Sally D. Maruzo, Mediation of
Child-Custody and Visitation Disputes in a Court Setting, in DIVORCE MEDIATION:
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in general and its success in any particular case depend on its ability to
dissociate moral from legal issues and to render moral discourse irrelevant
to the resolution of divorce-related conflict.
The trend toward the increased dissociation of law and morality may
be abating somewhat, at least as a matter of constitutional law. In Bowers

v. Hardwick,4" the Supreme Court rejected the argument that majority

sentiments about the morality of homosexuility were insufficient to
support a criminal prohibition on behavior engaged in by consenting
adults. More recently, in Michael H. v. Gerald D, 4 the Court drew
heavily on what it saw as the morality of conventional family structures

to uphold a California paternity presumption that precluded a biological
father from gaining legal recognition as a parent. While these decisions
indicate that the current Supreme Court majority may be willing to grant
states somewhat wider latitude in translating collective moral judgments
into family law commands, the evidence suggests that states may be
reluctant to accept the Court's invitation. For example, less than a year
after the Court's decision in Michael H., California repealed the
conclusive paternity presumption that had barred the nonmarital father in
that case from asserting his parental rights." 5 Similarly, the Court's
decision in Bowers probably accelerated, rather than impeded, successful
state and municipal efforts to accord greater legal recognition to gay and
lesbian intimate relationships.
III. EVALUATION OF THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS

As is true of private ordering in general, the privatization of family
law is neither a panacea nor an unmitigated disaster. Moreover, for
women in particular, the privatization of family law must be measured
against a traditional system of public ordering that both severely restricted
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 163, 173 (mediator acts to minimize
discussion of the past and direct the focus away from relationship issues that could not be
resolved during marriage); Grillo, supra note 277, at 1563-64 ("It is typical for mediators
to insist that parties waste no time complaining about past conduct of their spouse, eschew
blaming each other, and focus only on the future.").
413.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
414.
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding statute conclusively presuming husband of
mother to be father of child, despite evidence of biological paternity and existence of
three-year relationship between biological father and child).
415.
Act of Aug. 24, 1990, ch. 543, see. 2, 1990 Cal. Stat. The amendment
allows a presumed father who is not the child's mother's husband to move for blood
testing to establish paternity within two years of the child's birth. It also authorizes a
court to award custody and visitation rights when the court finds, pursuant to such blood
testing, that a.parent-rhild relationship exists and that the award would be in the child's
best interests. Act of Aug. 24, 1990, ch. 543, 1990 Cal. Stat.

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1531 1992

1532

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

women's options and systematically subordinated their interests. Yet
privatization holds particular dangers as well, dangers that are often
masked by the seemingly neutral rhetoric associated with private ordering.
This section is designed to highlight those dangers, while acknowledging
the potential benefits to both women and men of a family law regime that
accords substantial deference to privately chosen norms and desires.
A. The TraditionalSystem of Public Ordering
In order to understand the appeal of private ordering in family law,
it is useful to highlight the disadvantages of the traditional system of
public ordering. For purposes of this section, three disadvantages stand
out. First, the publicly-ordered system was sexist in the sense that it
stereotyped both women and men, and forced them to conform to narrow
conceptions of female and male roles. The sex-based role allocations of
the traditional marriage contract were perhaps the most salient example
of such stereotyping. The traditional rules governing the financial
consequences of divorce similarly reflected these gender-based
stereotypes: Only wives were eligible to receive alimony4 1 while only
husbands could be ordered to contribute financially to the support of their
children.417
Second, the publicly-ordered system of family law both created and
perpetuated hierarchy, particularly the hierarchy of men over women. By
assigning women a subordinate role within the family and by limiting
their options outside of it, the traditional system of public ordering
ensured both the sexual subordination of women and their economic
dependence on men.
The traditional system of family law also
perpetuated the hierarchy of heterosexual over homosexual relationships
by reserving marriage for heterosexual couples and by using marriage, to
determine eligibility for a wide range of privileges and benefits.418
A third disadvantage of the traditional system of family law was that
it reflected and reinforced the notions of racial and class superiority that
permeated the legal system as a whole and society more generally. Many
of the Supreme Court's early privacy decisions were directed against
legislative enactments that- reeked of racism and elitism. The anti416.
See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). In reality, only a small percentage of
divorcing women ever were awarded alimony. See Singer, supra note 2, at 1106.
417.
See CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS II, supra note 18, at 259, 710.
418.
See Jaff, supra note 28, at 236 ("The 'traditional' family is not just obsolete;
it is also a bastion of male dominance, hierarchy, racism and sexual oppression. Marriage
(and, so, the 'traditional family') has always meant women's 'sexual availability at will'
and women's economic dependence .
.
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miscegination statute that the Court struck down in Loving v.
Virginia4 9-entitled "An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity"-proscribed
only inter-racial marriages involving white persons; it did not apply to
other inter-racial unions.

Although Loving was decided primarily on

equal protection grounds, the Court's characterization of marriage as a
"vital

personal right[ ]" formed the basis for its subsequent
recognition in Zablocki of a constitutionally-protected individual right to

marry."1

Similarly, the Court first suggested that the Constitution

afforded heightened protection to procreative choices in striking down a
state statute that authorized the sterilization of certain categories of
"habitual criminals" but explicitly excluded from its scope most types of

regulatory and white-collar crime.'
B. The Advantages of Privatization
1. PRIVATIZATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TRADITIONAL FAMILY
STRUCTURES

In light of these disadvantages, it should come as no surprise that one
of the most important advantages of privatization is that it provides an
alternative to the sexism and hierarchy of traditional family rules and
structures. Marital and premarital contracting, for example, allows
women and men to reject the sex-based role allocations of the stateimposed marriage contract in favor of a more egalitarian partnership.
Similarly, the increased legal acceptance of consensual alternatives to
marriage and the decreased use of marital status as the basis for allocating
419.
388 U.s. 1, 1-12 & n.l (1967).
420.
Id. at 12.
421.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 (1978). For a discussion of
Zablocki, see supra text accompanying notes 323-27.
422.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The Oklahoma statute
invalidated on equal protection grounds in Skinner defined "habitual criminals" subject to
sterilization as persons who had been convicted two or more times of "felonies involving
moral turpitude." Id. at 536 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 173 (West 1935)).
The statute explicitly excluded from its scope "offenses arising out of the violation of the
prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement or political offenses." Id. at 537 (quoting
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 195 (West 1935)). The defendant in Skinner had been
convicted once of stealing chickens and twice of robbery. Id. at 537. Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, recognized the racial and class aspects of the case: "The power
to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil
or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
whither and disappear." id. at 541; see id. (strict scrutiny of sterilization laws essential
"lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or types
of individuals").
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public benefits and burdens allow individuals to choose other, less
hierarchical, forms of intimacy without forfeiting important material and
psychic benefits. In addition, increased judicial willingness to enforce
cohabitation agreements enables couples who are unwilling or unable to
marry to create legally enforceable financial commitments.
Moreover, while the publicly-ordered system of marriage and divorce
tended to define women and men by virtue of their gender, privatization
offers all persons the opportunity to define themselves without regard to
gender, and to be treated as ungendered individuals, at least for formal
legal purposes. More generally, privatization-with its emphasis on
individual choice and decisional autonomy-provides a welcome antidote
to the overly altruistic expectations that have historically defined
appropriate behavior for women within the family. 4'
2. RESPECT FOR DIVERSITY

A second benefit of private ordering is that it has the potential to
respect and nurture diversity. Promoting diversity with respect to family
relationships is of obvious general importance, but it may be particularly
important to women for at least two reasons. First, women's familyrelated activities have traditionally been central both to women's
perceptions of themselves and to society's expectations of women. For
this reason, state-imposed orthodoxies of family behavior are likely to
constrain women in a particularly severe way.
Moreover, the
consequences of failing to conform to prevailing family norms have
always been more severe for women than for men. 4' In large part, this
is because society traditionally offered women few opportunities outside
the family to achieve success or gain recognition. Thus, a woman who
"failed" in her traditional role as wife and mother was likely to be
dismissed as "not really a woman," whereas a man who -was
"unsuccessful" at family life could more easily achieve recognition in
other spheres.' z For both of these reasons, women have a particular
423.
See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 184 (1988) ("The victory
of contract has a considerable appeal for feminists, given the long sway of coverture and
the various social and legal means still used to deny women ownership of property in their
persons."); Judith Areen, A Need for Caring, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1077-78 (1988).
424.
See, e.g., Jaff, supra note 28, at 212-14 (discussing stigmatization of
unmarried women). Of course, the consequences for men, particularly gay men, of
failing to conform to traditional family norms have been severe as well.
425.
Historically, marriage was thought to be "that state in which women's
character would be most fully developed"; some authors went so far as to claim that
"marriage was the only true life for women." Jaff, supra note 28, at 212 (quoting LEE
V. CHAMBERS-SCHILLER, LiBERTY, A BErrER HUSBAND 15 (1984)). The words used to
describe unmarried women reflect society's negative view. Unmarried women are called
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interest in fostering the respect for diversity in family relations that
private ordering can offer.

Respecting diversity in family relations is also consistent with the
feminist critique of objectivity and the skepticism shared by many

feminists toward claims of universal or value-free knowledge.'

A

major shared premise of feminist thought is that knowledge of the world
is necessarily partial and is bound by both context and power. 4' These
insights caution against state attempts to impose a unitary family form or

to define a particular family structure as ideal.
3.

INCREASED DEGREE OF CONTROL

A third important benefit of privatization is that, at least for certain

categories of people, it increases the degree of control that they can
exercise over important aspects of their lives. Again, while legal
structures that enhance individual control have obvious general appeal,
they are likely to be particularly attractive to women. To a large extent,

this is because women traditionally have been accorded little control over
many aspects of their productive and reproductive lives. Moreover,
because of the centrality to women's lives of reproduction and other
family-related activities, women's lack of control in the family realm has
severely affected their opportunities and well-being outside of, as well as

within, the family. 4'
"old maids" or "spinsters," while unmarried men are referred to as "eligible bachelors."
Jaff, supra note 28, at 212. Similarly, women who are unable to have children are
referred to as "barren;" no equivalent term exists for men.
426.
See, e.g., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Essay, 95 YALE L. J. 1373, 1376 (1986) ("Feminist analysis begins with the principle that
objective reality is a myth."); Martha Minow, Foreword: JusticeEngendered, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 10, 45-54 (1987); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the
Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 478-79 (1990); Judith Resnick, Complex Feminist
Conversations, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL F. 1, 6-7; Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
427. - Judith Resnick, On The Bias: Feminist Reconsiderationsof the Aspirations
for Our Judges, 61 C. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1906 (1988); see MiNow, supranote 359, at
193-214 (discussing feminist scholarship in history, literature, psychology, moral theory
and law). Critical race scholars have also emphasized the partiality of knowledge and the
limited perspective from which one necessarily views the world. See, e.g., Richard
Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the Fundamental
Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1988); Patricia
Williams, Spirit-Murderingthe Messenger: The DiscourseofFingerpointingas the Law's
Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 151 (1987).
428.
Judgments about women's reproductive capacity and their "appropriate" role
within the family have consistently been used as justifications for restricting their
employment and other economic opportunities. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
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Advocates of private ordering in several areas of family law have
emphasized the link between privatization and control. Marjorie Shultz,
for example, draws heavily on the benefits of control in advocating an
intent-based approach to parenthood that would make private, bargainedShultz
for choices presumptively determinative of legal parenthood.'
argues, in particular, that people perform major and responsible tasks
(like parenting) better when they exercise control over the assumption of
Advocates of independent and "preplanned"
those responsibilities.'
adoption similarly emphasize the increased element of control that private
adoption arrangements (including surrogacy) accord both birth mothers
and potential adoptive parents. 31 Proponents of divorce and custody
mediation sound a similar theme; they stress that mediation enables
couples to maintain control of their post-divorce relationship, rather than
surrendering that control to an arbitrary and uncaring judicial system.'
The link between privatization and control, however, depends upon
the assumption that the most important barriers to individual control are
those imposed directly by the state, rather than those created or
maintained by private concentrations of wealth or power. To the extent
that individuals (or families) are deprived of control over their lives not
by state-imposed restrictions, but by private concentrations of power,
privatization is likely to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the problem.
As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has argued in a somewhat different
context, private deprivation of basic freedoms can be just as harmful as
(16 Wall) 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (women's "paramount destiny"
as wife and mother precludes her from adopting an independent career from that of her
husband); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (limitations on women's work
hours justified by state's interest in the physical well-being of women "in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race"); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)
("grave social problems" that would be created by the presence of female bartenders
justifies forbidding all women from tending bar; exception for wives and daughters of
male bar owners supported by oversight assured by presence of male protector); Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (women's place, as "center of home and family life"
justifies exclusion of women from jury pool). For a recent attempt by employers to use
women's reproductive capacity to severely restrict their job opportunities, see UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (invalidating as illegal sex discrimination
employer's "fetal protection policy" which excluded virtually all women of childbearing
age from working at battery manufacturing plant). For a perceptive analysis of how
restrictions on abortion have historically been used to enforce traditional gender roles and
to circumscribe women's opportunities outside the family, see Reva Seigel, Reasoning
from the Body: A HistoricalPerspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 280-346 (1992).
Intent-Based Parenthood,supra note 348, at 323.
429.
430.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 188-92.
431.
See sources cited supra notes 294-98.
432.
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infringement by the government. 3 Indeed, given the concentration of
wealth and power in private hands, the need for protection from private
deprivations may be greater than the need for protection from government
infringement, particularly since democratic processes impose some
accountability and limits on the government.'
This analysis suggests that the privatization of family law is most
likely to increase opportunities for individual control where the most
salient barriers to that control have been barriers set up by the state. The
state's traditional ordering of marriage and its refusal to recognize
consensual alternatives to marriage may be one such example. Where,
by contrast, the efforts of individuals to control their lives have been
thwarted primarily by private concentrations of power, or by power
inequalities within the family,.the link between privatization and control
becomes considerably more problematic. At best, a shift from public to
private ordering in these areas is likely to enhance the control of some
family members at the expense of others. Efforts to privatize the
economic consequences of divorce and to remove divorce-related disputes
from the judicial arena may well be examples of this phenomenon.
Focusing on the issue of control also helps to illuminate the debate
between proponents and critics of commercial surrogacy. Surrogacy
proponents tend to see government restrictions on reproductive
transactions as among the most salient barriers to the exercise of
procreative choice. The enforcement of private surrogacy agreements
removes one such government barrier; it therefore enhances procreative
control by enabling consenting individuals to give effect to their
Opponents' of surrogacy, by contrast,
reproductive intentions."
private disparities in wealth and power
effect
that
distorting
emphasize the
have on the intentions expressed in private bargains, particularly bargains
These scholars argue that
regarding reproduction and parenting. 4
legalizing contract surrogacy is likely ultimately to diminish the ability of
poor women (as well as women in coercive family or social relationships)

Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 510
433.
(1985); see Mark V. Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 383, 392 (1988) ("[l1t is doubtful that one could defend the proposition that'
governments in the contemporary United States are in fact in a better position to inflict
harm than private actors.").
434.
Chemerinsky, supra note 433, at 510-11.
See Intent-Based Parenthood,supra note 348, at 373-95.
435.
436.
See, e.g., FIELD, supra note 209, at 25-32; ROTHMAN, supra note 340, at
229-45; Areen, supra note 228, at 1750-55; Radin, supra note 158, at 1930-31; Raymond,
supra note 248.
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to control their reproductive lives, by inducing them to produce other
people's babies. e7
4. PRIVATIZATION, CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

Closely related to the idea of control are the notions of choice and
individual autonomy. In our current political and legal culture, these
notions have an almost mythical appeal. As one legal theorist recently
noted:
Modem arguments for the moral grounds of democracy, for the
legitimacy and moral worth of the free market, for the
justification of criminal punishment, for the limitations upon
paternalistic applications of state power, for the priority of
individual rights over collective welfare, and even for the
legitimacy of law itself all rest on a commitment to the virtues
of individual autonomy and an antipathy toward authority....
"Choice" and "autonomy" are becoming synonyms for "right"
and "good" . . . .11

Proponents of private ordering have generally assumed (and
sometimes argued) that private ordering enhances choice and that
enhancing choice promotes autonomy."
But feminists and other
scholars have questioned both of these assertions. As an initial matter,
these critics have pointed out that current social and economic conditions
make many people's family-related choices more illusory than real.'
An economically-dependent battered wife who fails to leave her abusive
husband can hardly be said to have chosen freely to stay with him. A
shift from public to private ordering does little to alter these social and
economic constraints on choice; indeed, the antipathy to collective action
that privatization entails is likely to exacerbate these impediments.

437.
See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 248, at 9-11.
438.
Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions ofFranz Kajka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384,
384-85 (1985) (footnote omitted).
439.
See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 120, at 1018 ("The liberal ideal that
individuals have fundamental rights, and should freely choose to make of their lives what
they wish supports private ordering."); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical Significance of
Free Choice: A Reply To Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1431 (1986).
440.
See e.g., Nancy Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32
ARIz. L. REV. 431, 480 (1990) (discussing concept of choice with respect to work-family
policy); JaneM. Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REv. 105 (1987).
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Even assuming the existence of social and economic conditions that
would permit the exercise of meaningful choice, the complexities of our
psychological nature render problematic any inherent link between
expanding choice and enhancing individual autonomy. In particular, our
deference to authority, or our sense of social obligation may cause us to
consent to arrangements that neither foster our autonomy nor enhance our
well-being."' To the extent that some of us participate in family
transactions not because we think they will enhance our freedom or
increase our welfare, but because they fulfill our desire for approval or
our craving for authority, deference to privately chosen family norms may
not necessarily enhance autonomy, even if it increases choice.
Recent scholarship has also cast doubt on the view-characteristic of
much law and economics thinking-that people's preferences and choices
exist independently of the legal system. This scholarship suggests instead
that prevailing legal and social structures influence to a significant extent
the preferences of individuals." 2 Feminist scholarship has similarly
emphasized the ways in which women's choices, in particular, have been
shaped by gender ideology." 3 Joan Williams, for example, argues that
an updated version of the Victorian ideology of domesticity plays a central
role in the "choices" of many women today to subordinate their careers
for the sake of their families.'
As Kathryn Abrams has recently
pointed out, one need not subscribe to a simplistic notion of "false
consciousness" to acknowledge the influence of gender ideology on the
family-related choices of women and men. 5
None of this is meant to suggest that expanding choice is necessarily
unwise or that we should reject private ordering altogether because
441.
See West, supra note 438; West, supra note 199; Raymond, supra note 248.
Q. Mnookin, supra note 120, at 1019-24 (discussing possibility that divorcing spouses
may sometimes be temporarily incapable of making deliberative and well-informed
choices).
442.
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title Vii Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1756-58, 1815-43 (1990); Cass R.
-Sunstein, Legal Interferencewith Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986);
MacPherson, Want Formation, Morality and Some 'Interpretive' Aspects of Economic
Inquiry, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AS MORAL INQUIRY 96 (Norma Haan et al. eds., 1983).
443.
See, e.g., CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAW 46-632 (1987); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH.

L. REV. 797 (1989); Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV.
761 (1990).
444.
Williams, supra note 443, at 830-31.
445.
Abrams, supra note 443, at 796-97; see Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism And
Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 836-37 (1988) (book review).
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economic, social or psychological constraints may sometimes prevent us
from choosing wisely. It does indicate, however, that choice should not

be viewed as a moral trump and that the asserted link between
privatization, choice and individual autonomy should serve to initiate,
rather than preempt, the inquiry into the desirability of private ordering

in family law.
C. Disadvantagesof Privatization
1. EXACERBATION OF EXISTING GENDER INEQUALITIES

One of the most significant dangers of the privatization of family law
is that it will exacerbate existing power inequalities. Because women, as
a group, are less powerful than men in our society, and because family
law is centrally involved both in shaping male-female relationships and
resolving disputes between men and women, the effect of substituting

private norms and private decisions for public ordering of family law
should be of particular concern to women. In the section that follows, I
will use mediation as a lens through which to examine the potential effects
of private ordering on existing gender-based disparities in wealth and
power. Although the analysis focuses on mediation-which privatizes the
process of resolving family disputes-I believe the dangers it illuminates
are relevant as well to the privatization of the substantive areas of family

law.' 6
There is substantial reason to suspect that mediation is significantly
more likely than adjudication (and lawyer-conducted negotiation) both to
reflect and to reproduce power imbalances between the sexes." 7

The

Frances Olsen has argued that the ideology of private ordering and the model
446.
of state nonintervention in the family has long masked the state's support of the existing
patriarchal family structure. Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985). Similarly, Linda Gordon ties the state's refusal
to "intervene" in the family to concepts of male supremacy-the view of the family as
man's territory and intervention as challenge to that authority. Linda Gordon, Feminism
and Social Control: The Care of Child Abuse and Neglect, in WHAT ISFEMINISM 63, 6379 (Juliet Mitchell & Ann Oakley eds., 1988). Even Robert Mnookin, a strong supporter
of private ordering in family law, recognizes that private divorce bargaining may
disadvantage a spouse who "sees himself [sic] as lacking alternatives and as being
dependent upon resources controlled by the other spouse." Mnookin, supra note 120, at
1027, 1029-31.
447.
Two recent articles, both published while this Article was in press, contain
extensive analyses of the ways in which divorce mediation is likely to disempower
women. See Grillo, supra note 277; Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce
Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441 (1992). Professor Grillo's
article focuses specifically on California's mandatory mediation scheme, while Professor
Bryan's article discusses more generally the ways in which the rhetoric of divorce
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substantive fairness of divorce mediation depends heavily on the ability
of divorcing parties effectively to express and represent their own
interests without the assistance of counsel."
The available evidence
suggests that husbands are often in a better position to do this than wives
and that the nature of the mediation process is unlikely to alter this
fact. 9
The treatment of power in mediation literature is, at best,

erratic.'
Some mediation proponents ignore entirely the question of
power imbalances, while others acknowledge but dismiss it quickly, or
characterize it as an insignificant issue."1

One recent mediation

theorist, for example, dismisses as absolutely without merit the argument
that a husband's financial sophistication and domination during marriage
may leave a mediating couple in unequal bargaining positions or give the
husband greater negotiating power than his wife. 2 Even those
theorists who do address power imbalances in mediation generally do so
from an individualistic perspective that largely ignores the possibility of

systemic gender inequalities.

3

Mediation theorists also posit the

existence of multiple sources and types of power, thus suggesting that
while a husband may enjoy power in one area (such as finances or

mediation reinforces patriarchy. The critique of mediation presented here is consistent
with much of the analysis in these two articles. See also Ellis, supra note 282, at 330
("Sexist biases, when combined with a professionally enjoined neutral stance, may help
produce mediation agreements which are a greater economic disaster for women than the
negotiated agreements produced by lawyers, whose sexist biases may be muted by the
economic and personal biases of the clients who pay them.").
448.
Although concerns for adequate representation also arise in judicial
proceedings, the matter is far more pressing in mediation because the process occurs in
private without the presence of attorneys or court reporters, and without access to
appellate review. Carol S. Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects of Ideology
and Mediation on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 2
INT'L J.L. & FAM. 106, 120 (1988).
449.
See Bryan, supra note 447, at 449-515; Ellis, supra note 282, at 329-33.
450.
Shaffer, supra note 258, at 178.
451.
See id. at 178 & nn.81-83.
452.
MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note 279, at 104. These authors also dispute the
conclusions of researchers who have found that women's standard of living declines
dramatically as a result of divorce. See id. at 118-19.
453.
See Shaffer, supra note 258, at 179-80. The recent critiques of mediation
offered by Professors Grillo and Bryan represent an important exception to this
perspective. See Grillo, supra note 277; Bryan, supra note 447; see also Diane Neumann,
How Mediation Can Effectively Address the Male-Female Power Imbalance in Divorce,
9 MEDIATION Q. 227 (Spring 1992) (discussing mediator responses to male-female power
differences).
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decision making), this advantage is likely to be counterbalanced by the
wife's superior power in another area (such as childcare).1" .
Considerable disagreement also exists within the mediation
community about whether, and how, a mediator should attempt to remedy
power imbalances. 5 Some mediation theorists suggest that mediators

can employ a variety of techniques to empower and support the less
powerful party and to disempower the more powerful spouse.'
"These suggestions share the premise that the mediator can recognize
power disparities when they occur and intervene to lessen their

impact. " "

Even a mediator who is willing to address power

imbalances, however, may not be able to compensate for the important,
but often subtle, disparities in power and sophistication that characterize

many male-female interactions."' Studies of conversations between
men and women who know each other suggest that masculine control of
male-female dialogues through such techniques as monopolization of

speaking time and the use of interruptions is so commonplace that even
a trained mediator may

not perceive the power imbalances

it

portends.'
Moreover, any attempt by a mediator to correct a
perceived power imbalance compromises the mediator's claim to be
merely a facilitator of the couple's decision-making process and increases
the likelihood that the mediator's own values or prejudices will influence
the mediation outcome.
Another equality-based problem with mediation stems from the ideal

of impartiality espoused by many mediators and from their claim to
454.

See, e.g., John Haynes, Power Balancing, in DIVORCE MEDIATION:

THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 277.

455.
Compare, e.g., MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note 279, at 103-19 (cautioning
that mediators should be extremely wary about intervening to correct perceived power
imbalances) with John Forester & David Stitzel, Beyond Neutrality: The Possibilities of
Activist Mediation in Public Sector Conflicts, NEGOTIATION J., July 1989, at 251, 256
(activist mediators must dispense with neutrality in order to balance information and
participation). See generally Bryan, supra note 447, at 498-515 (discussing mediator
reluctance and ineffectiveness in remedying power disparities).
456.
Grillo, supra note 277, at 1592. For example, the mediator might provide
pertinent information, forbid discussion of certain issues or advise a party who seems to
be at an economic disadvantage to see a financial-counselor.
457.
GriUo, supra note 277, at 1592.
458.
See, e.g., HILARY M. LIPS, WOMEN, MEN AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POWER
100-01 (1981) (men engage in verbal dominance more frequently than women); Pamela
M. Fishman, Interaction: The Work Women Do, in LANOUAOE, GENDER & SOCIETY 89101 (Barrie Thorne et al. eds., 1983); Anne K. McCarrick et al., Gender Differences in
Competition and Dominance During Married-Couples Group Therapy, 44 SOC. PSYCH.
Q. 164, 164-65 (1981) (in marital context, husbands dominate conversation time and
interrupt their wives far more frequently than their wives interrupt them).
459.
Bruch, supra note 448, at 120; see Bryan, supra note 447, at 463-65.
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provide only "neutral" information and advice during the mediation
process. This claim seems based on the belief that solutions exist in the
divorce context that are neutral, rather than gendered in their concept and
their impact.'
Feminist critiques of objectivity and impartiality cast
doubt on this "neutrality" claim."
Moreover, given the disparate
economic and parenting circumstances faced by many divorcing men on
the one hand, and many divorcing women on the other, such "genderneutral" divorce solutions are likely to be extremely rare. In addition, at
least some research suggests that men and women in our culture may have
different moral orientations and different perspectives on interpersonal

responsibility that may be highly relevant to the questions couples face at
divorce.

2

If this is true, then no solution may exist which is

inherently "neutral" or acceptable to both parties, and the subjective
proclivities of mediators, both individually and as a group, may determine
the substantive outcomes of mediation.'

An example of this phenomenon may be the strong link between
mediation and joint custody.'

Many mediators and mediation

460.
See Bruch, supra note 448, at 119.
461.
See Grillo, supra note 277, at 1587 ("The concept of impartially is based on
the notion of an observer without a perspective. But any observer inevitably sees from
a particular perspctive, whether that perspective is acknowledged or not."); Shaffer, supra
note 258, at 178, 184-86. See also sources cited supra notes 426-27.
462.
Bruch, supra note 448, at 119. Specifically, women appear to value
responsibility in relationships to a relatively greater degree than men, and men appear to
value independence and personal autonomy to a greater degree than women. See
generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WoMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982). For a perceptive discussion of the ways in which these
differences in orientation can influence the process and outcomes of mediation, see Grillo,
supra note 277, at 1601-05.
463.
See Bruch, supra note 448, at 119; Grillo, supra note 277, at 1592-94;
Robert E. Emery & Joanna A. Jackson, The Charlottesville Mediation Project: Mediated
andLitigated Child Custody Disputes, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1989, at 3, 8 (noting that
agreements mediated in program run by authors reflect authors' biases in favor of joint
legal (but not joint physical) custody); Sally E. Merry, The Social Organization of
Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies: Implications for Informal Community Justice in
America, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 17, 21, 26-27 (Richard L. Abel ed.,
1982) (mediators represent the norms and values of their community).
464.
Research indicates that agreements reached during mediation are far more
likely than either attorney-negotiated agreements or court orders to provide for joint
custody, particularly joint legal custody. See, e.g., Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 289,
at 506-07 (nearly 70% of study participants who reached agreements in mediation opted
for joint custody, as opposed to less than 30% of nonmediated outcomes; mediated joint
custody agreements typically provided for joint legal authority while delegating day-to-day
care to the mother); Emery & Jackson, supra note 463, at 8, 11 (mediated agreements are
more likely than negotiated settlements to stipulate joint legal custody although two sets
of outcomes did not differ in terms of primary physical residence or number of days spent
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advocates are also strong proponents of joint custody, which they tend to
refer to as "shared parenting" after divorce. 4'
Indeed, "[m]any
mediators state unabashedly that they attempt to steer their clients toward

joint custody, regardless of what the clients want."I

Although

mediation proponents often present joint custody as an idea whose merit

is beyond dispute, the costs and benefits of this notion may be very
different for women as opposed to men. This is particularly likely where,
as is still the case in most two-parent families, the mother has been the

children's primary caretaker during marriage. She may perceive joint
custody as a threat and as a devaluation of her activities during marriage,
while the less-involved father may perceive it as a victory. 7
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that mediation theory
generally disapproves of focusing on a couple's past behavior;' thus,
with nonresidential parent); Stephen K. Erickson & Marilyn S. McKnight Erickson, Dan
andLinda: A Typical Divorce Mediation, MEDIATION Q., Fall 1988, at 3, 5 (describing
typical first mediation session during which author-mediators recommend that separating
couple purchase book advocating joint custody).
465.
See, e.g., BIENENFELD, supra note 279, at 42-43 ("When either or both
parents are seeking exclusive or sole custody (with visitation rights for the other parent),
I introduce the alternative of joint custody.... I consider it both natural, and beneficial
for everyone, when parents share rights and responsibilities for the children."); JOHN M.
HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THERAPISTS AND COUNSELORS

34 (1981) (expressing belief that "parents should be encouraged to share in joint legal
custody"); Evarts & Goodwin, supra note 297, at 292 n. 11 (predicting that "mediation
is likely to be the precursor for a more widespread and successful use of the joint custody
concept"); Kuhn, supra note 262, at 745 ("[Mlediation provides a procedural forum that
encourages joint custody agreements."); Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt-Connected
Mediation and Counseling in Child-Custody Disputes, 17 FAM. L. Q. 469, 479-80 (1984).
A number of mediation statutes also link mediation to shared custody after divorce. For
example, the purpose of custody mrediation under California's mandatory mediation statute
is "to develop an agreement assuring the child or children's close and continuing contact
with both parents." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (West Supp. 1992). Similarly, the
Louisiana statute authorizing court-ordered mediation of custody and visitation disputes
lists as one of its stated purposes "to develop an agreement assuring the child or children's
close continuing contact with both parents after the marriage is dissolved." LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:352 (West Supp. 1989).
466.
Grillo, supra note 277, at 1594; see Bryan, supra note 447, at 491 ("Divorce
mediators havea strong bias in favor of joint custody."). Some mediators also tell parents
that their refusal to agree to joint cusody may result in a recommendation or an award of
custody to the other spouse as the "friendlier" parent. Grillo, supra note 277, at 1594-95
& n.237; see Fineman, supra note 135, at 751-52 (when choosing between parents in
custody disputes, helping professionals prefer parent who most freely allows child access
to the other parent).
467.
See generally Fin eman, supra note 135, at 765-70.
468.
See, e.g., Emery & Jackson, supra note 463, at 6 (characterizing as a
"ground rule" of mediation that parents focus on the future, not the past); Grillo, supra
note 277, at 1562-64 (mediators typically preclude parties from discussing past behavior).
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a mediator is likely to characterize as irrelevant or uncooperative a
mother's argument that she deserves sole custody because of her primary
parenting role during marriage. This negative characterization not only

weakens the mother's position during mediation, but it may also damage
her chances of gaining custody at trial, should the mediation fail.'
Similarly, a mediator may view as inappropriate or obstructionist a
mother's concern about a previously uninvolved father's parenting
skills. 4 ' At best, a mediator is likely to respond to the mother's
concern by encouraging the parties to develop custody "solutions" that
will enable the father to improve his parenting skills, rather than seeing

his lack of skills and prior involvement as reasons to disfavor his custody
claims.
It is also of concern, from a gender equality perspective, that
mediation is touted most enthusiastically as a substitute for adjudication

in precisely those areas-custody and visitation-where the prevailing
legal standards are perceived to favor women.47 While virtually all
court-connected mediation programs address custody issues, only half of
such programs mediate child support issues, despite both the

overwhelming importance of support to the well-being of children and the
obvious connection between custody arrangements and child support. 4'
Even fewer mediation programs address the other financial aspects of
469.
A number of states have enacted so-called "friendly parent" provisions which
direct the court, in adjudicating custody claims, to give preference to the parent who is
more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the other parent. See,
e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West 1986) (court should consider, in awarding
custody, "which parent is likely to allow the child or children frequent and continuing
contact with the noncustodial parent"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (1) (1985) ("court
shall consider the denial by one parent of the child's opportunity for maximum continuing
contact with the other parent, without just cause, a significant factor in determining the
proper custody arrangement"); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(6a) (Callaghan 1981); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-223, 224 (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5303(A) (1991). Under
these provisions, one parent's opposition to joint custody during mediation could be used
to justify a sole custody award to the other parent. This danger is particularly acute in
jurisdictions where mediators are permitted to make recommendations to the court. See
Grillo, supra note 277, at 1598. For a critique of such "friendly parent" provisions, see
Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent On Joint Custody, 47 MD.L. REV.
497, 517 (1988); Joanne Shulman & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Custody:
Analysis of Legislationand Its Implicationsfor Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE
L. REV. 539, 554-55 (1982).
470.
See Bruch, supra note 448, at 119. For examples and discussion of this
phenomenon, see Grillo, supra note 277, at 1562-64, 1568-69, 1594-97.
471.
Whether they in fact favor women is questionable. See generally Nancy D.
Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A BriefAnalysis of Criteria Used In Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235 (1982).

472.

See Divorce Mediation in the States, supra note 253, at 22-23.
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divorce (property division and spousal support) that are of particular
concern to divorcing women.4 '3 If mediation is such a desirable
alternative, surely feminists are entitled to ask why it has largely failed
to address those issues where women, rather than men, have the most
reason to be dissatisfied with the results of our current adjudicative

system.
Research on the reasons that divorcing men and women choose to
mediate also raises concerns about the gendered impact of mediation. A

study conducted by several leading researchers who are generally
supportive of mediation found that women who prefer mediation to
adjudication do so because they view it as less remote and impersonal
than the court system, while men choose to mediate largely because they
believe it will improve their chances of winning.474 There is also some
evidence that fathers' rights groups favor mediation because they view
mediators as more malleable and more sympathetic to their interests than
either judges or attorneys. 4"
Preliminary data also suggests that men may benefit more from
mediation than women. A recent study comparing satisfaction levels
among parents who mediated and litigated their custody disputes revealed
that men who mediated were significantly more satisfied and significantly
more likely to feel their rights had been protected than were men who
participated in adversary proceedings. 76 By contrast, women who
473.
Many mediators and mediation theorists appear to have strong reservations
about the desirability of post-divorce income sharing. They view the achievement of
economic independence on the part of both spouses as an important substantive goal. See
Linda K. Girdner, How PeopleProcessDisputes, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 45, 55; Erickson & Erickson, supra note 464, at 9; see also
Grillo, supra note 277, at 1569 ("All too often mediators stress the need for women to
become economically independent without taking into account the very real dollar
differences between the male and female experience in the labor market."). But cf.
Jessica Pearson, The Equity of Mediated Divorce Agreements, 9 MEDIATION Q. 179, 19596 (Winter 1991) (reporting that neither mediation nor adjudicative decision making
adequately protects divorcing women from prolonged and severe financial dislocation, and
suggesting that post-divorce income disparities be addressed by fundamental societal and
legal change).
474.
Jessica Pearson et al., The Decision to Mediate: Profiles of Individuals Who
Accept and Reject the Opportunity to Mediate Contested Child Custody and Visitation
Issues, 6 J. DIVORCE 17, 31 (1982).
475.
See Fineman, supra note 135, at 758.
476.
Emery & Jackson, supra note 463, at 12. But cf. Joan B. Kelly, Mediated
and AdversarialDivorce: Respondents' Perceptionsof Their Processesand Outcomes,
MEDIATION Q., Summer 1989, at 71, 85-86 (study comparing adversarial divorce
procedures with comprehensive private mediation found no gender differences in
satisfaction levels; discrepancy may reflect private vs. court-connected setting and
comprehensive vs. custody-focused nature of mediation).
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mediated were less likely than women who resolved their disputes through

adversary channels to feel that their rights had been protected and that
they had achieved what they wanted.'" Women who mediated also
reported higher levels of post-setilement depression than women who

participated in adversary procedures. 4n
Many women may also experience mediation differently than men.
A recent law review article observes that "[w]omen who have been

through mandatory mediation often describe it as an experience of sexual
domination, comparing mandatory mediation to rape." 4" In explaining
this perception, the author notes that because the stakes in court-ordered
custody mediation are extremely high, and because "mandatory mediation
is a forced engagement, ordinarily without attorneys or even friends, it

may amount to a form of 'psychic breaking and entering' or, put another
way, psychic rape."'
Moreover, although mediation is purportedly
designed in part to help participants avoid the trauma associated with
judicial procedures, the face-to-face nature of mediation, combined with
its apparent informality and uncertainty about the governing rules, may

render the process particularly traumatic for women who have not made
a voluntary and informed decision to participate.4 1
Empirical data provide support for these perceptions. An analysis of
two large mediation studies revealed that, compared to their male
counterparts, women who participated in mediation were more likely to

report that their ex-spouses pressured them into an agreement, that they
never really felt comfortable expressing their feelings, that mediation was
tense and unpleasant, that they felt angry during many of the mediation
sessions and that the mediators were very directive and essentially dictated
the terms of the agreement.'
Men, by contrast, were more apt than
477.
Emery & Jackson, supra note 463, at 12-13. The authors explain this result
is due to a temporary sense of vindication felt by women after winning in court, and
hypothesize that the difference in rates of depression will disappear at longitudinal
followup. Id. at 16. For a critique of this explanation, see Grillo, supra note 277, at
1578-79 ("A more accurate analysis may well be that all women are angry at divorce, but
that the mediation process may require that anger to be suppressed (or at least not to be
attended to) or to be directed against themselves, resulting in increased evidence of
clinical depression.").
478.
Emery & Jackson, supra note 463, at 16.
479.
Grllo, supra note 277, at 1605 & n.267. Grillo acknowledges that many
women experience the adversary process in a similar way.
480.
Id. at 1606 (quoting David L. Singer et al., Boundary Management in
Psychological Work with Groups, in EXPLORING INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
BOUNDARIES: A TAvisTOCK OPEN SYSTEMS APPROACH 21, 32 (W. Gordon Lawrence
ed., 1979)).
481.
Grillo, supra note 277, at 1606-07.
482.
Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation, supra note 284, at 469. For an
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women to report that they felt comfortable and relaxed during
mediation.i Men were more likely to report as disadvantages that they
waited too long to get into mediation and that they spent too much time

in mediation discussing the past.'
Finally, at least one recent study suggests that mediation of divorce
and separation issues may exacerbate wife abuse.'
Among women
who reported being abused during their marriages, researchers found that
those who participated in mediation were more likely to report postseparation abuse by their ex-partners than were women who relied on
adversary procedures.'
Both the privateness of the mediation process
and the centrality to mediation of the concept of self-help may help to
explain this finding.' The possibility of a correlation between divorce
mediation and the continuation of marital violence has serious policy

implications: studies indicate that violence and abuse are part of the
history of a significant percentage of divorcing and separating
women.s Moreover, even if mediation rules permit (or require)
abused parties to "opt out" of court-connected mediation, an abused

spouse may have difficultly showing that she is entitled to such an
exemption; to be relieved from participating in mediation, a woman must

often come forward with more than her word.'
excellent discussion of the ways in which the mediation process suppresses the expression
of anger and the reasons why that suppression may be especially harmful to women
eperiencing divorce, see Grillo, supra note 277, at 1572-81. Grillo argues that the
delegitimation of anger in divorce mediation may be especially damaging to Black women.
Id. at 1579-81.
483.
Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation, supra note 284, at 469.
484.
Id.
485.
See Ellis, supra note 282, at 328 (discussing study results). Other scholars
have argued that mediation of wife abuse cases is likely to increase the risk of further
abuse. See, e.g., Barbara Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The FurtherEndangermentof Battered
Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317 (Summer 1990); Lisa
G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute
Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984); Dianna R. Stallone,
Decriminalizationof Violence in the Home: Mediation in Wife Battering Cases, 2 LAW
& INEQ. J. 493 (1984).
486.
Ellis, supra note 282, at 328.
487.
See id. at 336.
488.
See Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and The Problem Of
Transition: Perspectiveson Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 27-28
(while exact figures are difficult to obtain, 50% figure is one many experts subscribe to);
Shattuck, supra note 412, at 191, 206 (domestic violence had occurred in 32% of families
in court mediation sample); Linda K. Girdner, Custody Mediation in the United States:
Empowerment or Social Control?, 3 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 134, 138 n.19 (1988)
(Canadian study shows physical violence given as reason for marital separation by 50-75 %
of women).
489.
Grillo, supra note 277, at 1584-85 & nn.187-88.
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Thus, both empirical research and feminist analysis suggest that
privatizing the procedures for resolving divorce and custody disputes may
exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, existing gender-based power
inequalities within the family. Moreover, the dangers that private dispute
resolution poses for women may apply as well to the privatization of the
substantive legal doctrines that govern the dissolution of marriage. The
widespread availability of unilaterial divorce, coupled with the notion that
the state should not impose upon divorcing parties any continuing support
responsibilities, obviously has different consequences, on average, for
divorcing women than for men. This divergence may be particularly
striking with respect to parents, since divorcing mothers are much more
likely than their partners to have reduced their earning capacity in order
to care for the couple's children.' °
More generally, concerns about gender equality suggest that we
should be considerably more wary about the wisdom of private ordering
when it comes to the dissolution of family relationships, than when it
comes to their creation. This is true, in part, because membership and
participation in a family often creates or exacerbates inequality.
Parenthood, for example, necessarily entails a relationship of dependence
and inequality between a child on the one hand, and an adult or adults,
on the other. The process of parenting may also create or enhance
economic and other inequalities between adult family members,
particularly mothers and fathers. 91 In light of these disparities, legal
rules that grant unfettered discretion to private individuals to structure the
process of marital dissolution or that place dissolution-related disputes
outside the "shadow of the law" may end up empowering economically
stronger family members at the cost of economically weaker ones in much
the same way that the legal system's traditional refusal to intervene in the
affairs of an ongoing marriage reinforced the power of husbands over
wives.

490.
As of 1987, approximately 60% of married women with minor children
worked outside the home. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Family Earnings and Employment
Data, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 76, at B1 (Apr. 22, 1987). Of this 60%,
approximately one third held only part time jobs. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Half of Mothers with Children Under 3 Now in Labor Force, News Release,
U.S.D.L. 86-345 at tbl. 3 (Aug. 20, 1986). Despite the increasing number of women in
the paid labor force, men's earnings still provide the bulk of family income in most intact
marriages. Even in families where both spouses are employed, wives earnings typically
amount to only 44% of their husbands' income. Spencer Rich, 1 Wife in 5 Outearns her
Husband, WASH. POST, May 7, 1986, at A18. See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital
Partnershi and the Case for Permanent Alimony, in ALIMONY:' NEw STRATEIES FOR
PURSUIT AND DEFENSE 45, 47-49 (1988).
491.
See generally ARLIE R. HOCHSCHILD, THE SEcoND SHIFT (1989).
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2. THE EFFECT OF PRIVATIZATION ON THIRD PARTIES

Another disadvantage of both private norm creation and private
dispute resolution in family law is their potential to compromise the
interests of third parties, particularly children. An increasing number of
scholars have emphasized the detrimental effects of the private ordering
of divorce on children.'
Substantial evidence suggests that the
common divorce bargaining practice of a parent trading off financial
claims for custody assurances has contributed both to inadequate child
support agreements and to the impoverishment of children and their
custodial parents after divorce.'
The broader the scope of private
divorce bargaining, the greater the potential for such damaging trade-offs.
The broad "best interest of the child" standard for determining custody,
for example, encourages divorcing parents (and their lawyers) to bargain

in ways that are particularly detrimental to children's financial
interests. 4' Similarly, the absence (until recently) of precise guidelines
for determining child support contributed to the inadequacy of many
privately negotiated child support arrangements.49 5
Even the shift from public to private control of the decision to
dissolve a marriage may be detrimental to children's interests. Recent
studies suggest that the psychological effects of divorce on children are
both more serious and more enduring than previously believed. 4' At
492.
See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 156, at 323-56; MARY A. GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 86-111 (1987); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9 (1990).
493.,
WErrZMAN, .supra note 156, at 224-25; Richard Neely, The Primary
Caretaker Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.

168 (1984).
494.
Neely, supra note 493, at 168-69; Singer & Reynolds, supra note 335, at
520.
495.
See Judith M. Billings, From Guesswork to Guidelines-The Adoption of
Uniform Child Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 859, 865-66.
496.
See, e.g., JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES (1989) (10 year follow-up study on children of divorce indicates that long-term
effects of divorce-particularly for girls-are more harmful than had previously been
believed); Judith S. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Preliminary Report of a Ten Year
Follow-up of Older Children and Adolescents, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 545
(1985) (same); E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects of Divorce and
Remarriage on the Adjustment of Children, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 518,
527 (1985) (in a six year follow up study, boys in divorced families continued to be less
compliant than boys in intact families); Scott, supra note 492, at 29-32 (discussing
studies). Some girls seem to adjust well soon after divorce and only show the harmful
effects as they reach adulthood and contemplate serious relationships themselves. Judith
S. Wallerstein, Children After Divorce: Wounds That Don't Heal,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
1989, (Magazine), at 19, 20-21.
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a minimum, divorce involves significant stress and upheaval for children.
"The adjustment of most children is disrupted substantially for a year or
two after divorce; for some, the disruption continues to exert a harmful

influence for many years." 4' Moreover, except in cases, of extreme
interparental conflict, little evidence supports the comforting assumption
that divorce is better for children than a marriage in which one or both

parents are unhappy.' s For many children, apparently, even a
marriage in which parents are less than satisfied is better than a
divorce.'l

The private transfer of parental rights also threatens children's
interests. Advocates of independent adoption trumpet the ability of
privately arranged child transfers to avoid many of the restrictions and
bureaucratic hurdles imposed by adoption agencies. But jettisoning these
safeguards may have disastrous consequences for children. For example,
the absence of significant public controls on the private adoption process
in New York may well have contributed to the 1987 death of nine-yearold Lisa Steinberg; Lisa died at the hands of her "adoptive father"-an

attorney who retained custody of the child after agreeing to arrange a
private adoption.'

Critics of surrogate-parenting contracts also point to the potentially
damaging effects of surrogacy on the children who are conceived as a
result of these contracts. Dean Judith Areen, for example, argues that

surrogacy arrangements increase the risk that both biological parents will
consider it acceptable to abandon less-than-perfect infants after they are
born5 ° ' The surrogate mother may consider it acceptable because that
497.
Scott, supra note 492, at 29-30.
498.
Id. at 37, 32-33.
499.
This conclusion does not automatically lead to the endorsement of greater
restrictions on divorce. Promoting the welfare of children is only one goal-albeit a very
important one-of a just family law regime.
500.
Lisa Steinberg's death resulted in renewed calls for increased public
restrictions on the private placement adoption. See E.R. Shipp, Death Draws Public's Eye
to Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1987, at B1.
501.
Areen, supra note 228, at 1746-48. There have been at least two cases in
which parties to a surrogacy arrangement have initially disclaimed responsibility for a
child born with medical problems. In 1984, Christopher Ray Stiver was born suffering
from a strep infection and microcephaly, a congenital disorder usually associated with
mental retardation. The contracting father refused to consent to medical treatment for the
child and disclaimed parental responsibility. The results of paternity tests, revealed to the
parties on the Phil Donahue television show, indicated that the husband of the surrogate
mother was the genetic father of the child. Id. at 1747 & n.28. A 1986 case involved
a woman who contracted to become a surrogate mother for her sister. The surrogate had
a history of drug abuse that was not known to her family. At birth, the child tested
positive for the HIV antibody. Both the surrogate mother and the contracting couple
refused custody of the child. Id. at 1747 & n.29.
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is precisely what the surrogacy contract encourages her to do; the father
(and his spouse, if any) may do so because, as a purchaser, he is likely
to feel that he has the right to reject "damaged goods."'
Critics have

also raised concerns about the effects of both surrogacy and free market
adoption on other children touched by the process, for example, the
siblings or half-siblings of the child who is transferred or traded

away.5
Children's interests may also be threatened by the shift from public
to private ordering of the process for resolving family disputes. Children

are, quite literally, unrepresented third parties in divorce mediation, and
none of the parties who do participate are directly responsible for
safeguarding children's interests. Although some mediators view their

role as encompassing some degree of child advocacy, others view such
advocacy as both inconsistent with the neutrality required of a mediator
and contrary to mediation's commitment to parental autonomy.' More
than one quarter of the mediators surveyed in a recent study, for example,
indicated they would accept a custody agreement that cut the children off
from their favorite grandparents even though the children were unhappy

with the arrangement and the agreement had been arrived at through a
502.
Id. at 1747-48.
503.
See Jane M. Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REv. 105
(1987). Even the most avid proponents of the private transfer of parental rights
acknowledge the potential for third party harm:
The ordinary presumption of free-enterprise economics is no stronger than that
free exchange will maximize the satisfaction of the people trading .....
There is no presumption that the satisfactions of the thing traded, in most
instances a meaningless concept, are also maximized. If we treat the child as
a member of the community whose aggregate welfare we are interested in
maximizing, there is no justification for ignoring how the child's satisfactions
may be affected by alternate methods of adoption.
Landes & Posner, supra note 197, at 342.
504.
Compare, e.g., DONALD T. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY
DispuTES 38 (1983) (mediator must be advocate for children) and Bishop, supra note 274,
at 413 (mediator has a duty to promote children's best interests in the mediation process)
with MARLOW & SAUBER, supra note 279, at 80-87 (family autonomy principles require
that mediators not make judgments about children's needs or attempt to determine
children's best interests) and Emery & Jackson, supra note 463, at 8 (including children's
input in mediation is contrary to mediation's rationale of parental self-determination).
Both the ABA Standards of Practice for Family Mediators and the Model Standards of
Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation issued by the Association of Family and
Conciliation Courts suggest that the mediator has a duty to ensure that participants
consider the best interest of their children. See Bishop, supra note 274, at 417,423. The
ABA Standards also provide that "[ilf the mediator believes that any proposed agreement
of the parents does not protect the best interests of the children, the mediator has a duty
to inform them of this belief and its basis." Zd. at 417.
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"bald-faced trade-off of access to the children for support payments."'
Most of these mediators rationalized their decision on the basis of the
"family's right to autonomous judgment."'
There is also considerable debate in the mediation literature about
whether and how mediators should involve children in mediation.'
A 1983 survey of mediators found that fewer than fifty percent of the
respondents met with children in their average mediation." A more
recent survey of California mediators indicated that while most mediators
believed that children above age four should have some input in the
mediation process, fewer than twenty-five percent always sought the input
of school-aged children and fewer than thirty percent always sought the
input of adolescents."
Moreover, while mediation has been touted as
superior to adversary procedures for promoting the welfare of children
affected by divorce, there is little credible evidence that it has fulfilled
this promise. 1°
One possibility for ameliorating the effects of privatization on
children would be to consider a two-tiered family law regime. One tier,
applicable to families with children, would allow only a limited degree of
private ordering; the other tier, applicable to families without children and
to family decisions not directly affecting children, would accord private
ordering considerably broader scope. Under such a two-tiered regime,
the decision of two (or more) adults to marry or to enter into a marriagelike intimate relationship would be accorded considerable deference; the
government would have only limited authority to distinguish among such
consensual intimate relationships in distributing public benefits and
burdens, including employment-related benefits.
505.
Gary W. Paquin, The Child's Input in the Mediation Process: Promoting the
Best Interests of the Child, MEDIATION Q., Winter 1988, at 69, 70; see Joseph P. Folger
& Sydney E. Bernard, Divorce Mediation: When Mediators Challenge the Divorcing
Parties, MEDIATION Q., Dec. 1985, at 5, 11, 15.
506.
Paquin, supra note 505.
507.
Id. at 72. See Emery & Jackson, supra note 463, at 8 (explaining why
author-mediators "almost never include children in mediation").
508.
Pearson et al., supra note 270, at 15, 17.
509.
Paquin, supra note 505, at 74-75.
510.
See Grillo, supra note 277, at 1608-09 n.293. Research shows that children
whose parents reach a settlement in mediation are no better adjusted following the divorce
than children whose parents did not use mediation. Id. at 1608-09. See KENNETH
KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DIVORCE: How PROFESSIONALS AND COUPLES NEGOTIATE

SETTLEMENTS 285-86 (1985). But cf. Barbara J. Bautz & Rose M. Hill, Mediating the
Breakup: Do Children Win? 8 MEDIATION Q. 199 (Spring 1991) (asserting superiority
of mediation for children, base on evidence that couples who mediated were more likely
to choose joint custody, less likely to miss child support payments and more satisfied with
their divorce agreement than couples who relied on adversary procedures).
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Decisions to dissolve intimate relationships, however, might be
subject to greater public scrutiny. In particular, both the procedures for
obtaining a divorce and the deference accorded to private resolution of
divorce-related issues would vary according to presence or absence of
minor children. Several scholars have endorsed the notion of such a twotiered marriage and divorce regime. Ten years ago, Judith Younger
proposed the creation of a special legal status for married couples with
minor children.5"'
Under Younger's proposal, couples with minor
children would have to establish, in addition to the usual grounds for
divorce, "that continuing the marriage would cause either or both spouses
exceptional hardship and would harm their minor children more than the
divorce.""1 Moreover, in the event of a divorce, the court would have
the power to order a continuation of the ex-spouse's economic partnership
in order to safeguard the children's interests. 1 3
More recently, Elizabeth Scott has argued that both the long-term
personal goals of most spouses and the broader social objective of
protecting children support a scheme of mandatory legal rules that would
make the divorce process more cumbersome for divorces involving minor
children."
Specifically, Scott recommends that parents of minor
children be permitted to divorce only after a two-year separation
period.515 She also advocates enhanced parental support obligations and
property distribution schemes that are more protective of children's
interests than our current property division rules.516 Counseling,
mediation and mental health evaluation of the children might also be
required before parents would be permitted to divorce. 7 Along these
same lines, Mary Ann Glendon has recently proposed that a "children
first" principle govern all divorces where minor children are involved. 51
511.
Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 45, 90-91 (1981).
512.
Id. at 90.
513.
Id. at 91.
514.
Scott, supra note 492, at 87-91.
515.
Id. at 91.
516.
Id.
517.
Id.
518.
GLENDON, supra note 492, at 94-103. A recent proposal by Britain's Law
Commission endorses a similar "children first" approach. The Commission recommended
that parents contemplating divorce "notify the courts of their intention and then spend at
least nine months resolving crucial details of the divorce. Their first obligation would be
to decide the future of their children before settling questions of property and
maintenance. Only then could couples return to court for a divorce." Marilyn Gardner,
Putting Children First-theNew English Precedent, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 30,
1990, at 14; see ELAINE C. KAMARCK & WILLIAM A. GALSTON, PUTINO CHILDREN
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Although no American jurisdiction currently applies different
standards for granting a divorce where minor children are involved, other
aspects of our current divorce system support the notion of at least a
modified two-tiered family law regime. For example, although the law
today generally accords spouses great latitude in structuring their postdivorce financial affairs, this latitude does not extend to agreements
regarding child support or child custody.519 In theory, at least, parental
agreements regarding the custody and support of children are subject to
judicial scrutiny undera best-interest standard." 2 Moreover, the recent
adoption by all states of presumptive child support guidelines, as well as
recent state and federal efforts to improve child support enforcement,
appears to indicate a renewed public commitment to ensuring the financial
well-being of children affected by parental separation. The adoption of
presumptive child support guidelines also reduces considerably the
permissible scope of private bargaining regarding the financial incidents
of divorce.
Tying the acceptable scope of private ordering to the presence or
absence of minor children also weakens the case for private transfers of
parental rights, in both the adoption and surrogacy contexts. Since
decisions about parental status necessarily implicate children's interests,
such a two-tiered family law regime would accord little deference to
private attempts to effectuate the transfer of parental rights and
responsibilities. In the adoption context, this might mean, at a minimum,
an increased public role in private-placement adoption, through such
requirements as a preplacement home study or a prequalification
procedure for potential adoptive parents 21 In the surrogacy context,
FIRST: A PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POLICY FOR THE 1990, at 30-31 (1990).
519.
Areen, supra note 248, at 1746.
520.
See, e.g., Guille v. Guille, 492 A.2d 175, 177-80 (Conn. 1985) (child's right
to parental support not dependent on contract between parents; minor children thus
permitted to open and correct dissolution judgment by deleting provision of parents'
separation agreement which precluded modification of custody and support); Essex v.
Ayers, 503 So. 2d 1365, 1366-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (parents may not by contract
impair obligation to support minor child); Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 564-65.
(N.D. 1985) (court not bound by stipulation between parents regarding custody and care
of child if not in child's best interests); Clement v. Clement, 506 So. 2d 624, 626 (La.
Ct. App. 1987) (regardless of consideration given for agreement, permanent waiver by
custodial parent of right to compel payment of child support unenforceable because not
in child's best interests). The evidence suggests, however, that courts rarely give such
parental agreements regarding children more than perfunctory review. See Teitelbaum
& DuPaix, supra note 287, at 1108; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 297, at 954-56.
521.
The most recent draft of the Proposed Uniform Adoption Act requires the
completion of a written preplacement assessment before a child can be placed with any
prospective adoptive parent. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 21 (Proposed Offical Draft 1992).
This requirement, which a court may waive upon good cause shown, applies to both
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concerns about the effect of surrogacy on children, in conjunction with its
potential to exploit women, suggest that the law should discourage
contract surrogacy by refusing to enforce private surrogacy agreements
and by resolving any resulting custody disputes within the framework of
family law.'
Of course, there is no guarantee that a system of publicly imposed
constraints on private transactions involving children will protect children
any better than unrestricted private ordering. Many family law rules
ostensibly adopted for child welfare purposes have, in fact, been
motivated by less laudatory goals, or have proven misguided or
counterproductive." z But insisting that legal rules affecting children
include a significant public component at least allows us to focus directly
and collectively on children's interests, rather than relying exclusively on
disputing adults or on the invisible hand of the market to protect
children's welfare.
3. THE EFFECT OF PRIVATIZATION ON FAMILY LAW REFORM

Another danger of privatization is its potential to dampen law reform
efforts and to impede the growth of family law. This may be particularly
disadvantageous to women, since feminists and other women's advocates
have recently refocused their efforts on family law reform. Part of the
impetus for this redoubling of efforts is the growing realization that our
current, no-fault divorce regime has had devastating economic
consequences for divorcing women and their children."2 The initial
enthusiasm for private ordering that accompanied the no-fault divorce
revolution may well have diverted attention away from the economic
consequences of divorce and impeded efforts to reform the legal doctrines
that governed post-divorce financial allocations. 5' In addition, the
perceived desirability of a "clean break" between divorcing spouses who
were presumed both to value and to deserve post-divorce independence
undermined efforts to insist publicly on substantial sharing of financial
resources following marital dissolution.5"
Privatizing the dispute
private and agency adoptions. Id.
522.
See Areen, supra note 248, at 1752-53.
523.
See, e.g., Jacobus Tenbroek, California'sDual System of Family Law: Its
Origin, Development and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964).
524.
See sources cited supra note 2.
525.
See generally, Henna H. Kay, An Appraisalof California'sNo-FaultDivorce
Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291 (1987); Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality:
Ideology, Contradictionand Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 789.
526.
Cf Kay, supra note 525, at 313-14 (emphasis of no-fault divorce on a clean
financial break between spouses is inconsistent with treating graduate degrees as marital
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resolution process through divorce and custody mediation is likely further
to stifle law reform efforts.

Unlike adjudication, which develops and

applies public norms, mediation does not result in the development or the
application of public standards.527 There is, therefore, little ongoing
public evaluation of the norms applied or the outcomes reached during
divorce mediation. Nor are judges encouraged to review mediated
divorce agreements, either for fairness or for compliance with prevailing
legal standards. 5"

Indeed, statutes and rules governing mediation in a

number of jurisdictions actively discourage judges from independently
scrutinizing mediated agreements. 5' 2
Moreover, mediation, unlike
adjudication, is conducted in private. If records are maintained, they are
likely to be confidential. 5" The closed and confidential nature of
mediation insulates the process from public scrutiny and impedes external
review and challenge."'
An emphasis on private, contract-based solutions to family law

problems may also truncate our ability to imagine alternative forms of
public ordering. A passage in Marjorie 'Shultz's influential article
532
advocating contractual ordering of marriage illustrates this danger.
Shultz poses the following hypothetical:
Suppose that a woman
contemplating marriage agrees, in principle, to sex with her husband on
demand; should such an agreement prevent her from later filing a rape
property).
527.
As one mediation proponent put it, in mediation "the family's own standards,
rather than the judge's, are used to make the decision." Deis, supra note 263, at 163.
See Evarts & Goodwin, supra note 297, at 527 ("Possessed of no precedential power and
,bound by no precedential history, mediation creates no opportunities for redress for the
larger group.").
528.
See, e.g., Andrew Schepard et al., Ground Rulesfor Custody Mediation -and
Modification, 48 ALBANY L. REV. 616, 660-61 (1984) (suggesting that judges should
exercise more restraint in reviewing mediated agreements than agreements negotiated by
lawyers); Margaret Little et al., A CaseStudy: The Custody Mediation Services of the Los
Angeles Conciliation Court, 23 CONCILIATION CTS. REV., Dec. 1985, at 1, 5; John P.
McCrory, Legal and PracticalIssues in Divorce Mediation: An American Perspective, in
THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 253, at 144, 153.
529.
Maine's mediation statute, for example, provides that where the parents have
agreed to an award of shared parental rights and responsibilities, the court shall make that
award unless there is substantial evidence that it should not be ordered. McCrory, supra
note 528, at 153. Court rules for mediation programs in several Oregon and Arizona
counties similarly provide that, in order to preserve and promote the integrity of
mediation, the court will. endeavor to include in its order all reasonable agreements
reached by the parties. Id.
530.
See Lerman, supra note 485, at 90.
531.
See Shaffer, supra note 258, at 167; Tomain & Lutz, supra note 278, at 7.
532.
Marjorie M. Shultz, ContractualOrdering of Marriage: A New Model For
State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 279 (1982).
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claim against her husband?533 In her response, Shultz acknowledges
that a strong argument can be made that private contract ought not to
override the general criminal law; she asserts, however, that "the idea of
enforceable private agreements concerning violent sexual conduct is less
offensive than a state declaration that violent sexual conduct is
automatically acceptable in marriage." 5' This ranking of undesirables
may well be correct, although I, for one, am not so sure. More
important, however, is that Shultz's response appears to present publicly
condoned and privately consented to marital violence as the only relevant
options; it therefore begs the question of whether public solutions exist
that are superior to either publicly sanctioned or privately authorized
violence against women.535
Privatization of family law may also impede law reform efforts by
individuating women's grievances. This may be particularly true of
mediation and other informal dispute-resolution mechanisms.
By
emphasizing the uniqueness of each divorcing couple's situation,
mediation may encourage divorcing women who end up significantly
poorer than their ex-husbands to believe that "this only happens to me"
and may discourage them from looking outward for structural
explanations for their plight. 5" Similarly, the mediator's effort to
validate each party's interests and to have each party understand (and
possibly accept) the other's behavior may encourage divorcing women to
blame themselves for whatever financial and parental disadvantages they
suffer as a result of a mediated divorce. As the inheritors of a movement
grounded on the insistence that "the personal is political," feminists
should be particularly wary of legal developments that encourage-this sort
of individuation and depoliticalization of women's grievances.
Privatization may also stymie efforts to reform family law doctrine' by
removing from judicial consideration cases and issues crucial for the
development of the parameters of the law.537 This may be particularly
true of mediation, which privatizes the method by which we resolve a
533.
Id.
534.
Id. at 280.
535.
See PATEMAN, supra note 423, at 185.
536.
See Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE
POLrrIcs OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267, 291 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); Grillo, supra note
277, at 1561-62 (family systems perspective held by most mediators obscures issues of
unequal social power and sex role socialization and isolates family relationships from
outside social attitudes and forces).
537.
See Shaffer, supra note 258, at 165-66; Judith L. Maute, Public Values and
Private Justice: A Casefor Mediator Accountability, 4 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS
503, 503 (1991) ("Private settlement can prevent needed legal development on important
matters requiring an authoritative public decision."). Cf Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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particular category of legal disputes. But it is also likely to be true of
private ordering more generally, since entrusting entirely to private parties
the authority to create and enforce norms of family behavior reduces both
the opportunity and the perceived need for continuing public scrutiny of

those norms.
In a related context, Owen Fiss has argued that advocates of
alternative dispute resolution often err in reducing the social function of
the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes.53

Those who

unqualifiedly support the privatization of family law may commit a
similar error by conceptualizing family law issues as affecting only those

individuals immediately involved in a family dispute. In fact, family law
has historically been one of the most powerful ways that we, as a society,

have defined our values and have articulated our aspirations for personal
relationships, particularly relationships between adults and children and
between women and men.539 Of course, not all of these historical

values are worth retaining. The legal rule that the husband was entitled
to choose the family domicile, for example, was more than a way of
resolving disputes relating to the marital residence; it was also one of
many legal building blocks that defined the "proper" (that is, hierarchical)
relationship between husbands and wives and, by analogy, between men

and women generally.
But the legal doctrines that govern family relations can send more
positive messages as well. For example, the common law doctrine of
necessaries and the husband's more general duty to support his wife and
children may have been one (albeit flawed) way of expressing society's
view that those with access to material wealth have obligations to share
538.
Fiss, supra note 537, at 1085. Cf.William M. Lanes & Richard A. Posner,
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979) (private methods of dispute
resolution systematically underproduce precedents).
539.
See, e.g., Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor Parental
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1417-31 (1991) (legal rules governing relationships
between unmarried parents and their children reflect society's view of appropriate male
and female parenting); Teitlebaum & DuPaix, supra note 287, at 1116 ("As a social
matter, [divorce] proceedings define, at least initially, crucially important relationships
between parents and their children."); Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A Historical
Perspectiveon Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV.
261 (1992) (current and former laws restricting access to abortion designed to ensure
women's performance of marital and maternal obligations). While there is no uniform
agreement that law is an effective tool of social engineering, there is a strong argument
that both legislation and judicial decisions influence societal behavior and attitudes.
Nanette K. Laughrey, Uniform Marital Property Act: A Renewed Commitment to the
American Family, 65 NEB. L. REV. 120, 141 (1986); see A. MYRDAL, NATION AND
FAMILY vi (1968) ("No government, however firm might be its wish, can avoid having
policies that profoundly influence family relationships. .. ").
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that wealth with financially more vulnerable family members. Similarly,
a requirement that spousal support (or other forms of income sharing) be
used to compensate divorcing spouses who have reduced their economic
opportunities in order to assume primary domestic responsibilities
indicates that we value such domestic work and want it to continue.
More generally, the law's advocacy of partnership and sharing principles
at divorce, through such devices as the equitable distribution of marital
property, sends a powerful signal about what we, as a society, consider
desirable behavior in marriage."
Privatizing these matters implies, at best, that we are neutral about
what sort of behavior goes on within families. At worst, when combined
with the self-maximizing ideology of law and economics-an ideology that
often accompanies private ordering-it privileges self-interested behavior
over other forms of family interaction.
4.

PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE SPLIT

A related danger of privatization in family law is that it will
reinforce the dichotomy our legal system has traditionally drawn between
the private, domestic sphere, and the public sphere of politics and the
market."
One of the most salient features of this dichotomy is the
view that family issues reside "naturally" in the private realm and, for
that reason, are not appropriate subjects of state concern.'
Since the
"naturally" private family realm encompasses many of the issues that
centrally affect women's lives, the effect of the traditional public/private
split has been to exclude from the public agenda many of women's most
pressing concerns. 5" The trend toward private ordering of family

540.
See, e.g., Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to
Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539; Singer, supra note 2; Goldfarb, supra note 490.

541.
See, e.g., Laughrey, supra note 539; Susan W. Prager, Sharing Princiles
and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1977).
542.
Feminist scholars, particularly Frances Olsen, have identified two versions
of the public/private split. One version separates government from the market. The other
version separates the family from all forms of public life. Frances E. Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983);

see MINOW, supra note 359, at 281 & n.52. In this Article, I am concerned with the
version that separates the family from both politics and the market.
543.

See SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989) (arguing

that both classical and modern political theory has largely ignored questions of justice
within the family).
544.
For example, the traditional view of the family as a private enclave insulated
from public scrutiny has helped to obscure the multiple links between women's economic
and political inequality and their caretaking roles within the family. See generally, OKIN,
supra note 543, at 8-10; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 491, at 249-56.
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issues is likely to perpetuate this exclusion.'
For example, if the
impoverishment of divorcing women is viewed primarily as the
(unfortunate) result of private choices, made in a "naturally" private
realm, then it may also seem natural for the government to ignore the
problem or to characterize it as outside the scope of public
responsibility.'
Similarly, if women's relinquishment of parental
rights through contract surrogacy and free market adoption are seen as
essentially matters of private choice, then policy makers are less likely to
focus on the publicly-created and maintained conditions that lead women
to "choose" these reproductive options.5'
Moreover, characterizing family issues as matters to be resolved by
private individuals in an isolated private realm reinforces the view that the
public has little interest in, and little reason to value, the caregiving and
homemaking work that goes on within families. Since women have
traditionally performed the bulk of this work-and, to a large extent,
continue to do so-the devaluation of the work that goes on within
families is particularly disadvantageous to women. Moreover, the
devaluation of domestic work contributes to the marginalization of the
behaviors and attitudes associated with that work, and to the conviction
that these so-called feminine attitudes are incompatible with success in the
public realms of politics and the market.'
The notion of a natural demarcation between legitimate public issues
and private domestic concerns-which the privatization of family law
reinforces-also isolates the family from the workplace and obscures the
connections between family and work. 9 As a result, work-family
conflicts tend to be characterized as private matters, and the inability to
integrate work and family responsibilities is viewed as an individual

545.
See Shaffer, supra note 258, at 166-67 ("Removing divorce from the public
realm amounts to a 'reprivatization' of the family, allowing traditional patterns of
inequality to flourish.").
546.
See Dowd, supra note 426, at 481 & n.273.
547.
See Barbara K. Rothman, The Meanings of Choice in Reproductive
Technology, in TEST-TuBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD 23 (Rita Arditti

et al. eds., 1984) (discussing the ways in which society structures reproductive choices);
Cohen, supra note 503, at 172-73 (expressing concern that the endorsement of market
structures to govern adoption will decrease the likelihood that public policy will respond
to the problems of poor women who are the potential producers of babies).
548.
Cf Areen, supra note 423, at 1072-78 (contrasting the "justice" and "care"
perspectives and suggesting that the care perspective be extended beyond the family into
the public sphere).
549.
See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the
Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.C.L. REv. 79, 118-19 (1989).
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failure, rather than as a structural or a societal problem. 5

This view

masks the fact that the American workplace is designed by and for
workers with no significant family responsibilities.551 Caring for young
children (and other dependent family members) is assumed to be the task
of someone other than the full-time worker and that someone is usually
female.552
The assumption that childcare and other family
responsibilities are incompatible with "real" (that is, paid) work hurts
both women and men. It hurts women by limiting their employment
options and by disadvantaging them in the paid work force; it hurts men
by characterizing fatherhood in purely economic terms and by
discouraging men from assuming more active parenting and caregiving
roles.553
Even the structure of our judicial system reflects the notion that
family issues and family disputes are not worthy of sustained public
attention. The argument that divorce and custody issues are particularly
well suited for mediation reflects, in part, a sense that our judicial system
should be reserved for matters more important than domestic
conflicts. 5" Despite the fact that over half of all civil actions filed in
the nation's trial courts are divorce cases, 555 most commentators agree
550.
Id. at 99.
551.
See Joan C. Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87 MicH. L. REv. 797, 822
(1989); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1221 (1989); Dowd, supra note 426, at 446.
552.
Abrams, supra note 551, at 1221.
553.
See Dowd, supra note 549, at 93, 113; Dowd, supra note 426, at 451-56.
554.
The so-called "domestic relations" exception to federal diversity jurisdiction
reflects a similar reluctance on the part of federal judges to adjudicate disputes concerning
family matters. See, e.g., Colev. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1089 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing
trial court's application of domestic relations exception to malicious prosecution suit and
concluding that "[s]o long as diversity jurisdiction endures, federal courts cannot shirk the
inconvenience of sometimes trading in wares from the foul rag-and-bone shop of the
heart"); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d
Cir. 1973) (declining, under domestic relations exception, to entertain suit by law firm to
recover fees earned in divorce litigation and expressing doubt "that the Supreme Court
today would demand that federal judges waste their time exploring a thicket of state
decisional law in a case such as this"); Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C.
1976) ("The field of domestic relations is so vexatious, time-consuming and specialized
that virtually every state in the Union has established a separate system of family courts
to prevent their own trial courts from being overburdened. As it has done consistently
in the past, the federal court system should allow them that dubious honor exclusively.").
See generally Barbara F. Wand, A Call for the Repudiation of the Domestic Relations
Exception to FederalJurisdiction, 30 VILL. L. REv. 307, 385-86 (1985) (discussing
judicial distaste for domestic relations disputes). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the existence of the domestic relations exception, as it applies to divorce and custody
disputes. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
555.
Oldham, supra note 146, at 787.
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that current court procedures are ill-suited for dealing with divorce and
family disputes.
While mediation proponents view these judicial
shortcomings as persuasive justification for removing domestic cases from
the judicial system, an equally logical solution would be to reform the
judicial system itself so that it is more responsive to the family-oriented
cases that make up the bulk of its work.
Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that the allocation of
judicial and other legal resources to the resolution of divorce-related
disputes is a particularly appropriate distributive choice. 5'
For
many-if not most-disputants, divorce and its incidents are the only
occasion on which they will come into contact with the law in its formal
sense. 557 Moreover, this contact is for most disputants an extremely
important matter, with significant financial, emotional and symbolic
consequences. 5" "[Diecisions about how resources are allocated at the
time of divorce also have a significant impact on society; in particular,
they profoundly affect the economic opportunities and material well-being
of both this generation and the next."5.
The practical consequences of a legal ideology that isolates the family
from the public sphere and that devalues the work that goes on within
families are also obvious at the national level. The United States is the
only developed Western nation without an explicit national family
policy.'
Perhaps as a result, we are virtually the only developed
country without state-mandated maternity or parenting leave, or
meaningful government support for families with children. 1 We are
also set apart from other Western democracies by our "relative lack of
concern with assuring either public or, until very recently, private
responsibility for the problems of dependency associated with changing
patterns of family behavior."2
556.
Teitelbaum & DuPaix, supra note 287, at 1116.
557.
Jd.
558.
Id. at 1116-17.
559.
Singer, supra note 2, at 1103.
560.
This does not mean that we do not have a national family policy. It means
that our "family policy" is implicit, contained in the details of tax law, employment law,
pension and insurance law, and social security law. Because it is implicit, it is largely
unexamined, and its implications for family life are insufficiently aired and discussed.
GLENDON, supra note 518, at 135.

561.
GLENDON, supra note 492, at 135. The United States government lacks a
counterpart to European cabinet ministers charged with responsibility for family affairs.
Id.
562.
Id. at 112; see CURRENT POPULATION REPS., SERIES P-70, No. 23, FAMILY
DISRUPTION AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP: THE SHORT-RUN PICTURE FOR CHILDREN (1991)

(detailing negative economic consequences for children who experience family disruption).
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Moreover, although work and family issues have recently appeared
on the public agenda, both the range and the depth of initiatives discussed
have been extremely limited.'
President Bush's repeated veto of
legislation that would have guaranteed employees of medium and large
American companies up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for
newborn or sick children demonstrates the federal government's continued
unwillingness to assume substantial public responsibility for issues relating
to work and family.'
The privatization of family law legitimates this
continued failure of public will and helps to ensure that both the family
and the workplace will retain their traditional, gendered structures, to the
detriment of both women and men.
5.

PRIVATIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHARED VALUES

A number of scholars have criticized law-and-economics analysis on
the grounds that it inappropriately fosters the market-like aspects of
human behavior and stunts the growth of other, nonmarket values.'
Privatization is vulnerable to a related criticism. By keeping family issues
off the public agenda and by encouraging reliance on decentralized private
choices, the private ordering of family law may stunt the development,
and indeed the discussion, of shared public values with respect to family
behavior. As feminist and other scholars have pointed out, the way we
talk about something affects the way that thing is, or becomes. "Rhetoric
563.
Parental leave legislation and child care proposals have been virtually the only
topics of public debate. These two issues have evolved as separate policy initiatives and
are rarely seen as elements of an integrated family policy. Thus, there has been little
effort to calculate how child care needs would be affected by the availability and structure
of leave policies or how the unavailability of child care might undercut the-work force
stability that parental leave policies are designed to ensure. See Nancy E. Dowd,
Envisioning Work and Family: A CriticalPerspectiveon InternationalModels, 26 HARV.
J. ON LEois. 311, 314-15 (1989).
564.
See Kenneth J.Cooper, House Failsto Override Bush Veto of Family Leave,
WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1992, at A7. Congress twice failed to override President Bush's
veto. Id. A number of states have recently passed family leave legislation. See Joseph
J. Vicinanza & Jake M. Holdreith, New Family Leave Legislation Forces Employers to
Plan Ahead, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 20 (reporting that, since 1980, eight states
have passed family leave legislation affecting private employees); Income Security: Next
Step For Family Leave, 22 NAT'L J.,1869, 1902 (1990) (reporting that 15 states mandate
some form of job protected family leave). Like the federal bills that President Bush
vetoed, these state initiatives provide only unpaid parental leave.
565.
See, e.g., Radin, supra note 158, at 1877-86; Tamar Frankel & Francis H.
Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoption, 67 B.U. L. REv. 99, 101
(1987); James B. White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L.
REv. 161, 172-93 (1986).

HeinOnline -- 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1564 1992

1992:1443

Privatizationof Family Law

1565

To the extent that
is not just shaped by, but shapes, reality."'
privatization encourages us to think and talk about family relationships in
terms traditionally associated with private exchanges-terms like selfinterested and wealth maximizing-our behavior may take on these
characteristics. Moreover, privatization and its accompanying rhetoric
may have a contagious quality. As one commentator has suggested, the
advocates of contract surrogacy and free market adoption ask us today to
privatize the production and allocation of healthy, white infants;
tomorrow, we may be asked to consider privatizing the costs of care for
Surely, we should be at least
children the market would reject.'
cautious about endorsing a family law regime that would reduce activities
as sensitive and as central to human existence as sexuality, parenting and
being cared for, to matters of private exchange and efficient
distribution.'6
D. Privatizationas a Transition Strategy
The preceding analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
privatization suggests that the privatization of family law may be
particularly valuable as a sort of transition strategy-a way of moving
from an unjust and outdated system of public ordering to a system whose
publicly-imposed constraints more accurately reflect social reality and
more-fairly allocate the benefits and burdens of family life. Such a
conception would view private ordering not as an end in itself, but rather
as a potentially useful stepping stone to imagining and implementing a
more just form of public ordering. On this analysis, opportunities for
private ordering would be evaluated, at least in part, according to their
potential to contribute to the development and maintenance of such an
alternative public vision.
Recent legislative and judicial efforts to allocate more fairly the
economic consequences of divo'rce may illustrate the catalytic role that
privatization can play in creating such alternative forms of public
ordering. During the no-fault divorce revolution, many scholars and
policy makers endorsed private ordering of the economic . consequences
of divorce as a way of eliminating the sex-based role allocations of the
traditional marriage contract and acknowledging the legal equality of
But recent empirical studies have shown that
husbands and wives.'
the shift from public to private ordering of divorce may well have
566.

Radin, supra note 158, at 1870. See generally JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS

TRANSLATION:

567.
568.
569.

AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990).

Cohen, supra note 503, at 174.
Id.
See text accompanying notes supra 350-58.
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contributed to the economic impoverishment of women and the children
they continue to care for after divorce."7 In response to these studies,
scholars have advocated, and courts and legislatures are beginning to

adopt, new publicly-imposed standards for post-divorce financial
awards-standards that are designed to recognize both spouses' investment

in a marriage and to protect financially vulnerable spouses and children,
without endorsing the gender-based stereotypes that characterized
traditional alimony and property doctrine.

1

The breakdown of gender

stereotypes and the redefinition of marriage as a partnership of equals,
both of which characterized the privatization of divorce, may well have
been a necessary prerequisite to the development of these alternative
public standards.
The legal recognition of privately ordered alternatives to marriage
and the extension to these relationships of benefits traditionally reserved
for married couples may provide another example of privatization serving
as a catalyst for the development of alternative forms of public ordering.
Claims for increased public recognition of domestic partnerships, for
example, have forced legislators and other policy makers to articulate and
defend the values traditionally associated with the marital family-values
570.
See sources cited supra note 2.
571.
See, e.g., Freed & Walker, supra note 146, at 319 (noting continued trend
toward considering the value of one spouse's professional degree in awarding spousal
maintenance and equitably distributing marital assets); Ralph J. Brown & Linda L.M.
Viken, Recognition of Homemaker Career Opportunity Cost in Marital Dissolution Cases,
35 S.D. L. REV. 40 (1990); Joan M. Krauskoph, Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration
Alimony, in ALIMONy: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PURSUIT AND DEFENSE 65, 70-74 (1988)
(discussing emerging appellate trend to curtail the abuse of short term alimony and to
award indefinite alimony after lengthy marriages). A number of states have recently
amended their divorce statutes to require courts, in awarding support and distributing
property, to take into account the extent to which one spouse "has reduced his or her
income or career opportunities for the benefit of the other spouse." ARIz. REV. STAT.
§ 25-319(B)(7)(1987); see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a)(5) (1986) (in evaluating
claim for spousal maintenance, court must consider any "reduced or lost lifetime earning
capacity of the party seeking maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed
education, training, employment or career opportunities during marriage"); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.105(1)(d)(F) (1988). Legal scholars have also begun to develop new theories
to support substantial post-divorce sharing of income. See, e.g., Ira M. Ellman, The
Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1989) (developing theory of alimony designed to
encourage sharing behavior in marriage by requiring compensation, at divorce, for loss
in earning capacity arising from such sharing behavior); June Carbone, Economics,
Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Elbman, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1463 (1990) (criticizing Ellman's analysis but endorsing restitution-based theory for
divorce-related financial allocations as a way of affirming both spouses' obligations to
contribute to the benefits that marriage makes possible); Rutheford, supra note 540;
Singer, supra note 2, at 1117-21 (proposing investment partnership model of mairiage to
justify substantial post-divorce sharing of income).
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such as providing stability, nurturance and a supportive environment for
raising children.
Focusing on these values, in turn, reveals the
shortcomings of a publicly ordered legal regime that denies recognition
to intimate relationships other than marriage that fulfill these same
familial functions.'
According legal recognition to such privately
chosen family forms thus becomes notmerely a means of expanding the
opportunities for private choice, but also a vehicle for better achieving the
public values that we, as a society, have identified as important.
IV. CONCLUSION

A preference for private over public ordering has characterized the
development of family law over the past quarter century. This preference
has encompassed both the substantive legal doctrines governing family
relations and the preferred procedures for resolving family disputes. The
shift from public to private ordering cannot be understood or evaluated
in isolation. This Article has therefore attempted to show how the
privatization of family law has been influenced by-and has contributed
to-related doctrinal and jurisprudential developments in a number of
other legal fields. By highlighting the connections between these related
legal developments and the privatization process, the Article has attempted
both to situate the privatization of family law in its broader doctrinal and
jurisprudential context and to underscore the connection between our legal
vision of the family, and the rules and assumptions that govern other
aspects of our legal culture.
In exploring the advantages and disadvantages of a more privatized
family law regime, this Article has also highlighted the dangers of
privatization-dangers that tend to be obscured by the neutral and selfaffirming rhetoric associated with private ordering of behavior. It has
done so not to advocate a return to some imagined golden age of family
law, but rather to contribute to the search for legal doctrines and
jurisprudential principles that recognize and affirm family relationships as
both a haven for individual self-expression and a vehicle for expressing
our most cherished public values.

572.

See generally Treuthart, supra note 44; Brown, supra note 44.
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